The Acts of January 26, 1839, February 5, 1840, and the other provisions of the various Constitutions and statutory enactments subsequent thereto, granting lands to the several counties for school purposes, operated as appropriations for a specific purpose and when the lands were segregated from the public domain, by an actual location and survey, they ipse facto became the property of the county making the survey and were not subject to location and survey by any settler or claimant under any of the grants by the State to private individuals. Paschal's Digest, arts. 3464-3476; Constitution of 1845, P.D., p. 71; Constitution of 1866, P.D., pp. 944-5; Fannin County v. Riddle, 51 Tex. 368 [ 51 Tex. 368]; Henderson County v. Shook, 51 Tex. 370 [ 51 Tex. 370]; Keuchler v. Wright, 40 Tex. 607 [ 40 Tex. 607]; Milam County v. Bateman, 54 Tex. 164 [ 54 Tex. 164]; Milam County v. Robertson, 33 Tex. 366 [ 33 Tex. 366]; Wylie v. Wynne, 26 Tex. 42; Murphy v. Luttrell, 120 S.W. 905. In determining the priority of rights and title to lands reference will be had to the time of location and survey, and these, when made in accordance with a valid certificate or claim, will prevail over a patent subsequently issued.

And it is a familiar rule that a party to a suit may avail himself of title acquired, pending the suit and before final trial. Murphy v. Luttrell, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 149, 120 S.W. 905; Schmidt v. Huff, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 28 S.W. 1053; Compton v. Jennings (Tex.Civ.App.) 266 S.W. 571. Article 7085, c. 3, on the subject of franchise tax, requires the payment of a franchise tax by foreign corporations authorized to do business in this state.

One of the fundamental rules in trespass to try title is that the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of her own title, and not upon the weakness of her opponent's title. Hillmann v. Meyer, 35 Tex. 538; Jones v. Lee, 41 S.W. 195; Soape v. Doss, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 649, 45 S.W. 387; Willoughby v. Townsend, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 724, 45 S.W. 861; Allen v. Worsham, 50 S.W. 157; Peterson v. Renner, 51 S.W. 867; Smith v. Rothe, 55 S.W. 754; Trevy v. Lowrie, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 321, 89 S.W. 981; Jaggers v. Stringer, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 571, 106 S.W. 151; Brown v. Orange County, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 470, 107 S.W. 607; De Roach v. Clardy, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 233, 113 S.W. 22; Bailie v. Western Live Stock Land Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 473, 119 S.W. 325; Murphy v, Luttrell, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 149, 120 S.W. 905; White v. McCullough, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 383, 120 S.W. 1093; Ward v. Nelson, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 281, 131 S.W. 310; Lefevre v. Jackson, 135 S.W. 212; Skov v. Coffin, 137 S.W. 450; Staley v. King Bank Mer. Co., 144 S.W. 308. Nor did the defendant in error unconditionally admit that it had acquired plaintiff in error's title by limitation, as is mistakenly stated by her, but its statement was merely:

See 2 Gammel's Laws of Texas, page 142. In the case of Murphy v. Luttrell, 120 S.W. 905, this court had before it a controversy in which the continued existence of the College of De Kalb as a corporate entity was denied, and the validity of surveys of land theretofore made in its favor was disputed, upon the ground that the corporation had become extinct. We held against both contentions, and subsequently a writ of error was refused by the Supreme Court.