Opinion
Civil Action 1:22-00018-KD-N
07-14-2022
RODNEY J. MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
KATHERINE P. NELSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Rodney J. Murphy, who is proceeding without counsel (pro se) and in forma pauperis, initiated this action on December 6, 2021, by filing a complaint with the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. See (Doc. 1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. On January 12, 2022, that district court ordered the action transferred to this Court. (See Doc. 7). Following transfer, Murphy filed a motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 10), along with an amended complaint dated April 11, 2022 (Doc. 11).
The assigned District Judge has referred said motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a). See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (electronic reference notation entered 4/14/2022).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a “party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within[,] if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. 15(a)(1)(B). “Here, [Murphy] had not previously amended [his] complaint and the [Defendants] had not filed a responsive pleading. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), [Murphy] could have amended [his] complaint as a matter of course. Instead, [he] filed an unnecessary motion to amend, with the proposed amendments attached.” Coventry First, LLC v. McCarty, 605 F.3d 865, 869 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). When a counseled party, within the time to amend as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1), instead chooses to file a motion to amend, that party “waive[s] the right to amend as a matter of course and ... invite[s] the District Court to review its proposed amendments.” Id. at 869-70. However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that this rule does not apply to pro se parties. See id. at 870 n.2 (“Our conclusion is not inconsistent with Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004), in which we held that the district court abused its discretion by denying a motion to amend a complaint before any responsive pleading had been filed. There, the plaintiff was pro se.”); Toenniges v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 502 Fed.Appx. 888, 889 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“In Coventry First, we held that a plaintiff waives the right to amend his complaint as a matter of course if he chooses to file a motion to amend instead of filing the amended complaint as a matter of course. [605 F.3d] at 869-70. However, we distinguished Brown because the plaintiff in Brown was pro se. Id. at 870 n. 2. Applying this distinction here, Toenniges, proceeding pro se, did not waive his right to amend as a matter of course merely because he filed a motion to amend instead of amending as a matter of course.”); Hoke v. Lyle, 716 Fed.Appx. 930, 931 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[A] pro se plaintiff (unlike a counseled party) does not waive his right to amend as a matter of course by seeking the court's leave to amend.” (citing Coventry First, 605 F.3d at 870 n.2)). And “[w]hen the plaintiff has the right to file an amended complaint as a matter of course, ... the plain language of Rule 15(a) shows that the court lacks the discretion to reject the amended complaint based on its alleged futility.” Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1292 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, because Murphy's amended complaint dated April 11, 2022 (Doc. 11), was filed as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1), his accompanying motion for leave to amend (Doc. 10) is MOOT. The amended complaint (Doc. 11) is now the current operative pleading in this action, and supersedes the original complaint (Doc.1).
The Court emphasizes that Rule 15(a)(1) only allows a party to amend his pleading “once as a matter of course.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1) (emphasis added). Once a party has amended once as a matter of course, or the time to do so expires, the “party may [thereafter] amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).
“As a general matter, ‘[a]n amended pleading supersedes the former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader's averments against his adversary.' ” Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Dresdner Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG in Hamburg v. M/V OLYMPIA VOYAGER, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation omitted)). See also, e.g., Fritz v. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 676 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Under the Federal Rules, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.”).
DONE and ORDERED