Murphy v. State

3 Citing cases

  1. Gonzales v. State

    478 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)   Cited 8 times
    Rejecting hearsay-based challenge to police officer's testifying to his personal knowledge of market value of automobile

    Holmes v. State, 126 Tex.Crim. R., 72 S.W.2d 1092.' In Murphy v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. R., 275 S.W.2d 104, this court held that the testimony of the owner of the alleged stolen car was sufficient to establish value where he had been driving automobiles for thirty-five or forty years and thought he knew the market value of cars. This court has consistently held that hearsay evidence is admissible as proof of market value.

  2. Lucas v. State

    452 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)   Cited 13 times

    Esparza v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 367 S.W.2d 861; De La O v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 373 S.W.2d 501; Morris v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 615. In Murphy v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. R., 275 S.W.2d 104 this court held that the testimony of the owner of the alleged stolen car was sufficient to establish value where he had been driving automobiles for 35 or 40 years and thought he knew the market value of cars. See also Taylor v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 499, 321 S.W.2d 300; Collins v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 376 S.W.2d 354; Pigg v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. R., 287 S.W.2d 673; Israel v. State, 158 Tex.Crim. R., 258 S.W.2d 82; Morris v. State, supra.

  3. State v. Hammond

    6 Wn. App. 459 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 29 times
    In State v. Hammond, 6 Wn.App. 459, 460, 493 P.2d 1249 (1972), the jury convicted the defendant of grand larceny, an element of which was that the stolen items had a combined value in excess of $75.

    iples are recognized as comprising the general rule followed in nearly all jurisdictions, and are equally applicable in criminal as well as civil cases. The general rule permitting an owner to testify as to the value of property without qualifying as an expert is relied upon in the criminal field as noted by the following cases: Lewis v. State, 165 Ala. 83, 51 So. 308 (1909); Luker v. State, 23 Ala. App. 379, 125 So. 788 (1930); Johnson v. State, 190 Ark. 979, 82 S.W.2d 521 (1935); People v. Henderson, 238 Cal.App.2d 566, 48 Cal.Rptr. 114 (1965); State v. Endorf, 219 Iowa 1321, 260 N.W. 678 (1935); Young v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1955); Mercer v. State, 237 Md. 479, 206 A.2d 797 (1965); Benton v. State, 228 Md. 309, 179 A.2d 718 (1962); People v. Johnson, 215 Mich. 221, 183 N.W. 920 (1921); State v. Kelly, 365 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1963); State v. Johnson, 293 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. 1956); Whitley v. State, 36 N.M. 248, 13 P.2d 423 (1932); State v. Rooks, 62 R.I. 251, 4 A.2d 905 (1939); Murphy v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 87, 275 S.W.2d 104 (1955); State v. Myers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1000, ยง 25 (1954). The authorities show somewhat of a divergence of view on the question of the admissibility of the opinion as to the value of jewelry of a nonexpert owner but the general rule permitting the owner of a chattel to testify as to its market value without qualifying as an expert is adhered to in the majority of instances.