There being no genuine dispute as to the material fact of non-exhaustion of the administrative grievance procedure established by the 1973 City Ordinance, we hold that the City's grant of summary judgment against the entirety of Exum's complaint was proper. Irvin v. Jenkins, 233 Ga. 16 ( 209 S.E.2d 610) (1974); Murphy v. Dominy, 211 Ga. 70, 73 ( 84 S.E.2d 193) (1954). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Where all the relief sought can be obtained in the manner provided by law, a suit in equity for injunctive relief will not lie. See Scarbrough v. Cook, 208 Ga. 697 (2) ( 69 S.E.2d 201). For cases involving similar factual situations where the plaintiffs sought to have certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the director from requiring the plaintiff to surrender his license and this court ruled that the plaintiff had not exhausted all available remedies at law, see Lively v. Grinstead, 210 Ga. 361 (2) ( 80 S.E.2d 316); and Spruill v. Dominy, 212 Ga. 145 (2) ( 91 S.E.2d 43). See also Murphy v. Dominy, 211 Ga. 70 ( 84 S.E.2d 193), a mandamus case. 2.
1. The jurisdictional provisions of Code Ann. § 92A-423, supra, apply solely to appeals from refusals, suspensions, revocations and cancellation of licenses for the various causes specified in Code Ann. Ch. 92A-4, which chapter has different objectives from those of Ch. 92A-6, under which the present proceeding was brought. See Murphy v. Dominy, 211 Ga. 70, 73 ( 84 S.E.2d 193). Therefore, if the Civil and Criminal Court of Clayton County had jurisdiction of this appeal from the proceeding under § 92A-609 (c) it must have been by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act Code Ann. Ch. 92A-6), specifically § 92A-602 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 565, 567; 1956, pp. 543, 547).