Opinion
6:24-cv-6-CEM-LHP
07-31-2024
STEPHEN LYNCH MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. JANELLE IRWIN TAYLOR, PETER D. SCHORSCH and EXTENSIVE ENTERPRISES MEDIA, LLC, Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LESLIE HOFFMAN PRICE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
MOTION: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Doc. No. 18)
FILED: March 18, 2024
THEREON it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff Stephen Lynch Murray, appearing pro se, filed a complaint against Defendants Janelle Irwin Taylor, Peter D. Schorsch, and Extensive Enterprises Media, LLC (“EEM”). Doc. No. 1. The complaint is two hundred and fifty-eight (258) pages and 798 numbered paragraphs long. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, via claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶ 740-41.
Plaintiff also suggests the Court may have supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) “if protection against defamation is a right ordinarily provided in Florida.” Doc. No. 1, ¶ 741.
As best the undersigned can tell, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor wrote an article published by Defendant Schorsch on a website owned by EEM, the contents of which discussed Plaintiff's arrest for the alleged cyberstalking of a spouse of a Florida legislator and sending vulgar and threatening emails about the spouse to multiple government officials. Id. ¶¶ 166-173, 354-81. Plaintiff further alleges that, after emailing Defendant Schorsch to request altering portions of the article, and Defendant Schorsch's rejection of that request, Plaintiff sued Defendants in state court arguing the article was defamatory. Id. ¶¶ 371-413. Plaintiff then alleges his civil complaint against Defendants was dismissed and that he initiated another lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida. Id. ¶ ¶ 414-37, 453, 462.
In addition to these allegations, Plaintiff spends a large portion of his complaint discussing various tangential issues that are not set forth in any logical fashion and do not appear to relate to any specific claim for relief. See, e.g., Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 221-330 (subsections of the complaint entitled “The Voter is the Designed Regulator of Due Process in Florida,” “Why Governance of Due Process was Handed to Voters,” “Political Communication is the Transcript for Review of Due Process,” and “Internet Quorum Stronger than Law”); ¶¶ 331-40 (a discussion of the definition of the word “fair”).
Plaintiff identifies three causes of action in his complaint: “Stigma Plus a Protected Interest” (Count I); “Plus Deprived of Political Speech” (Count II); “Plus Deprived of Due Process” (Count III), and lists the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. No. 1, at 1; ¶¶ 748-93. Plaintiff also lists the “Ku Klux Klan Act 42 USC 1983,” and cites throughout the complaint to cases from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See generally Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff requests as relief that an injunction be imposed barring Defendants from posting articles or speaking in public about Plaintiff again, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id., at 256-57.
On March 18, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 18. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible claims for relief, the complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading, and to the extent any claims can be identified, they are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition. Doc. No. 19. The matter is therefore ripe for consideration and was referred to the undersigned for issuance of a Report and Recommendation.
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned will respectfully recommend that Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 18) be granted in part, and that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed as a shotgun pleading with leave to amend.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so as to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). In addition, “Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each claim be separated into separate counts and supported by distinct factual allegations.” Bagley v. City of Tampa, No. 8:07-cv-218-T-27EAJ, 2007 WL 9723949, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b)). Although a court must accept as true well pleaded allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). For purposes of this analysis, exhibits attached to the complaint are “part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). See also Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[D]ocuments attached to a complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference can generally be considered by a federal court in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).
“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.'” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings generally present in one of four ways: (1) a complaint “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that fails to separate “into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4) complaints containing “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1321-23. Each of these types of pleadings fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
A pro se complaint should be construed leniently, but a court does not have “license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. v. Cty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. See also Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 281 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[L]iberal construction is not the same thing as wholesale redrafting.”). Pro se parties must comply with the minimum pleading standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. Nawab v. LVNV Funding LLC, No. 5:12-cv-129-Oc-10PRL, 2012 WL 12918283, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2012); see also Arrington v. Green, 757 Fed.Appx. 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018) (“We construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Nevertheless, we ‘have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.'”) (citing Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003), and quoting Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018)).
III. ANALYSIS
As noted above, Plaintiff's complaint largely consists of lengthy narratives on a variety of topics with no clear relation to any specific claims for relief. See Doc. No. 1. Simply put, it is impossible for the undersigned - and in turn Defendants - to ascertain the factual or legal basis for any of the claims Plaintiff purports to assert.
