Opinion
Case No. 2:06-cv-618-MEF.
March 6, 2008
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Southern Energy Homes, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 32). For the reasons stated herein, the motion is due to be GRANTED.
Plaintiff also names a number of fictitious defendants. Federal courts do not allow fictitious party practice. New v. Sports Recreation, Inc., 114 F.3d 1092, 1094 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[F]ictitious party practice is not permitted in federal court."). Therefore, the fictitious defendants are due to be dismissed. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Risk Enterprise Mgmt. Ltd., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1279 n. 1 (M. D. Ala. 1998) (DeMent, J.) (dismissing sua sponte fictitious defendants).
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Plaintiff's claims arise under a law of the United States, specifically the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310, et seq., and the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5401, et seq. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of both.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in dispute, and judgment may be rendered by considering the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Court must accept facts in a complaint as true and views them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996). The complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494, 497 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The pleadings, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish the following facts:
Plaintiff purchased a manufactured home from Defendant on or about December 26, 2003. Complaint (Doc. # 1-2, ¶ 7). The purchase price was $45,639. ( Id.). It is undisputed that Defendant constructed the exterior walls of Plaintiff's home with interior vapor barriers, which is expressly permitted under the HUD Code. 24 C.F.R. § 3280.504(b)(1).
On June 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed an eleven-count complaint in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. (Doc. # 1-2). Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he manufactured homes designed and manufactured by Defendant, including the manufactured home purchased by Plaintiff, have an improper design and construction of exterior walls." ( Id. ¶ 4). On July 14, 2006, Defendant removed the case to this Court. Notice of Removal (Doc. # 1).
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by the Manufactured Housing Act. "Congress's intent to preempt state law may be explicitly stated in the language of a federal statute or implicitly contained in the structure and purpose of the statute." Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004). There are three types of preemption: (1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; and (3) conflict preemption. Id.
In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are due to be dismissed because of conflict preemption. "Conflict preemption exists where state law actually conflicts with federal law, making it impossible to comply with both, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Manufactured Housing Act's implementing regulations specify that the test for determining whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress is "whether the State rule can be enforced or the action taken without impairing the Federal superintendence of the manufactured home industry as established by the Act." 24 C.F.R. § 3282.11(d).
Plaintiff's claims are based on Defendants' construction of the exterior walls of Plaintiff's home with interior vapor barriers, which is expressly permitted under the HUD Code. 24 C.F.R. § 3280.504(b)(1). Section 3280.504(b) provides for a range of authorized options for exterior wall construction. See § 3280.504(b). The regulations lay out "the requirements for condensation control, air infiltration, thermal insulation and certification for heating and comfort cooling." 24 C.F.R. § 3280.501. The language does not suggest that the regulation sets forth minimum standards, and Courts have suggested that regulations providing a range of options do not set forth minimum standards. See Stone ex rel. Estate of Stone v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 28, 44 (D. Mass. 2002).
In a recent case, this Court held that similar claims were barred by conflict preemption because they would penalize the manufacturer for choosing a federally authorized option. See Perry v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2007 WL 2893410 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2008); see also Guidroz v. Champion Enters., Inc., No. 05-1148 (W.D. La. January 26, 2007). The Court agrees and concludes that Plaintiff may not penalize Defendant for choosing an option permitted by § 3280.504(b).
Plaintiff argues, looking both to case law and the structure of the regulations themselves, that the regulations at issue set forth are performance-based. Response (Doc. # 36, § A.2). In other words, the manufacturer is given several options to meet a performance-based requirement. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, the regulations set forth minimum standards. The Court disagrees. The regulation at issue in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. also set a performance requirement. 529 U.S. 861, 878 (2000) ("[The regulation at issue] set a performance requirement for passive restraint devices and allow[ed] manufacturers to choose among different passive restraint mechanisms, such as airbags, automatic belts, or other passive restraint technologies to satisfy that requirement.").
The Geier Court noted that the manufacturers were required to meet a performance requirement by choosing from a range of options. See id. at 878-79. Nonetheless, the plaintiff's claims were preempted because they penalized the manufacturer for choosing an option provided by the regulations. See id. at 881. Even if the regulations set forth performance requirements or a performance standard, the Court cannot agree that the regulations provide a minimum standard. Maintenance of Plaintiff's state court claims would "impair the Federal superintendence of the manufactured home industry as established by the Act." 24 C.F.R. § 3282.11(d). Therefore, Defendants' motion is due to be GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED as follows:(1) Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. # 32) is GRANTED.
(2) Plaintiff's claims in this case are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(3) Defendant's Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert Robert Kondner and Request for In Limine Heading (Doc. # 69), Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert Bobby Parks and Request for In Limine Heading (Doc. # 70), and Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 71) are DENIED as moot.
(4) All claims against the fictitious defendants are DISMISSED.
(5) The Court will enter a separate final judgment taxing costs.
A copy of this checklist is available at the website for the USCA, 11th Circuit at www.ca11.uscourts.gov Effective on April 9, 2006, the new fee to file an appeal will increase from $255.00 to $455.00. CIVIL APPEALS JURISDICTION CHECKLIST 1. Appealable Orders : Appeals from final orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291: 28 U.S.C. § 158Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre 701 F.2d 1365 1368 28 U.S.C. § 636 In cases involving multiple parties or multiple claims, 54Williams v. Bishop 732 F.2d 885 885-86 Budinich v. Becton Dickinson Co. 486 U.S. 196 201 108 S.Ct. 1717 1721-22 100 L.Ed.2d 178LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc. 146 F.3d 832 837 Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a): Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Fed.R.App.P. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1292 Appeals pursuant to judicially created exceptions to the finality rule: Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 546 69 S.Ct. 1221 1225-26 93 L.Ed. 1528Atlantic Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. 890 F.2d 371 376 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 379 U.S. 148 157 85 S.Ct. 308 312 13 L.Ed.2d 199 2. Time for Filing Rinaldo v. Corbett 256 F.3d 1276 1278 4 Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1): 3 THE NOTICE MUST BE RECEIVED AND FILED IN THE DISTRICT COURT NO LATER THAN THE LAST DAY OF THE APPEAL PERIOD — no additional days are provided for mailing. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(3): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4): Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5) and 4(a)(6): Fed.R.App.P. 4(c): 28 U.S.C. § 1746 3. Format of the notice of appeal : See also 3pro se 4. Effect of a notice of appeal : 4 Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction conferred and strictly limited by statute: (a) Only final orders and judgments of district courts, or final orders of bankruptcy courts which have been appealed to and fully resolved by a district court under , generally are appealable. 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(c) Appeals are permitted from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . ." and from "[i]nterlocutory decrees . . . determining the rights and liabilities of parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Interlocutory appeals from orders denying temporary restraining orders are not permitted. (d) : The certification specified in (b) must be obtained before a petition for permission to appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals. The district court's denial of a motion for certification is not itself appealable. (e) Limited exceptions are discussed in cases including, but not limited to: , , , , , (1949); , , (11th Cir. 1989); , , , , , (1964). : The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. , , (11th Cir. 2001). In civil cases, Fed.R.App.P. 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