" The credibility and weight to be attributed to any evidence offered [at trial] is solely within the province of the jury." Murteza v. State, 7 Conn.App. 196, 208-09, 508 A.2d 449 (1986). Thus, the evidence at trial must be afforded the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entitled in support of the verdict.
"To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as [a] matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the general verdict was found; they must negative every reasonable hypothesis as to the situation provable under the issues made by the pleadings; and in determining that, the court may consider only the issues framed by the pleadings, the general verdict and the interrogatories, with the answers made to them, without resort to the evidence offered at the trial." Belchak v. New York, New Haven Hartford R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 634, 179 A. 95 (1935); see DeJesus v. Craftsman Machinery Co., 16 Conn. App. 558, 572, 548 A.2d 736 (1988); Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 201, 508 A.2d 449 (1986). "It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting answers in order to take the case away from the jury on a theory that gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences.
The evidence and record must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict which is reasonable. Kalleher v. Orr, supra, 127; Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 203, 508 A.2d 449 (1986)." Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 606, 525 A.2d 1332 (1987).
The trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict is entitled to great weight in our assessment of the claim that its decision is erroneous. Kalleher v. Orr, 183 Conn. 125, 126, 438 A.2d 843 (1981); Waldron v. Raccio, 166 Conn. 608, 618, 353 A.2d 770 (1974). The evidence and record must be given the most favorable construction in support of the verdict which is reasonable. Kalleher v. Orr, supra, 127; Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 203, 508 A.2d 449 (1986). The plaintiff's claim takes into account only one of the two valid defenses to a products liability action.
Decided May 28, 1986 The plaintiff's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 7 Conn. App. 196, is denied. Wesley W. Horton, in support of the petition.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 202, 508 A.2d 449, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 803, 510 A.2d 191 (1986). A jury's finding that a defendant was negligent in one or more respects as alleged in a complaint does not, in and of itself, mandate a finding that such negligence proximately caused the damages complained of. Id., 204.
¶ 34 Second, the three cases Holmstrom cites to support her position that proximate cause follows negligence are each factually distinguishable. See Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 106-09 (Ct.App. 1993) (involving traffic accident in which defendant completely obstructed plaintiff's lane, accident occurred entirely in plaintiff's lane, and plaintiff never left his lane of travel); Murteza v. State, 508 A.2d 449, 450-51, 453 (Conn.App.Ct. 1986) (involving traffic accident with no other cause but defendant's negligence; jury verdict still not overturned because damages not sufficiently proven); Rogers v. DiChristina, 600 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (App.Div. 1993) (involving two separate traffic accidents with two separate defendants, thus falling in multi-actor category of which Holmstrom speaks). ¶ 35 Finally, we were able to find three two-party traffic accident cases — including one from Utah — factually similar to the one at issue (i.e., not involving significant damages disputes; low-speed, rear-end collisions; pre-existing medical conditions; multiple actors; or substantial passage of time between the negligent act and the damages) in which the no-proximate-cause determination was upheld, despite the defendant's negligence.
"`To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as a matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the [general] verdict was found. . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449, 459, 612 A.2d 114 (1992); see Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 634, 179 A. 95 (1935); Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 201, 508 A.2d 449 (1986)." Bilodeau v. Bristol, supra, 38 Conn. App. 454.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Norwalk, 28 Conn. App. 449, 459, 612 A.2d 114 (1992); see Belchak v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 634, 179 A. 95 (1935); Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 201, 508 A.2d 449 (1986). Here, the trial court should not have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant because the jury's initial response to the interrogatories did not conclusively negate an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action.
"`To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as a matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the verdict was found . . . .'" (Emphasis added.) Murteza v. State, 7 Conn. App. 196, 201, 508 A.2d 449 (1986), quoting Belchak v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 119 Conn. 630, 634, 179 A. 95 (1935); see also DeJesus v. Craftsman Machinery Co., 16 Conn. App. 558, 548 A.2d 736 (1988). In this case, the court could not have directed a verdict for the defendant because the jury's initial responses to the interrogatories did not conclusively negate an essential element of the plaintiff's claim.