The Rules of Evidence do not address this problem. We faced a version of it in Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), also a capital murder case. In Murphy, the prosecution sat idly by while the defense on cross-examination elicited hearsay testimony from a witness (as distinguished from the case at bar, where the prosecution made a proper and timely and correct objection, only to have it overruled).
Donald v. State, 472 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1985); Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984); see also Pennington v. State, 437 So.2d 37, 42-43 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., concurring); Jackson v. State, 163 Miss. 235, 244, 140 So. 683 (1932) (Griffith, J., dissenting) and Rule 103, Miss.R. Ev., effective January 1, 1986. It is apparent from the record that the trial judge fully understood the basis for the objection.
1987). One is deprived of the right to cross-examine when the trial court fundamentally and substantially restricts it. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Miss. 1984). This Court has interpreted this to mean that the party is deprived of the opportunity without fault on their part. Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695, 701 (Miss.
We also agree with the State that to the extent Kolberg asserts he should have been allowed to elicit hearsay from Officer Crisco during cross-examination, this assignment of error is also without merit. The State directs our attention to our decision in Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), where we said: There is no hearsay exception based upon the scope of examination. You may allow its admission by failing to object to it, but you simply cannot "open the door" to hearsay.
We have held that a party cannot "open the door" to hearsay. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1984). To the extent that the majority adopts a different rule, I disagree.
So those are the kind that I've talked with.Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (1984), which states the rule that the door may not be opened for the entrance of hearsay, would not apply here for the Murphy case also stands for the proposition that if the testimony is merely collateral, irrelevant or otherwise damaging, you can open the door on cross-examination. Murphy cites as authority for this proposition, Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999 (1980), where the appellant's attorney on cross-examination introduced the subject matter of the Stilson wrench and Jefferson v. State, 386 So.2d 200 (1980), where the defendant's attorney put the defendant's prior crimes before the jury on cross-examination. Also relied upon is Sanders v. State, 219 So.2d 913 (1969).
The State argued that admission of testimony attesting to the fact there were no prints of value did not result in any prejudice to the defendant and was admissible because Pilgrim "opened the door." ¶ 25. Pilgrim, citing Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion because the defense cannot open the door to hearsay. The State replies that the testimony elicited was not hearsay, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — whether there were or were not fingerprints on the bag — but to rebut the defense's insinuations of an incomplete or shoddy investigation and to tell the complete story of the investigation.
Furthermore, "[t]his Court has recognized that ‘it would be vain and foolish to demand that in the heated flow of trial, where the grounds of the objection are reasonably apparent from the context, that counsel state his grounds or waive his objection.’ " Willis v. State, 352 So. 3d 602, 612 (Miss. 2022) (quoting Murphy v. State, 453 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984)). When defense counsel made the objection, he noted that the authority for the pro posed instruction cited both Holliman v. State, 178 So. 3d 689 (Miss. 2015), and Williams v. State, 111 So. 3d 620 (Miss. 2013).
'Hearsay is incompetent evidence.'" Quimby v. State, 604 So.2d 741, 746 (Miss. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1984)). This is because hearsay "is considered unreliable and untrustworthy."
This Court has recognized that "it would be vain and foolish to demand that in the heated flow of trial, where the grounds of the objection are reasonably apparent from the context, that counsel state his grounds or waive his objection." Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984). Additionally, the State acknowledged at oral argument that Willis had preserved his Confrontation Clause objection through his post-trial motion.