We are not compelled to transplant mechanically the Ridenour preclusion of recovery theory where a plaintiff is found more negligent than a defendant to claims arising under a breach of warranty theory. Prior to the adoption of the Wyoming comparative negligence statute, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, 468 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1970), addressed the issue of whether tort defenses, such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk, apply to warranty claims. The court recognized the lack of unanimity on the matter, but, noted that "[o]ne of the difficulties in precluding such defense is the consequent deprivation of an opportunity to show that the real cause of the injury was from another source than the agency furnishing the product."

Seattle Flight Serv., Inc. v. City of Auburn, 24 Wash.App. 749, 604 P.2d 975, 977-78 (1979). Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969, 975 (Wyo.1970). Cigna, 241 F.3d at 17.

In " pure" comparative negligence states, a plaintiff's recovery is reduced directly by the amount of his or her negligence. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Unit Rig & Equipment Co., 797 F.2d 883, 888 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090, 107 S.Ct. 1300, 94 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987); Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Serv., 468 P.2d 969, 974-75 (Wyo.1970); In re Certified Questions, 416 Mich. 558, 331 N.W.2d 456 (Mich.1982) (applying pure comparative negligence statute, Mich.Stat.Ann. § 27A.2949 [M.C.L.A. § 600.2949] (Callaghan Supp.1987), to breach of warranty); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719, 726-27 (R.I.1983) (allowing consideration of " pure" comparative negligence only where personal injury damages are sought). Some states apply a fifty per cent comparative negligence law, which bars recovery by plaintiffs if their negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's.

Despite appellant's awareness of these standards of review, he argues that in the present case we have a duty to examine the record and reach our own independent conclusion from the evidence contained therein. He bases his claim on the rule that where evidence is uncontroverted, the findings in the trial court may be treated as legal conclusions, reversible by this court, and where such evidence admits of only one conclusion, a contrary one may not stand. Murphy v. Petrolane Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970). We do not find that rule to be controlling here. Appellant's assertion presumes that the evidence presented as to the circumstances of Eric's death was conclusive.

Wendling v. Cundall, supra. See also Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970); Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507 (1967); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 845, p. 288. The district court stated that the legislature did not consider whether skiing is extrahazardous activity, and that the statute does not cover skiing in and of itself.

Without consideration of the difference, if any between a "duty" and "standard of care," it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to recognize that appellant's contention is that the standard of care imposed upon one who handles a potentially dangerous product is to use every reasonable precaution suggested by experience to avoid known dangers. Appellant properly cites Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Like, supra, and Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970), among other cases, in support of this contention. The record reflects that this standard was adequately argued to the trial court.

Though not in the posture of summary judgment, as here presented, this court has frequently applied the principle that when fair-minded persons may draw different opinions and draw different conclusions from the facts, the question of negligence or its degree is a question of fact for the jury, when demanded. Krahn v. La Meres, 1971, 483 P.2d 522; Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo. 1970, 468 P.2d 969; McClure v. Latta, Wyo. 1960, 348 P.2d 1057, Meredith GMC, Inc. v. Garner, 1958, 78 Wyo. 396, 328 P.2d 371, 373; Negligence, West's Wyoming Digest. On the other hand, if but one inference can be drawn as to whether a party was negligent, only then does the question become one of law.

Wendling relies upon a series of prior decisions by this Court in urging the proposition that if evidence at the trial is uncontroverted the findings by the district court may be treated as legal conclusions, which are subject to reversal by the appellate court, and which should be reversed where only a contrary conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. See Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969 (1970), on petition for rehearing; Wyoming Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507 (1967); In re Stringer's Estate, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508 (1959); Twing v. Schott, 80 Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839 (1959); Hercules Powder Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 66 Wyo. 309, 210 P.2d 824 (1949), on petition for rehearing. While these cases rather broadly state principles which justify Wendling's proposition, a more strict analysis demonstrates that the role of this Court in such an instance is the same as in any other case.

* * *" In face of the trial court's specific finding of this element, the appellants must be reduced to the contention that the evidence simply does not sustain this finding of good faith and bona fide intention of appellees to diligently proceed with the drilling of the well, and appellants ask us to find therefrom that appellees' real purpose was only to hold this lease. If there is substantial evidence we cannot do this, but must be bound by the finding of the trial court, Caillier v. City of Newcastle, Wyo., 423 P.2d 653, 656, and cases collected in 1 West's Wyoming Digest, Appeal and Error, p. 402, et sequitur, and cases in 1976 Cum.P.P. Further, "Findings of fact must be construed liberally and favorably to the judgment," and the presumption is that they are right, Jassman v. Wulfjen, 71 Wyo. 261, 257 P.2d 334, 336; Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969, 979. This court has held further that where the finding by the trial court is not inconsistent with the evidence it will not be disturbed on appeal, Wyoming Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. May, Wyo., 434 P.2d 507, 511. In our view there was sufficient evidence for the court to make this finding from the facts which have been heretofore set out, and we thus cannot disturb the trial court's finding on this first issue no matter what might be our personal view.

We have heretofore held in the case of Gish v. Colson, Wyo., 475 P.2d 717, 718, that it is prejudicial error to give an instruction on contributory negligence if this is not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we are directly faced with a determination of whether this evidence will sustain an instruction on contributory negligence. It has been held in Murphy v. Petrolane-Wyoming Gas Service, Wyo., 468 P.2d 969, 976, as follows: "* * * Apparently the court assumed that if one is advised of a problem not routine nor transient he is thereby informed of danger.