Accordingly, "[t]his framework places the initial burden of establishing a prime facie case of discrimination on the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that: (1) [she] is a member of protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for the position in question; (3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." Musante v. Mohawk Valley Comty. Coll. , 270 F. Supp. 3d 564, 577 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (citation omitted). "A plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case is de minimis. "
As explained supra, the McDonnell Douglas framework puts the initial burden on the plaintiff to make out a prima facie showing of discrimination by establishing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) who is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse job action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to a minimal inference of discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. See, e.g., Musante v. Mohawk Vall. Cmty. Coll., 270 F. Supp. 3d 564, 577 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).
"A discrimination claimant may show pretext by demonstrating such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." Musante v. Mohawk Vall. Comm. Coll., 270 F. Supp. 3d 564, 579 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Bombero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 196, 203 n. 7 (D. Conn. 2000)). Emmons's claim fails at this final step. Granica, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 77 ("In short, the question becomes whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a rational inference of discrimination.").
The McDonnell Douglas framework puts the initial burden on the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) who is qualified for his position; (3) he suffered an adverse job-related action; and (4) under circumstances that give rise to a minimal inference of discrimination on the basis of one or more of his protected characteristics. See, e.g., Musante v. Mohawk Vall. Cmty. Coll., 270 F.Supp.3d 564, 577 (N.D.N.Y. 2017). “The plaintiffs burden of proof as to this first step has been characterized as minimal and de minimis.”
Regarding Evans-Dame's Facebook activity that allegedly indicates gender discrimination, Carpenter points to only one instance where Evans-Dame commented “[s]o true” on an article entitled: “Barrack Obama: Women Ruling All Nations Would Improve ‘Everything.'” (Dkt. No. 111, Attach. 22 at 89-90.) With respect to his argument that Evans-Dame has “been sued for sexist discriminatory investigations” before, Carpenter cites to a case which never reached a merits-based conclusion. (Dkt. No. 118, Attach. 17 at 21 (citing Musante v. Mohawk Valley Cmty. Coll., 270 F.Supp.3d 564 (N.D.N.Y. 2017)). In support of his argument that a female employee who allegedly maintained “inappropriate boundaries with male students” and was not investigated, Carpenter cites his own deposition testimony wherein he stated that the only proof he had of such a relationship was “rumors,” he did not “know if the [rumors] were true or not,” and could not say whether Evans-Dame was aware of the allegedly inappropriate relationship.
The defendant is then entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces evidence "sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the defendant's employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." Walsh, 828 F.3d at 75 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995) (plaintiff need show only that "prohibited factor was at least one of the ‘motivating’ factors") (citations omitted); Musante v. Mohawk Valley Cmty. Coll., 270 F.Supp.3d 564 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) ("plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating [ ] weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37–38 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Pretext may be demonstrated [ ] by the presentation of additional evidence showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence, or by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more").After a careful review of the record, we conclude that CBS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mauze's discrimination claims, which we address in turn.