Opinion
Civil No. L-98-962
July 14, 2000
MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is the partial Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Protective Order filed by the defendants State of Maryland, State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS), Stuart Simms, William Sondervan, Richard Lanham, Frank Sizer, Sewall Smith, Mitchell Franks, and Eugene Nuth (the "state defendants". This case concerns sexual harassment allegedly suffered by the plaintiff, Hilda Murphy, during her employment as a guard at DPSCS. The essential factual allegations of Ms. Murphy's claims were outlined in this Court's Memorandum and Order of February 5, 1999, and will not be repeated here.
Defendant Gary Logan is not a party to this motion.
On January 6, 2000, the Court (Chief Judge Motz) granted the plaintiff leave to amended her complaint. The state defendants answered the complaint in part and moved to dismiss in part. For the following reasons, the Court will, by separate Order, GRANT the defendants' motion to dismiss and DENY AS MOOT the Motion for a Protective Order.
I. Legal Standard
Ordinarily, a Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond all doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that entitle him to relief.See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Labram v. Havel, 43 F.3d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1995). The liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) demand only a "short and plain" statement of the claim. In evaluating such a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1969).
II. Analysis A. Counts One, Two and Three
Counts I, II, and III of the amended complaint charge the defendants with sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Defendants Simms, Lanham, Sondervan, Sizer, Smith, Franks, and Nuth have moved to dismiss these three counts against them, asserting that they cannot be liable for Title VII violations under Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc, 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that (i) at least some of the defendants must have approved of defendant Logan's harassment of the plaintiff, thus rendering their actions "delegable," and making the defendants individually liable, and (ii) alternatively, the defendants are being sued in their official, rather than individual capacities.
The Court finds the plaintiff's first theory without merit. Lissau holds unambiguously that "supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations." 159 F.3d at 181. All individual defendants must therefore be dismissed in their individual capacities.
Lissau did not address the question of proceeding against individuals under Title VII in their official capacities. The Fourth Circuit has, however, assumed that such an action is possible. See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Alvarado v. Board of Trustees, 848 F.2d 457, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1988)). Actions against individuals in their official capacities are normally permitted when the actual employing entity is immune from suit, and a suit against the individual is equivalent to the suit against the entity. See, e.g., Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 460-61.
In the instant case, the State and DPSCS are not moving to dismiss Counts I, II and III against them. There is therefore no need to proceed against any of the individual defendants in their official capacities. Counts I, II, and III will be dismissed against Defendants Simms, Sondervan, Smith, Lanham, Sizer, Franks, and Nuth.
B. Count Four
Count IV alleges that Defendants Lanham, Smith, Sondervan, Franks, Sizer, and Nuth infringed upon the plaintiff's constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Murphy argues that Logan remained in a supervisory position over Murphy until early December 1997, despite DPSCS's ongoing investigation of Murphy's sexual harassment complaint against Logan filed in September 1997. During the period from September to December, Logan allegedly retaliated against Murphy for having filed a complaint against him. According to Murphy, the state defendants are therefore liable for violating § 1983 in a supervisory capacity by leaving Logan, who allegedly had a history of sexually harassing his subordinates, in a supervisory position during the pendency of the investigation.
In order to establish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (i) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury, (ii) that the supervisor's response showed deliberate indifference to, or tacit authorization of, the alleged offensive practices, and (iii) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and the constitutional injury.See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
The behavior of the state defendants alleged by Murphy cannot rise to the level of "deliberate indifference." Murphy admits that the defendants launched an investigation of Logan promptly upon receipt of her complaint, and that they launched a second investigation upon receipt of her complaint of retaliation. Both of these investigations resulted in disciplinary actions against Logan, the second of which was his dismissal. Because the facts as alleged in the amended complaint cannot establish deliberate indifference to Murphy's plight, the Court will dismiss Count IV of the amended complaint against the state defendants. Cf. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 1999) ("When a supervisor investigates a claim of improper . . . conduct and suspends the offending officer, it simply cannot be said that he is indifferent to the risk of the underlying constitutional violation.")
C. Count Five
Count V alleges that the defendants discriminated against Murphy on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In order to make a prima facie case under § 1981, a plaintiff must establish the familiar McDonnell Douglas elements: (i) she was a member of a protected class, (ii) her job performance was satisfactory, (iii) she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (iv) similarly situated employees outside of her class received more favorable treatment. See Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of General Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting standards for a prima facie case under § 1981 are the same as under Title VII). The crux of Murphy's § 1981 claim charges that the defendants have a custom of disregarding the constitutional rights of African American female correctional officers at MCI-J, which in turn created the atmosphere that permitted Logan's alleged harassment of Murphy.
Murphy fails to state a claim under § 1981 because her complaint does not contain any allegations that white female correctional officers were treated any differently that were African American female officers. Although the complaint does state a claim for sex discrimination, § 1981 does not provide relief for victims of discrimination based on sex. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976). Count V will therefore be dismissed.
D. Count Six
Count VI charges the individual state defendants with negligence in failing to train and supervise Logan adequately. The defendants argue that the individual state defendants are immune from state tort liability under Md. Code Ann. Cts. Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b), which provides state officials with immunity in the absence of malice or gross negligence. Defendants also argue that if Murphy is pressing Count VI against the State and DPSCS, these two parties are immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
Murphy concedes that § 5-522(b) does provide immunity to the individual defendants for simple negligence. She argues, however, that she should be allowed to prove gross negligence, and thus overcome § 5-522(b) immunity. The Court disagrees on two grounds: (i) the complaint as pleaded does not contain any allegations of malice or gross negligence, and (ii) the factual allegations contained in the complaint against the individual state defendants concerning their monitoring of Logan do not rise to the level of malice or gross negligence. The Court will therefore dismiss Count VI against the individual defendants.
As noted above, Murphy admits that the state defendants investigated both of her complaints against Logan and took disciplinary action against him as a result.
If Murphy is pressing Count VI against the State and DPSCS, the claim will be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment.
E. Motion for Protective Order
Defendants Simms, Sondervan, Lanham, Sizer, Smith, Franks, and Nuth have moved for a protective order. They seek to extend time to answer discovery requests propounded on them until after the Court has ruled on their motion to dismiss. Because the Court is granting the motion to dismiss, the motion for a protective order is now moot. Defendants Simms, Sondervan, Lanham, Sizer, Smith, Franks, and Nuth will be expected to respond to any discovery requests pertaining to the liability of the State of Maryland, DPSCS, or Defendant Logan.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court shall, by separate Order, GRANT the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Counts I, II, and III are DISMISSED against Defendants Simms, Sondervan, Smith, Lanham, Sizer, Franks, and Nuth. Count IV is dismissed against the state defendants. Counts V and VI are dismissed in their entirety. The Motion for a Protective Order is DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated this 14th day of July, 2000.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum of even date, the Court hereby ORDERS that partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants State of Maryland, DPSCS, Simms, Sondervan, Lanham, Sizer, Smith, Franks, and Nuth (Docket no. 53) is GRANTED. The Motion for a Protective Order (Docket no. 73) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of July, 2000.