"We think the rule which comports with justice is that he who removes a party wall or a wall in which his neighbor has the right of support for his own legitimate purposes, where such wall is sufficient to support the presently existing buildings, is not in such removal an insurer against injury to his neighbor or under absolute duty to avoid injury to the latter, but he must use the highest possible care to prevent and avoid such injury which may be caused as the natural and proximate result of his building operations.* * *" See generally Bradbee v. Christ's Hospital, 4 M. G. 714, 134 Eng.Rep. 294 (1842); Brooks v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 639, 10 Am.Rep. 545; Carroll Blake Const. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 203 S.W. 945; Cartwright v. Adair, 27 Ind. App. 293, 61 N.E. 240; J.C. Penney Co. v. McCarthy, 93 Ind. App. 609, 176 N.E. 637; Murray v. Patterson, 18 Tenn. App. 30, 72 S.W.2d 558. See also the view presented in 2 Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., pp. 378, 379:

By alleging both general negligence and specific acts of negligence in her complaint plaintiff did not waive the right to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is well settled law in this state in a case where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable the plaintiff does not lose the benefit of it by alleging specific acts of negligence which she fails to prove. Oliver v. Union Transfer Co., 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S.W.2d 478 (1934); Murray v. Patterson, 18 Tenn. App. 30, 72 S.W.2d 558 (1934); South-eastern Aviation v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962); Nashville Interurban Ry. Co. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 193 S.W. 1053 (1917). In considering defendants' motion for a directed verdict the Trial Court was required to look to all the evidence, to take as true the evidence for plaintiff, to discard all countervailing evidence, to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence for plaintiff, to allow all reasonable inferences from it in her favor; and if then there is any dispute as to any material determinative evidence, or any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from the whole evidence, the motion must be denied.

The answer of defendant Clopton simply denies the material allegations of the complainants' bill with respect to any negligence in tearing down the wall of the defendants' building and denies that any damage to the wall of complainants' building had resulted from his operations. The Chancellor found that there was no party wall between these buildings and, with the finding that there was no party wall, that the rule of Murray v. Patterson, 18 Tenn. App. 30, 72 S.W.2d 558 is not applicable and the defendants were not insurors. The Chancellor further noted in his opinion that the complainants contended that they had an easement by prescription in said wall, but found that the proof did not meet the requirements as set forth in Nashville Trust Company v. Evans, 30 Tenn. App. 415; 206 S.W.2d 911, and that, therefore, there was no prescriptive easement.

The Court failed to see any reason for a distinction, saying that the rule of Anderson v. Miller applied in either case "even if there be any real distinction between the value of the bridge when it was destroyed or the cost of its restoration to the condition it was in when it was destroyed". Murray v. Patterson, 18 Tenn. App. 30, 72 S.W.2d 558, 564, was an action for injuries to a building resulting from the collapse of a party wall. It was held that since the cost of restoration of the building would have been more than the depreciation in value, the true rule for measuring the damages "was the difference between the value of her premises immediately prior to the injury and the value immediately after the injury — in other words, the depreciation in value resulting from the injury", citing Aycock v. Nashville, Chattanooga St. L. Railway Co., supra. We think the Court was correct in instructing the jury that in arriving at the difference between the value of the premises immediately before and after the fire they could take into consideration the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its former condition allowing for depreciation. McCormick on Damages, 483, Sec. 126; 4 Sutherland on Damages, 2967, Sec. 1015; see, Southern Oil Works v. Bickford, 82 Tenn. 651, 656; Note, 7 A.L.R. 277, 281.

See Appendix to 155 Tennessee Reports, page XII. The Supreme Court has the same Rules. Appendix to 155 Tennessee Reports, page V. Hence, if appellants' fourth assignment purported, by its terms, to be an assignment that the Chancellor erred in admitting evidence over objection, it fails to "quote the full substance of the evidence admitted" as required by the Rule above quoted. References to pages of the record, without a quotation of the evidence, or a full statement of its substance, is not a sufficient compliance with the Rule. Wood v. Green, 131 Tenn. 583, 175 S.W. 1139; State ex rel. v. Collier, 160 Tenn. 403, 423, 23 S.W.2d 897; Dacus v. Knoxville Outfitting Company, 9 Tenn. App. 683, 690; Edgington v. Kansas City, M. B. Railroad Company, 10 Tenn. App. 685, 690; Murray v. Patterson, 18 Tenn. App. 30, 35, 72 S.W.2d 558. We may add that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record tending to show that there is error in the figures given by Mr. Goodloe on which the Chancellor based the finding quoted in appellants' fourth assignment of error; hence there is no reason to suppose that the appellants will suffer any real injustice from their failure to obtain an investigation by this Court of the technical admissibility of such evidence.