Muskat v. U.S.

37 Citing cases

  1. Merchia v. United States

    565 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2021)

    Under the variance doctrine, taxpayers may not raise claims for a refund that were not first presented in the administrative claim for a refund to the IRS. See Muskat v. United States , 554 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[A] claim or theory not explicitly or implicitly set forth in the taxpayer's administrative refund application cannot be broached for the first time in a court in which a subsequent refund suit is brought."). B. The Promissory Note .

  2. Cotto-Vázquez v. United States

    CIV. NO.: 16-2807 (SCC) (D.P.R. Mar. 11, 2021)

    Further, Mr. Arum's deposition testimony indicates that certain training and promotional activities took place in Puerto Rico. Lastly, the Court acknowledges the Government's reliance on the First Circuit's decision in Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2009). The Government points to Muskat for in the Amended Complaint, see Docket No. 26 at pgs.

  3. Stauffer v. Internal Revenue Serv.

    939 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    Accordingly, the court held that the statutory period for the filing of Carlton's 2006 tax refund claim was never tolled under § 6511(h)(1) and thus had expired in October 2010, which consequently deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the Estate's suit. See Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 194 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[A] district court has jurisdiction to adjudicate only those refund claims that have first been ‘duly filed’ with the Secretary of the Treasury." (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) )).

  4. Lawson v. U.S. Internal Revenue Servs.

    C.A. No. 15-499ML (D.R.I. Jul. 8, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    The exhaustion procedure is clearly laid out in the operative statutes and regulations, starting with the requirement in § 7422 that "a district court has jurisdiction to adjudicate only those refund claims that have first been 'duly filed' with the Secretary of the Treasury." Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 194 (1st Cir. 2009). To be "duly filed," the claim must be set forth in detail, made on the appropriate income tax return (sometimes an amended tax return) and filed with the service center serving the IRS district in which the tax was paid. 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6402-3(a)(1)-(2), 301.6402-2(a)(2), 301.6402-2(b)(1).

  5. Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP

    799 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2015)   Cited 104 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that publication of an EEOC determination could constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action

    Nor could we have overruled Wyatt's holding that reasonableness is not required for participation activity absent an en banc decision by this court. See Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir.2009). Consistent with the distinction set forth in Wyatt, for purposes of his participation clause claim the district court did not require Ray to demonstrate that his belief that Ropes had discriminated against him was reasonable.

  6. United States v. Soto

    799 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2015)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that defendant could be charged with multiple counts of identity theft because each count was supported by a different underlying felony

    This argument is easily dispensed with. “We have held, time and again, that in a multi-panel circuit, prior panel decisions are binding upon newly constituted panels in the absence of supervening authority [such as a new Supreme Court opinion or an en banc decision] sufficient to warrant disregard of established precedent.” Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir.1991) ). Steven points to no recent Supreme Court case or en banc opinion questioning Dessesaure, and thus it is binding.

  7. Sanchez v. United States

    740 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2014)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that the plaintiff's patent lack of diligence forecloses equitable tolling of FTCA claim

    Understandably, finding Gonzalez to be wrongly decided is precisely what plaintiff invites us to do. Departing from circuit precedent, however, can be justified only by “supervening authority” (such as a ruling of the Supreme Court or this Court en banc), Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir.2009), or “in those relatively rare instances in which authority that postdates the original decision, although not directly controlling, nevertheless offers a sound reason for believing that the former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective mind.” United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

  8. Recovery Group, Inc. v. C.I.R

    652 F.3d 122 (1st Cir. 2011)   Cited 10 times
    Stating court must apply plain and unambiguous meaning of statute unless it would lead to absurd results

    This incentive would have been balanced only by the stock seller-covenantor's preference for allocating purchase price to the assets sold (instead of the covenant), because he presumably would receive capital gain treatment (generally taxed at preferential rates) for his gain on the sale of the assets and would receive ordinary gain treatment for the consideration received under the covenant. See Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2009). In the context of stock acquisitions, however, the uncertainty — and consequently the possibility for much litigation between taxpayers and the IRS — caused by the inherent difficulty in valuing goodwill and going concern is generally present even where the purchased stock does not constitute a substantial portion of the corporation's total stock.

  9. United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez

    597 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2010)   Cited 58 times
    Rejecting defendant's argument that "the evidence, even if credited, shows him to be a freelance entrepreneur rather than a coconspirator"

    These exceptions center on situations involving supervening authority, such as "when the holding of a previous panel is contradicted by controlling authority, subsequently announced (say, a decision of the authoring court en banc, a Supreme Court opinion directly on point, or a legislative overruling)." Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2009). III.

  10. U.S. v. Platte

    577 F.3d 387 (1st Cir. 2009)   Cited 39 times
    Finding no clear error when drug quantity determination was "supported by a sensible (though not inevitable) view of the record"

    In a multi-panel circuit, on-point opinions of previous panels normally are binding on newly constituted panels. See Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446, 1449 (1st Cir. 1991). Although that rule admits of a few narrow exceptions (in the event, say, of an intervening Supreme Court decision or of a statutory overruling), there is no plausible basis for any exception here.