Accordingly, the undersigned agrees with Defendants and finds that the complaint constitutes the first, second, and forth types of shotgun pleading. The complaint is the first type of shotgun pleading as it nowhere identifies which factual allegations relate to which claim, thus leaving the undersigned and the Defendants to presume that every single factual allegations has been incorporated into all three claims. See Harris v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., No. 6:17-cv-2140-Orl-40DCI, 2019 WL 13272268, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2019) (dismissing amended complaint where each count incorporated by reference the exact same factual allegations, and the second of which incorporated all of the facts from the preceding count).
Plaintiff's complaint is also the second type of shotgun pleading because it is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. Plaintiff's complaint includes over two hundred and fifty pages of factual statements, narrative arguments, and legal conclusions regarding Defendants' publication of an article about Plaintiff's arrest without ever clearly connecting any allegations to a specific cause of action beyond conclusory references to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and certain case law regarding defamation. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff's complaint thus constitutes the second type of shotgun pleading. See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court's dismissal of complaint as second type of shotgun pleading where complaint was “rife with immaterial factual allegations, including five pages and 24 paragraphs of irrelevant details about the alleged criminal backgrounds of some of the defendants.”).
And the complaint constitutes the fourth type of shotgun pleading, as the pleading was brought against three (3) different Defendants, yet nowhere describes which Defendant is responsible for any of the claims Plaintiff raises. The vast majority of Plaintiff's complaint simply states “Defendants” engaged in the range of conduct Plaintiff alleges. See Doc. No. 1. And EEM is only mentioned by name in the body of complaint where Plaintiff provides EEM's principal place of business, nowhere else. Id. ¶ 739. Plaintiff's complaint thus fails to specify which Defendant is responsible for which acts or which claims are alleged against which Defendants. See Smith v. Knipe, No . 6:23-cv-1718-WWB-LHP, 2024 WL 988853, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:23-cv-1718-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 1619412 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2024) (dismissing complaint as the fourth type of shotgun pleading where the complaint “routinely refers to the actions of ‘Defendants' in detailing the copyright infringement that allegedly occurred during the trial in the defamation litigation against Plaintiff, without delineating the roles or alleged wrongs attributable to each of the eight named Defendants.”); N.J.H. v. 2Infnity Fla. LLC, No. 8:18-cv-2093-EAK-CPT, 2019 WL 5394205, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2019) (dismissing complaint as a shotgun pleading where it asserts “multiple theories of recovery against multiple Defendants without specifying which Defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions or which Defendant each claim is brought against.”).
In sum, the organization and drafting of Plaintiff's complaint prevents the undersigned from ascertaining whether any viable claims for relief exist against any specific Defendant. The complaint clearly does not contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), so as to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Sbrocco v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Se., No. 2:19-cv-59-FtM-99UAM, 2019 WL 2211112, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2019) (concluding the plaintiff's complaint “is a quintessential shotgun pleading as it is a narrative that fails to state the allegations in numbered paragraphs, fails to set forth concise statements of the facts, and is vague and conclusory.”).
Because the undersigned recommends dismissal of the complaint as a shotgun pleading, the undersigned will further recommend that dismissal on the substantive grounds listed in Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 18) is not warranted at this time. SeeMagluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (directing district court to dismiss complaint with leave to amend, and declining to “decide whether some of [plaintiff's] claims were subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), leaving for another day a decision about other claims following repleader on remand,” because such “[p]iecemeal adjudication . . . does not promote judicial efficiency.”); Ally v. Hous. Auth. of City of Orlando, Fla., No. 6:20-cv-1518-WWB-LRH, 2021 WL 2446760, at *4 & n.5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2446712 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2021) (finding Rule 12(b)(6) arguments premature and declining to address them when the shotgun complaint was due to be repleaded (citing Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284)); Alvarez v. Lakeland Area Mass. Transit Dist., No. 8:19-cv-1044-T-33SPF, 2019 WL 2868943, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2019) (“Because the [Amended] Complaint is a shotgun complaint, repleader is necessary and the Court need not delve into the merits of the claims at this juncture.” (quoting Madak v. Nocco, No. 8:18-cv-2665-T-33AEP, 2018 WL 6472337, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2018))). Given the shotgun nature of the complaint, the undersigned is also unable to ascertain at this juncture whether any claims are precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Otero v. Newrez LLC, No. 6:21-cv-118-PGB-DCI, 2021 WL 3017856, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2021) (dismissing complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading with leave to amend, and declining to address at that time defendant's substantive grounds for dismissal, which included res judicata, statute of limitations, collateral estoppel, and litigation privilege).
