Under New Hampshire law, "[w]hen interpreting a written agreement, we give the language used by the parties its reasonable meaning, considering the circumstances and the context in which the agreement was negotiated, and reading the document as a whole." In the matter of Taber-McCarthy McCarthy, 160 N.H. 112, 993 A.2d 240, 244 (2010); Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980) ("In reaching the proper interpretation we require that the words and phrases used by the parties be given their common meaning, . . . and this court will determine the meaning of the contract based upon the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person."). "The language of a contract is ambiguous if the parties to the contract could reasonably disagree as to the meaning of that language."
Under New Hampshire law, the construction of a written contract typically is a question of law. Mast Road Grain Building Materials Co. v. Ray Piet, Inc., 126 N.H. 194, 489 A.2d 143, 145 (1985); Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). When the parties to a contract have failed to define a term, courts construing the contract should adopt the common meaning of the term.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has further stated, in this connection: Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980); Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977).See Petition of Rattee, 145 N.H. 341, 761 A.2d 1076, 1080 (2000); Flanagan v. Prudhomme, 138 N.H. 561, 644 A.2d 51, 60 (1994).
Because the interpretation of a contract is a question of law for this court, Baker v. McCarthy, 122 N.H. 171, 174-75, 443 A.2d 138, 140 (1982), we will address this issue and apply the common meanings to the words and phrases used by the parties in an agreement. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). Article IX, par. B(5) of the CBA states that "[t]he College shall not arbitrarily reverse recommendations on promotion and tenure made by the F.E.A.C."
Catamount Const., Inc. v. Town of Milford, 121 N.H. 781, 782-83, 435 A.2d 123, 124 (1981); Clark v. Neergaard, 121 N.H. 632, 635, 434 A.2d 599, 600 (1981). In reaching the proper interpretation of a contract, we must apply the common meaning of the words and phrases used by the parties. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). This court will determine the meaning of the contract based upon the meaning that would be attached to it by reasonable persons.
[1, 2] The proper interpretation of contracts is a question of law. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). "In reaching the proper interpretation we require that the words and phrases used by the parties be given their common meaning . . . and this court will determine the meaning of the contract based upon the meaning that would be attached to it by a reasonable person."
The interpretation of those circumstances, however, as they bear on the intent expressed in the policy is a question of law for our independent review. See Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980) (interpretation of a written instrument is as a general rule an issue of law for the reviewing court to determine). This principle is equally applicable to the determination of implied intent on choice of law issues.
Language used by the parties to the agreement should be given its standard meaning as understood by reasonable people. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). In the absence of ambiguity, the intent of the parties to a lease is to be determined from the plain meaning of the language used. Mast Road Grain Bldg. v. Ray Piet, Inc., 126 N.H. 194, 197, 489 A.2d 143, 145 (1985).
See RSA 31:22. In searching for the proper interpretation of words used in a written instrument, we require that the words and phrases be given their common meaning. Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). We note that trustees of trust funds are bonded, as are all town officers, RSA 41:6, I (Supp. 1988), and that their accounts are audited annually.
Kilroe v. Troast, 117 N.H. 598, 601, 376 A.2d 131, 133 (1977). Contractual language is construed according to its common meaning, Mast Rd. Grain Bldg. Mat's Co. supra, and this court will give a contract the same meaning as would a reasonable person, Murphy v. Doll-Mar, Inc., 120 N.H. 610, 611-12, 419 A.2d 1106, 1108 (1980). Section 54 of the contract, the provision in question, provides that the State may terminate the contract for several enumerated causes or "[f]or any other causes whatsoever, [if Riblet] fails to carry on the Work in an acceptable manner . . . ."