Opinion
No. 3D19-339
01-02-2020
Lucila MURPHY, Appellant, v. Lenis OSORIO, et al., Appellees.
Law Office of Laurence A. Wanshel, P.A., and Laurence A. Wanshel, Miami, for appellant. Miguel San Pedro, for appellees.
Law Office of Laurence A. Wanshel, P.A., and Laurence A. Wanshel, Miami, for appellant.
Miguel San Pedro, for appellees.
Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.
HENDON, J.
Lucila Murphy appeals from a final judgment stemming from an action to quiet title to real property and from the denial of her motion for rehearing of the final judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Lenis Osorio and Velia Pouso (collectively, "the Plaintiffs") filed an action against Lucila and Melissa Murphy (collectively, "the Defendants"), seeking to quiet title to real property located in Miami, Florida. It is undisputed that the following warranty deed and quitclaim deeds relating to the subject property have been recorded :
The notice of appeal was not filed on Melissa's behalf.
For ease of reference, the recorded deed and quitclaim deeds are referred to as "first deed," "second deed," etc.
1. A warranty deed dated August 31, 1989, and recorded on September 8, 1989, from Miami Land Development Corp. to Mario Pena [Mario Sr.] and Manuela Pena, his wife.
2. A quitclaim deed dated August 4, 1994, and recorded on August 10, 1994, from Mario Sr. and Manuela Pena, his wife, to Mario Sr., Manuela
The "Mario Pena" referenced in the first, second, and third deeds, will be referred to as "Mario Sr."
Pena, his wife, and Lucila Murphy, a married woman.
3. A quitclaim deed dated March 10, 1995, and recorded on June 15, 1998, from Mario Sr. and Manuela Pena, his wife, and Lucila Murphy, a single woman, to Melissa Murphy, a single woman.
4. A quitclaim deed dated October 26, 1998, and recorded on December 6, 1998, from Manuela Pena, an unremarried widow, to Lucila Murphy.
5. A quitclaim deed dated November 30, 2002, and recorded on August 7, 2003, from Lucila Murphy and Manuela Pena to Lucila Murphy, Lenes Osorio , Mario Pena , Armando Pena, Victor Pena, Belia Pouzo, and Marcos Pena [collectively, "the siblings" or "seven siblings"].
Lenes is referred to as Lenis in the pleadings and the final judgment.
The "Mario Pena" referenced in the fifth deed will be referred to as "Mario Jr.".
Belia Pouzo is referred to as Velia Pouso in the pleadings and the final judgment.
This quitclaim deed was executed by all of the seven siblings.
In the complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that their parents, Mario Sr. and Manuela, did not sign the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed), and therefore, the quitclaim deed must be canceled and title to the property should be quieted in the Plaintiffs' favor and against all other persons claiming under the Defendants.
The Defendants answered the complaint and denied, among other things, that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) was not signed by Mario Sr. and Manuela. Despite raising several affirmative defenses, the Defendants did not raise any homestead defense relating to Lucila's husband's failure to execute the quitclaim deed recorded in August 2003 (fifth deed).
The Defendants also filed a counterclaim against the Plaintiffs and a third-party complaint against the remaining siblings, Mario Jr., Armando, Victor, and Marcos ("third-party defendants"). The Plaintiffs asserted that they were joining the third-party defendants because their legal rights will be affected as the Defendants were seeking to void the quitclaim deed recorded in 2003 (fifth deed) in which they are listed as grantees. In the counterclaim, the Defendants sought to quiet title to the property in favor of Melissa pursuant to the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed), asserting that this quitclaim deed is superior to any subsequently recorded quitclaim deed. The Defendants also asserted that Lucila did not know what she was signing when she signed the quitclaim deed recorded in 2003 (fifth deed) because she was told that she was signing something relating to her mother's (Manuela) will, not a quitclaim deed transferring title of the subject property to herself and her siblings.
In June 2018, a jury trial was conducted. Although there is no transcript of the jury trial, it is undisputed that the trial court ruled that there was a lack of evidence to support the Defendants' counterclaim and that the counterclaim was also time-barred. Further, the verdict form reflects that the only issue presented to the jury was whether Mario Sr. executed the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed). The jury found that he did not.
In July 2018, the Plaintiffs and the third-party defendants moved for the entry of a final judgment "in accordance with the jury verdict and the law," attaching a proposed final judgment. The proposed final judgment provides, among other things, that the falsified quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) is void ab initio, title is quieted in the names of the seven siblings, and Lucila and Melissa take nothing in their counterclaim and third-party complaint. There was no legal support for the argument that title should be quieted in the names of the seven siblings pursuant to the fifth deed.
