Murphy v. State

60 Citing cases

  1. Ponthieux v. State

    532 So. 2d 1239 (Miss. 1988)   Cited 37 times

    The Rules of Evidence do not address this problem. We faced a version of it in Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), also a capital murder case. In Murphy, the prosecution sat idly by while the defense on cross-examination elicited hearsay testimony from a witness (as distinguished from the case at bar, where the prosecution made a proper and timely and correct objection, only to have it overruled).

  2. Barnette v. State

    478 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1985)   Cited 17 times
    In Barnette the defendant alleged that the chain of custody of a controlled substance was not clearly proven, and therefore testimony from the Mississippi Crime Lab should not have ben admitted.

    Donald v. State, 472 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1985); Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984); see also Pennington v. State, 437 So.2d 37, 42-43 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., concurring); Jackson v. State, 163 Miss. 235, 244, 140 So. 683 (1932) (Griffith, J., dissenting) and Rule 103, Miss.R. Ev., effective January 1, 1986. It is apparent from the record that the trial judge fully understood the basis for the objection.

  3. Culp v. State

    2002 KA 1966 (Miss. 2006)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that the disclosure of grand jurors' identities was not required where the defendant failed to show the evidence was material

    1987). One is deprived of the right to cross-examine when the trial court fundamentally and substantially restricts it. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Miss. 1984). This Court has interpreted this to mean that the party is deprived of the opportunity without fault on their part. Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695, 701 (Miss.

  4. Kolberg v. State

    2000 KA 786 (Miss. 2002)   Cited 84 times
    Finding harmless error in failure to instruct jury on the elements of felony child abuse, the underlying felony of the capital-murder charge

    We also agree with the State that to the extent Kolberg asserts he should have been allowed to elicit hearsay from Officer Crisco during cross-examination, this assignment of error is also without merit. The State directs our attention to our decision in Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), where we said: There is no hearsay exception based upon the scope of examination. You may allow its admission by failing to object to it, but you simply cannot "open the door" to hearsay.

  5. Zoerner v. State

    96 KA 318 (Miss. 1998)   Cited 16 times

    We have held that a party cannot "open the door" to hearsay. Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1984). To the extent that the majority adopts a different rule, I disagree.

  6. Walker v. State

    473 So. 2d 435 (Miss. 1985)   Cited 34 times
    Summarizing pre- Gates holdings

    So those are the kind that I've talked with.Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (1984), which states the rule that the door may not be opened for the entrance of hearsay, would not apply here for the Murphy case also stands for the proposition that if the testimony is merely collateral, irrelevant or otherwise damaging, you can open the door on cross-examination. Murphy cites as authority for this proposition, Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999 (1980), where the appellant's attorney on cross-examination introduced the subject matter of the Stilson wrench and Jefferson v. State, 386 So.2d 200 (1980), where the defendant's attorney put the defendant's prior crimes before the jury on cross-examination. Also relied upon is Sanders v. State, 219 So.2d 913 (1969).

  7. Pilgrim v. State

    19 So. 3d 148 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times

    The State argued that admission of testimony attesting to the fact there were no prints of value did not result in any prejudice to the defendant and was admissible because Pilgrim "opened the door." ¶ 25. Pilgrim, citing Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290 (Miss. 1984), argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion because the defense cannot open the door to hearsay. The State replies that the testimony elicited was not hearsay, because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted — whether there were or were not fingerprints on the bag — but to rebut the defense's insinuations of an incomplete or shoddy investigation and to tell the complete story of the investigation.

  8. Gunn v. State

    374 So. 3d 1206 (Miss. 2023)   Cited 2 times
    In Gunn, the Court found that, "[u]ndeniably, Gunn possessed and used a deadly weapon resulting in the death of Smith[,]" therefore, "[w]e fail to see how the jury instruction commented on the weight of the evidence or singled out a particular piece of evidence absent any analysis from Gunn, especially when read in conjunction with the rest of the jury instructions." Id.

    Furthermore, "[t]his Court has recognized that ‘it would be vain and foolish to demand that in the heated flow of trial, where the grounds of the objection are reasonably apparent from the context, that counsel state his grounds or waive his objection.’ " Willis v. State, 352 So. 3d 602, 612 (Miss. 2022) (quoting Murphy v. State, 453 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984)). When defense counsel made the objection, he noted that the authority for the pro posed instruction cited both Holliman v. State, 178 So. 3d 689 (Miss. 2015), and Williams v. State, 111 So. 3d 620 (Miss. 2013).

  9. McCollum v. State

    No. 2021-KA-01276-SCT (Miss. Sep. 7, 2023)

    'Hearsay is incompetent evidence.'" Quimby v. State, 604 So.2d 741, 746 (Miss. 1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1984)). This is because hearsay "is considered unreliable and untrustworthy."

  10. Willis v. State

    352 So. 3d 602 (Miss. 2022)   Cited 11 times

    This Court has recognized that "it would be vain and foolish to demand that in the heated flow of trial, where the grounds of the objection are reasonably apparent from the context, that counsel state his grounds or waive his objection." Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293 (Miss. 1984). Additionally, the State acknowledged at oral argument that Willis had preserved his Confrontation Clause objection through his post-trial motion.