Compare Williams v. Commercial Trust Co., 276 Mass. 508, 517 (1931) (all funds expended came from "money belonging to or credit lent to" one party); Gerace v. Gerace, 301 Mass. 14, 18 (1938) (party signed mortgage as a convenience — no obligation to pay — deemed "a loan of credit"); Saulnier v. Saulnier, 328 Mass. 238, 240 (1952) (only the party that was "primarily liable" on mortgage "paid anything"); Bartula v. Bartula, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (1978) (husband alone signed mortgage, but wife also assumed the obligation of the mortgage and contributed to payments made toward it, a resulting trust arose in her favor of one-half interest). Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553 (1973), does not hold otherwise. In that case, property with a purchase price of $40,000 was conveyed to the defendant.
Consideration for the purchase of property can come not only from the actual purchaser's own funds, but also from the proceeds of money borrowed by him, even indirectly from the trustee. Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 555-56 (1973). In Murphy, the plaintiff sought to establish a resulting trust of real estate held by the defendant.
That interest was in the form of a contingent and unliquidated equitable lien. It sprang from the valuable credit accommodation which the Debtor provided to Carlo in 1989. Specifically, at the time of the 1989 Transfer the Debtor became personally obligated to Community in the amount of $150,000.00. Because that accommodation immediately exhausted some of the Debtor's credit capacity, and exposed the claims of his then-existing creditors to dilution, equity would compel the implication of an equitable security interest in the Property in favor of the Debtor to secure his credit accommodation of Carlo. Cf., e.g., Farrah, 187 Conn. at 501, 446 A.2d 1075; Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App.Ct. 553, 303 N.E.2d 744, 746, 749 (1973). For instance, if, prior to the commencement of the Debtor's bankruptcy case, the Note had fallen into default and Community declined to foreclose its Mortgage on the Property, but instead pursued the Debtor personally for repayment of the Loan, equity should entitle the Debtor to look to the Property for reimbursement.
The plaintiffs argue that the parcel of land has been impressed with a parol trust, with the beneficial enjoyment of that trust secured in the parishioners of St. Mary's, citing Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37, 42 (1912), and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 332 Mass. 582, 583 (1955). In the alternative, they argue that a resulting trust should be recognized for the beneficial enjoyment of the parishioners, citing Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 600-601 (1908), Meskell v. Meskell, 355 Mass. 148, 150 (1969), and Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 555 (1973). As we have stated above, the Constitution of the United States requires dismissal of the complaint.
Under the case law, the fact that Eddy took these actions in order to defraud his wife is not material to the precise question before us. So long as there was no fraud as between the parties as to this action, the doctrine of unclean hands is no bar to the creation of a resulting trust. See Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass.App.Ct. 553, 556–557 (1973) (“The clean hands doctrine does not bar the plaintiff's recovery in this case. It is true ... that the plaintiff conceded he was motivated in this transaction by a desire to keep the property out of the reach of his wife and to avoid a tax lien.
Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 600-601 (1908). See Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 555 (1973). This well-established rule has application even where all or part of the purchase price was borrowed from the title holder.
More importantly, plaintiff pledged defendant's credit to obtain the mortgage on the property. ( Cf. Murphy v. McKenzie (1973), 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 303 N.E.2d 744.) Finally, the fact that plaintiff's daughter may eventually inherit the property supports defendant's contention that plaintiff intended to dispose of the property as he did. Having applied the principles of law above to the present case, we find that the trial court properly found that the conveyance of the property to defendant as a joint tenant was intended by plaintiff as a gift.
Hill v. Syrjala, 377 Mass. 906, 906-907 (1979). Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 555-556 (1973). 5 Scott, Trusts § 456.2. (3d ed. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 456 (1959).
Cf. Doherty v. Woburn, 345 Mass. 523, 528 (1963). Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 559 (1973). But the duty to apply the law carries with it the duty to apply the law impartially.
Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. at 491. See Murphy v. McKenzie, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 558 n. 3 (1973). 2.