In response, the Defendants asserted that, at the conclusion of the jury trial, the trial court instructed the Plaintiffs' counsel to contact the Defendants' counsel to see if they could agree who are the titleholders of the property in light of the jury's factual finding that the quitclaim deed (third deed) was falsified. However, prior to discussing the matter with the Defendants' counsel, the Plaintiffs filed the motion for entry of final judgment. In their response, the Defendants agreed that, based on the jury's finding, the final judgment should reflect that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) is void, but asserted that the trial court had not yet made a legal determination as to who are the owners of the property in light of the jury's finding.
The trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion for entry of final judgment. At the hearing, the Plaintiffs' counsel informed the trial judge that the Plaintiffs prevailed at the jury trial, with the jury determining that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) was not signed by Mario Sr. and that the operative deed was the quitclaim deed to the seven siblings (fifth deed). In response, the Defendants' counsel acknowledged that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) is void based on the jury's finding, but that the jury made no finding as to which deed title should be quieted. The trial judge noted there is no transcript of the jury trial, but she remembers asking the parties to brief the issue of which deed is operative as a matter of law. In addition, the Defendants' counsel acknowledged there is no indication in the record whether the subject property was Lucila's husband's homestead. Further, the trial judge stated that she has no recollection that testimony was presented during the jury trial indicating that the property was Lucila's husband's homestead. At the conclusion of the parties' arguments, the trial judge executed the proposed final judgment, making one change not relevant to this appeal, which names the seven siblings as the owners of the property.
Lucila moved for rehearing, arguing, in part, that the quitclaim deed recorded in 2003 (fifth deed) was defective because Lucila's husband did not join in the conveyance of his homestead property. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing, stating that "Defendants' attempt to create a post-trial record, by alleging ‘facts,’ arguments and issues in a Motion for Rehearing that were not addressed, presented or established at trial, must be denied without a trial transcript for failure to demonstrate reversible error." Lucila's appeal followed.
Lucila argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the exercise of its chancery jurisdiction by failing to determine in which deed title should be quieted in light of the facts, applicable law, and the jury's determination that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 was void. We agree.
Based on our review of the final judgment and the transcript of the hearing on the motion for entry of final judgment, it appears that the trial court misconstrued the effect of the jury's verdict. The only issue decided by the jury was that Mario Sr. did not sign the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed). The jury did not determine, and could not have determined, the ultimate issues of (1) whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to legal or equitable title, free of any cloud, see Hill v. Da Costa, 65 Fla. 371, 61 So. 750, 751 (1913) ("In proceedings to remove a cloud upon title to real estate, the complainant must show with clearness, accuracy, and certainty the validity of his own title, and the invalidity of the title of the opposing parties."), or (2) which deed was the operative deed in light of the jury's factual determination that the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed) was forged. As such, we reverse the final judgment and the order denying rehearing and remand with directions for the trial court to make these determinations. Further, we encourage the trial court to allow the parties to file memoranda on the issues. As stated earlier, during the hearing on the motion for entry of final judgment, the trial judge stated that she remembers asking the parties to brief the issue of which deed is operative as a matter of law. A review of the parties' submissions do not indicate that they adequately briefed this legal issue. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
After the warranty deed (first deed) was executed in 1989, Mario Sr. and Manuela owned the property as tenants by the entireties. See Bridgeview Bank Grp. v. Callaghan, 84 So. 3d 1154, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("When real property is conveyed to a wife and husband, that conveyance creates an estate by the entireties."). "[P]roperty held by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties belongs to neither spouse individually, but each spouse is seized of the whole." Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Assocs., 780 So. 2d 45, 53 (Fla. 2001).
After the quitclaim deed was executed in 1994 (second deed), Mario Sr. and Manuela held a one-half undivided interest in the property as tenants by the entireties, and Lucila held the other one-half undivided interest in the property as tenants in common with Mario Sr. and Manuela. See Aderhold v. Aderhold, 983 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
As the jury determined that Mario Sr. did not sign the quitclaim deed recorded in June 1998 (third deed), that quitclaim deed is void. See Knowles v. Edwards, 967 So. 2d 255, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("A forged deed is absolutely void and wholly ineffectual to pass title."); Moore v. Smith-Snagg, 793 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (noting that a forged deed is void ab initio); Zurstrassen v. Stonier, 786 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that a "forged deed is void and thus creates no legal title nor affords protection to those claiming under it"). This void deed, therefore, must be removed from the chain of title.
Finally, as Lucila did not raise the homestead argument in her pleadings and because there is no transcript of the jury trial, we cannot question the trial court's recollection that no evidence was presented that the subject property was Lucila's husband's homestead. As such, Lucila cannot rely on this argument on remand.
Reversed and remanded with directions.