Murray v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. Cosby v. Jumper Creek Drainage Dist

    3 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1941)   Cited 2 times
    In Cosby v. Jumper Creek Drainage District, 1941, 147 Fla. 705, 3 So.2d 356, suit was brought to foreclose delinquent assessments.

    " The validity of Chapter 8888, Special Acts of 1921, creating a road district situated in Clay County, Florida, and authorizing special assessments and the issuance of bonds for the construction of the road therein named, was involved in the case of Paul Brothers v. Long Branch L. S. R. B. Dist., 93 Fla. 706, 92 So. 687, and the Act was held arbitrary and oppressive as a tax burden on property of small or limited value, when this Court in part said: "Even if Chapter 8888 does not contain distinct and unrelated provisions upon more than one subject and matter properly connected therewith in violation of Section 16, Article III, of the Constitution, and does not violate Sections 20 and 21, Article III of the Constitution in the provisions regulating the practice of courts of justice, if not also in other provisions, it is obvious that the essential provisions of the Act are so arbitrary and oppressive as tax burdens upon property of small value considered with reference to the multiplied enormous special assessment authorized to be made against it, as that the statute is a palpable abuse of the police and taxation powers of the State that will inevitably deprive the landowners of their property in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. This makes the entire Act invalid and unenforceable."

  2. Fitch v. State

    135 Fla. 361 (Fla. 1938)   Cited 33 times
    Containing an annotation on the effect of the distinction between custody and possession

    In the case of Jarvis v. State, 73 Fla. 652, 74 So. 796, it was held that one who obtains the possession of property by trick, device or fraud, with the intent to appropriate the same to his own use, the owner intending to part with the possession only, commits larceny when he subsequently appropriates it; that "the consent of the owner in surrendering possession of the property must be as broad as the taking." To like effect see Murray v. State, 93 Fla. 706, 112 So. 575. But there is a strong line of authorities in support of the proposition that at common law one who was merely the custody of a chattel, as distinguished from its possession, is guilty of larceny if, with felonious intent, he converts it to his own use, regardless of the fact whether the custody was acquired lawfully or unlawfully, or whether the intent to convert was formed at the time the custody was acquired or afterwards.

  3. Skipper v. State

    114 Fla. 312 (Fla. 1934)   Cited 16 times

    See Tipton v. State, 53 Fla. 69, 43 So.2d Rep. 684. The statute is discussed in Dwyer v. State, 93 Fla. 777, 112 So.2d Rep. 62; Murray v. State, 93 Fla. 706, 112 South Rep. 575; Thomas v. State, 36 Fla. 109, 18 So.2d Rep. 331; Neal v. State, 55 Fla. 140, 46 So.2d Rep. 845. If the offense under the statute is alleged in a general way as our statute permits a bill of particulars is proper to be furnished.

  4. McKinley v. State

    102 Fla. 632 (Fla. 1931)   Cited 8 times

    If the defendant had been indicted for grand larceny and the jury had found him guilty, upon the state of facts which were developed at the trial of this case, and upon the theory that he obtained possession of the money by trick, device or fraud, with the intent to appropriate such property to his own use, we would not be disposed to disturb the verdict. Murray vs. State, 93 Fla. 706, 112 So. 575; 17 R. C. L. 13-15. The burden was upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element necessary to constitute the crime of embezzlement namely: (1) that the thing converted or appropriated was of such a character as to be within the protection of the statute; (2) that it belonged to the master or principal or someone other than accused; (3) that it was in the possession of accused at the time of the conversion so that no trespass was committed in taking it; (4) that accused occupied the designated fiduciary relation, and that the property came into his possession and was held by him by virtue of his employment or office; (5) that his dealing with the property constituted a conversion or appropriation of the same; and (6) that there was a fraudulent intent to deprive the owner of his property.

  5. Cross v. State

    237 So. 2d 324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 3 times

    Lastly, even if the old distinction between larceny and embezzlement existed with respect to the time the intent was formed to unlawfully convert the property to the possession of the accused, the verdicts should still be upheld. This is so because such issue, under the facts of the instant cases, would have been a question for the jury in each instance. Murray v. State, 1927, 93 Fla. 706, 112 So. 575. The three judgments of conviction are severally affirmed.

  6. Casso v. State

    182 So. 2d 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 31 times
    Recognizing that "[a]ll former distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and obtaining money or other property by false representations" were "abolished by statute and are now merged into the one offense of larceny" and citing the version of section 811.021, Florida Statutes (dealing with larceny and other related offenses), that was in effect at the time relevant to the 1966 opinion

    One obtaining personal property by trick, device, or fraud, intending to appropriate it, is guilty of "larceny" on subsequent appropriation. Murray v. State, 93 Fla. 706, 112 So. 575; McKinley v. State, 102 Fla. 632, 136 So. 380; Finlayson v. State, 46 Fla. 81, 35 So. 203; Knight v. State, Fla. 1950, 46 So.2d 497. A person is guilty of larceny who gets possession of money of another by means of fraud or trickery with the preconceived purpose to appropriate the money to his own use, on the theory that the fraud vitiates the consent of the owner who is held to retain constructive possession up to the time of conversion by the taker. Mehr v. State, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 259.