Because that order was non-final while Worker's claim for benefits was pending, Worker properly and timely appealed the WCJ's HCP decision following the entry of the compensation order after the formal hearing. See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 ("[A]n order regarding a change of healthcare provider (HCP) is not a final, appealable order when a claim for benefits is pending before the Workers' Compensation Administration (WCA)."); Rule 12-321 NMRA ("To preserve an issue for review, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked."). {6} Turning to Worker's argument that Employer/Insurer made the initial HCP selection in this case, "Section 52-1-49(B) provides that the employer has the first opportunity either to select the initial HCP or to allow the worker to select [a] HCP of his or her choice."
Id. 1984-NMCA-093, ¶ 7; see Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 7, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (observing that "piecemeal appeals are disfavored" and that "fragmentation of issues is to be avoided"). "The general rule in New Mexico for determining the finality of a judgment is that an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact have been determined and the case disposed of by the trial court to the fullest extent possible."
Id. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by Worker's argument that all issues were fully resolved. {4} In light of our strong policy of avoiding piecemeal appeals, see generally Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 7, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (observing that "piecemeal appeals are disfavored; [and] fragmentation of issues is to be avoided"), we are of the opinion that it would be both inappropriate and imprudent to hear an immediate appeal from the compensation order at this time. To the extent that Worker is concerned that the outstanding evaluations may not result in any changes to the compensation order and he may lose his right to appeal, [MIO 3-6] we point out that the law of the case doctrine would apply to this Court's conclusion regarding finality.
{2} Our notice relied on case law directly applicable to Worker's appeal, holding that "an order regarding a change of healthcare provider (HCP) is not a final, appealable order when a claim for benefits is pending before the Workers' Compensation Administration (WCA)." Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 1, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (citing Kellewood v. BHP Minerals Int'l., 1993-NMCA-148, ¶¶ 5-11, 116 N.M. 678, 866 P.2d 406). In the current case, Worker filed the complaint for benefits long before the change in HCP, and the complaint is pending. [RP 1-2] We also explained that the collateral order doctrine does not apply such orders to permit immediate appeal because changes to HCPs can be reviewed on appeal from final compensation orders and rulings regarding HCPs are often intertwined with the progress and outcome of workers' compensation cases.
"As to the determination of benefits, [Section] 52-1-28 . . ., sets forth the elements necessary to prove a compensable claim" for workers' compensation. Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006- NMCA-008, ¶ 8, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173. Section 52-1-28(A)(1) provides that "[c]laims for workers' compensation shall be allowed only . . . when the worker has sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment[.]"
{2} In our notice of proposed disposition, we explained that, because Worker has not yet reached MMI and the new evaluation sought by Employer may result in a finding that Worker has now reached MMI, the workers' compensation IME order permitting the six-month evaluation is "intertwined with issues relating to benefits[.]" [CN 2-3] See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶¶ 1, 15, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (holding that an order allowing a change in healthcare provider is not a final, appealable order when a claim for benefits is pending before the workers' compensation administration); cf. Flores v. J.B. Henderson Constr., 2003-NMCA-116, ¶¶ 5, 7-8, 134 N.M. 364, 76 P.3d 1121 (holding that the workers' compensation judge's order allowing a periodic examination by a non-healthcare provider is final and appealable because the order fully disposed of all the issues before the workers' compensation judge). We therefore proposed to conclude that the IME order was not final and appealable because it could result in piecemeal appeals.
Father provides no record citations to support his allegations or authority for his argument that these events met the standard required to change the parties' time-sharing agreement. See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 ("Absent a record, we are left with the arguments in the briefs, and argument of counsel is not evidence."); Benavidez v. Benavidez, 2006-NMCA-138, ¶ 23, 140 N.M. 637, 145 P.3d 117 (refusing to address challenges to a district court's findings when the challenges are not supported by relevant and specific reasons and do not explain why the evidence relating to the finding is insufficient). Moreover, Father's assertion that some of the evidence supporting his allegations was excluded as hearsay evidence is not an assertion that the evidence supporting the district court's judgment is not sufficient.
Instead, the statements can be interpreted many different ways, including the possibility that they are the result of juror discussions regarding the weaknesses of Plaintiffs' case, and Plaintiffs have failed to point this Court to anything in the record that would indicate otherwise. See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006–NMCA–008, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 (“Absent a record, we are left with the arguments in the briefs, and argument of counsel is not evidence.”). {53} On the contrary, to support their argument that these statements reflect a jury member's immutable opinion, Plaintiffs point to permissible discussions of the evidence presented by the parties at trial.
Instead, the statements can be interpreted many different ways, including the possibility that they are the result of juror discussions regarding the weaknesses of Plaintiffs' case, and Plaintiffs have failed to point this Court to anything in the record that would indicate otherwise. See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 ("Absent a record, we are left with the arguments in the briefs, and argument of counsel is not evidence."). {53} On the contrary, to support their argument that these statements reflect a jury member's immutable opinion, Plaintiffs point to permissible discussions of the evidence presented by the parties at trial.
We will not search the record or applicable case law for the benefit of Defendants. See Murphy v. Strata Prod. Co., 2006-NMCA-008, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 809, 126 P.3d 1173 ("Absent a record, we are left with the arguments in the briefs, and argument of counsel is not evidence."); See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 ("We will not search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized arguments."); Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argument that relied on several factual assertions that were made without citation to the record); In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (explaining that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists).