Opinion
No. CV 10-6003197S
August 23, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The appellant, Paul Murray, was a Connecticut state employee who held positions within the Division of Criminal Justice from 1976 to 2009. From June 1976 until June 15, 2003, he served in various capacities as a state's attorney. On June 15, 2003, he was appointed as the Deputy Chief State's Attorney for Operations — a position he held until his retirement in 2009. The positions he held from 1976 until 2003 are covered by the State Employees Retirement System (SERS), codified as General Statutes § 5-152 and colloquially known as "Chapter 66." The position of Deputy Chief State's Attorney for Operations is covered by the State's Attorney's Retirement System (SARS), codified as General Statutes § 51-287. Up until he was appointed to Deputy Chief State's Attorney, Murray had accumulated 649.75 hours of sick time. He did not, nor could he not, accrue sick time while he was Deputy Chief State's Attorney for Operations.
When Murray retired in 2009, he requested to the appellee, the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services (DAS), payment of this accrued sick time pursuant to General Statutes § 5-247. His request was subsequently denied.
Murray appeals the decision of the DAS to this court. He maintains that the DAS "cannot deny [him] of benefits to which he is clearly entitled pursuant to statute." His contention is that he had the requisite age and years of service to be statutorily entitled for a full retirement payout, including his accrued sick time, pursuant to Chapter 66. This right, he argues, cannot be eliminated because he was appointed Deputy Chief State's Attorney for Operations.
The DAS maintains that it properly denied Murray his accrued sick time because Murray did not retire pursuant to Chapter 66. The DAS argues that the language of General Statutes § 5-247 only allows for the payment of accrued sick leave to a current employee who receives sick leave accruals as of their last day on the active payroll who "retires — in other words, leaves state service and immediately begins receiving retirement benefits — under Chapter 66 of [SERS]." Since the position of Deputy Chief State's Attorney is not entitled to sick time, the DAS argues that Murray did not retire pursuant to Chapter 66 because he was not accruing sick time up until he left state service in 2009.
The ultimate duty for this court is to determine, in view of all the evidence, "whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion." Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, 296 Conn. 594, 598-99, 996 A.2d 729 (2010). As to questions of law, courts "do not defer to [an agency's] construction of a statute . . . when . . . the [provisions] at issue previously ha[v]e not been subject to judicial scrutiny or when the [agency's] interpretation has not been time tested." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Christopher R. v. Commissioner of Mental Retardation, 277 Conn. 594, 603, 893 A.2d 431 (2006). Where an agency can only point to two isolated cases that support its interpretation, that interpretation is not "time tested." Id. at 603, n. 9; cf City of Hartford v. Hartford Municipal Employees Assn., 259 Conn. 251, 268, 788 A.2d 60 (2002) (deferring to interpretation of a board to resolve possible ambiguity when board had presented evidence of consistent interpretation of a statute for more than twenty-five years).
Here, the agency can only point to two interpretations of § 5-247 by the Attorney General, both of which were not subject to judicial scrutiny. Therefore this issue is not sufficiently time tested to be afforded judicial deference and this court's review is plenary. Accord Dept. of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relations, supra 296 Conn. 600.
"When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . ." Id. at 599-600. This court's primary guide as to the issue of statutory interpretation "is the language of the operative statutory provisions." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nagy v. Employees' Review Board, 249 Conn. 693, 702-03, 735 A.2d 297 (1999).
General Statutes § 5-247 states in relevant part that
[e]ach appointing authority shall grant, on account of illness or injury, to each full-time employee in a permanent position in the state service who has furnished satisfactory proof of such illness or injury, such sick leave with pay as has accrued to his credit at the rate of one and one-quarter working days for each completed calendar month of continuous full-time service which may be computed on an hourly basis. Hourly computation of sick leave shall not diminish benefit entitlement. On or before October 1, 1980, the Commissioner of Administrative Services shall adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54, concerning the accrual, prorating and granting of sick leave with pay to other employees in the state service and extending sick leave with pay or with part pay for longer periods to full-time permanent employees disabled through illness or injury. Each such employee who retires under the provisions of chapter 66 shall be compensated, effective as of the date of his retirement, at the rate of one-fourth of such employee's salary for sick leave accrued to his credit as of his last day on the active payroll up to a maximum payment equivalent to sixty days' pay Such payment for accumulated sick leave shall not be included in computing retirement income and shall be charged by the State Comptroller to the department, agency or institution in which the employee worked.
Chapter 66, § 5-162(b)(1) states that one's "retirement date" is the "date on which a member retires from state service."
(Emphasis added.)
Murray did not retire under the provisions of Chapter 66. He left state service as the Deputy Chief State's Attorney of Operations — a position not covered by Chapter 66 and a position that cannot accrue sick leave "as of the last day on the active payroll." Furthermore, if Murray had retired pursuant to Chapter 66, he would have been unable to retire under SARS. Pursuant to § 5-164a(c), but for three exceptions which do not apply here, anyone who retires under Chapter 66 cannot receive retirement benefits if they reenter state service. If Murray had "retired" under Chapter 66 and wanted to receive retirement benefits under that statute, he could have only worked part-time as a deputy chief state's attorney and would have been unable to collect retirement benefits under SARS. However, Murray did work full-time as a deputy chief state's attorney and claims that he is fully entitled to all the benefits under the SARS retirement program.
One exception under section 5-164a(c) allows a state employee to earn retirement income if they reenter state service only on the condition that they works ninety days out of the year. If Murray elected this option, he would have been ineligible for retirement benefits under SARS because he would not have worked full time.
Although Murray maintains that he was statutorily entitled to his accrued sick leave, he failed to meet the statutory requirement that he must retire pursuant to Chapter 66. Since he did not do so, his statutory right is nonexistent.
The decision of the DAS was reasonable and not illegal, not an abuse of discretion, and not arbitrary or capricious. The court affirms the decision of the DAS.