Generally speaking, the doctrine of res judicata precludes “a subsequent claim when a court of competent jurisdiction entered a final judgment on the merits of the same cause of action in a prior lawsuit between the same parties.” Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1998). Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel holds that “once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Because Plaintiff's complaint is a shotgun pleading, the undersigned cannot discern at this time whether and to what extent Plaintiff is raising claims, facts, or legal issues that were actually raised or could have been raised in the prior judicial proceedings mentioned in Defendants' motion. See Doc. No. 18, at 9-11.
Because Plaintiff's Complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading, and in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, dismissal of the Complaint, with an opportunity to replead, is appropriate. See Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In dismissing a shotgun complaint for noncompliance with Rule 8(a), a district court must give the plaintiff one chance to remedy such deficiencies.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Sifford v. Ford, 701 Fed.Appx. 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Generally, a district court must sua sponte provide a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend his complaint, even where the plaintiff did not request leave to amend.” (citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002))). See also Ally, 2021 WL 2446760, at *4 (granting in part motion to dismiss and striking pro se complaint as second type of shotgun pleading with leave to replead); Cummings v. Cameron, No. 6:17-cv-1897-Orl-41DCI, 2018 WL 7351719, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2018) (striking and dismissing with leave to amend shotgun complaint because the “rambling and, at times, incomprehensible allegations make it extremely difficult to determine whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief.”); SCCY Indus., LLC v. Jannuzzo, No. 6:17-cv-1495-Orl-31KRS, 2018 WL 8344812, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2018) (dismissing complaint as first type of shotgun pleading with leave to replead); Burgeson v. Collier Cty., No. 2:09-cv-220-FtM-36DNF, 2010 WL 11506949, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2010) (dismissing counts of complaint as both first and third types of shotgun pleading with leave to replead); Pyatt v. Gimenez, No. 1:20-CV-20827, 2020 WL 4003495, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020) (dismissing complaint with leave to replead where it “suffer[ed] from the second and fourth ‘sins' of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants is responsible for which acts or omissions and of alleging conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”).
Should Plaintiff be permitted leave to amend, Plaintiff is cautioned that in an amended complaint, he must only include factual allegations stating a plausible claim for relief, which requires him to “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Therefore, in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly allege the legal basis of the cause of action, whether a constitutional provision, treaty, statute, or common law. Plaintiff must name as Defendants only those persons who are responsible for the alleged violations. Plaintiff must allege in the body of the complaint, under a section entitled “Statement of Facts,” how each named Defendant participated in the activity that allegedly violated his rights. Plaintiff must also allege some causal connection between each Defendant named and the injury he allegedly sustained. One generally cannot be held liable for the actions and/or omissions of others, but can only be held responsible if he or she participated in the deprivation of a person's rights or directed such action and/or omission that resulted in such deprivation. Plaintiff must also specifically allege harm or injury by the actions and/or omissions of the Defendant(s).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Logan, he must allege “(1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). And because Defendants appears to be private actors and not government employees or officers, Plaintiff must also allege that “(1) the State has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution (‘State compulsion test'); (2) the private parties performed a public function that was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State (‘public function test'); or (3) ‘the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private parties] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.' (‘nexus/joint action test').” Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting NBC, Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 1988)). See also Wilson v. Dollar-Thrifty Auto Grp.- S. Fla. Transp., 286 F. App'x. 640, 641-42 (11th Cir.2008).
Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit are cited as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
Because Plaintiff is currently proceeding without a lawyer, the undersigned directs his attention to the Court's website, http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov. On the Court's homepage, Plaintiff can find basic information and resources for parties who are proceeding without a lawyer in a civil case by clicking on the “For Litigants” tab and then clicking on “Litigants without Lawyers.”
III. RECOMMENDATION.
For the reasons discussed herein, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the Court:
1. GRANT in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. No. 18);
2. DISMISS the complaint as a shotgun pleading (Doc. No. 1);
3. PERMIT Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, within a time established by the Court; and
4. DENY without prejudice Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 18) in all other respects.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from the date the Report and Recommendation is served to serve and file written objections to the Report and Recommendation's factual findings and legal conclusions. Failure to serve written objections waives that party's right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.