But his operation of the car at this rate of speed, with no endeavor to have the car under control, without giving warning that no stop would be made at this crossing, and knowing the liability of passengers being upon or near this crossing, made it his duty to have kept a close and searching lookout, given warning by gong or bell that the car would not stop, and to have reduced the speed largely so that he might have brought his car to a stop before it reached the crossing. We apply the rule in Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120, in these words: "The duty of a corporation like the defendant, to use every reasonable precaution to minimize the danger to the public growing out of its exercise of the special privileges granted it in the use of highways, is clear. . . . It appears from the record that the trial court ruled that whenever a car of the defendant was rapidly approaching a point where, from the existing condition and occupancy of the highway, it was apparent that the danger of injury to the public at that time and place would be materially lessened by sounding the bell, it was the duty of the defendant and of its motorman to sound the bell. The ruling is correct.

"The duty of a corporation like the defendant, to use every reasonable precaution to minimize the danger to the public growing out of its exercise of the special privileges granted it in the use of highways, is clear." Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253. The duty to keep sufficient control of its cars under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, is one which rested on each defendant, and a breach of that duty was actionable negligence.

26 $ 790.16 A. 119 U Prosoft $ 14,783.54 $ 518.47 A. 120 U e-spire Communications, Inc. $ 60,000.00 $ 2,104.

In support of the former contention the plaintiff relies upon this court's decision in Demonde v. Targett, 97 Conn. 59, 115 A. 470. The opinion in that case at page 64 contains this statement: "The reasonableness of a particular precaution against danger, arising from conditions well defined and constantly recurring, may be a question of law. Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120; Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 66 Conn. 24, 34, 33 A. 533." While on that appeal, as here, the charge under consideration related to the failure of a defendant driver to sound a warning for a plaintiff pedestrian, and this court held that the court was justified in charging that due care required the defendant driver to give warning of his approach, this conclusion, as is clear from the record, was predicated upon the fact of the driver's seeing the pedestrian either in or about to enter his course.

Ark. 28, 227 S.W. 257; 3 Labott, M. S. § 1127; 2 Thompson, Negl. § 1574; 1 White, Pers.Inj. § 263; Fordyce v. Briney, 58 Ark. 206, 214, 24 S.W. 250; Railway v. Triplett, 54 Ark. 289, 300, 15 S.W. 831, 16 S.W. 266; Bain v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 241, 244; International G. N. Railroad Co. v. Hinzie, 82 Tex. 623, 18 S.W. 681, 683; Smith v. Railroad, 132 N.C. 819, 44 S.E. 663, 664; Ft. Smith Lbr. Co. v. Shackleford, 115 Ark. 272, 171 S.W. 99; Railway Co. v. Hammond, 58 Ark. 324, 24 S.W. 723; Stevens v. Boston El. R. Co., 184 Mass. 476, 69 N.E. 338; Dimmey v. W. Va. T. E. Co., 83 W. Va. 755, 99 S.E. 93, 95; 39 C.J. 1268; Penas v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 112 Minn. 203, 127 N.W. 926, 30 L. R.A.(N.S.) 627, 140 Am.St.Rep. 470; Fenner v. Wilkes-Barre W. V. Tr. Co., 202 Pa. 365, 51 A. 1034; Mobile L. R. Co. v. Drooks, 11 Ala. App. 595, 66 So. 824; Ala. Power Co. v. Bass, 218 Ala. 586, 119 So. 625, 63 A.L.R. 1; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Haight, 59 N.J.Law, 577, 37 A. 135; Murphy v. Derby Street R. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 47 A. 120; Elliott, R. S. § 791. Plaintiff's intestate in approaching Washington avenue and going south thereon had the right to assume that the street car would not obstruct his passage without giving any signal of its purpose to do so. Montgomery St. R. Co. v. Smith, 146 Ala. 316, 39 So. 757; Mayor, etc., v. Tayloe, 105 Ala. 170, 16 So. 576; B. R., L. P. Co. v. Williams, 158 Ala. 381, 388, 48 So. 93; Ala. Power Co. v. Bass, supra; Anniston E. G. Co. v. Rosen, supra; Schneider v. Mobile L. R. Co., 146 Ala. 344, 40 So. 761; Borg v. Des Moines City R. Co., 190 Iowa, 909, 181 N.W. 10, 11; Ashley v. Kanawha V. T. Co., 60 W. Va. 306, 55 S.E. 1016, 1019, 9 Ann.Cas. 836. Under the circumstances shown, it is the privilege and may be the duty of the automobile driver to speed up in order to pass the obstruction before the street car can hit him. Mobile L. R. Co. v. McDonnell, 207 Ala. 161, 168, 92 So. 185. It is not permissible for an alleged wrongdoer, for the purpose of supporting a plea of cont

Minelda was a child eight years of age, and even if there had been neglect of proper surgical treatment by her mother, the negligence of the parent would not be imputable to the child. Daley v. Norwich W. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591, 598; Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 252, 47 A. 120; Wilmot v. McPadden, 78 Conn. 276, 284, 61 A. 1069. The jury were, in substance, told that if they found the negligence of the defendant was a substantial factor in producing Minelda's injuries, she would be entitled to recover, even though negligence on behalf of the parent in failing to obtain proper surgical treatment might have concurred with the negligence of the defendant. As regards the plaintiff Minette B. Lange, the jury were in effect told that she was entitled to recover for expenses incurred by her for nursing, surgery, etc., in connection with her daughter's injuries in so far as the wrongful conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. If the injuries were in any way aggravated by the failure of the parent to exercise reasonable care to obtain proper medical and surgical treatment, the parent could not recover for any aggravation of the injuries so caused.

As a general rule, the answer to a question of this character is one of fact, and not reviewable. Lose v. Fitzgerald, 105 Conn. 247, 248, 135 A. 42; Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. Co., 60 Conn. 239, 251, 21 A. 675, 22 id. 544. Where reasonable men may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct was or was not negligent, it is a question of fact upon which we cannot pass. Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital, 103 Conn. 520, 526, 131 A. 501. But there is a recognized exception where "the reasonableness of a particular precaution against danger, arising from conditions well defined and constantly recurring, may be a question of law." Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120. In Hizam v. Blackman, 103 Conn. 547, 131 A. 415, the plaintiff was walking across a roadway from the westerly side to the easterly in a diagonal or northeasterly direction, at the same time that an automobile was approaching from the south.

The present case does not fall within the recognized exception to this general rule that, "the reasonableness of a particular precaution against danger, arising from conditions well defined and constantly recurring, may be a question of law." Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120.

We have frequently held that in certain definite situations constantly recurring in experience, a trial court may properly say that a certain definite standard of duty rests upon a person in such a situation, without infringing upon the province of the jury. For instance, that certain conduct in such a situation would constitute a want of due care. Demonde v. Targett, 97 Conn. 59, 63, 64, 115 A. 470; Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 253, 47 A. 120; Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 66 Conn. 24, 34, 33 A. 533; Guilfoile v. Smith, 97 Conn. 271, 273, 116 A. 237. The court stated to the jury that "to ride on the running-board of a moving automobile is necessarily attended with greater danger than to ride inside the body of the car, and when one chooses to do so he must exercise a greater degree of care and diligence than when riding inside the car, as the greater the danger the greater the care that must be exercised." In Guilfoile v. Smith, 97 Conn. 271, 273, 116 A. 237, we held that it was not error for the trial court to charge that "a passenger riding in an automobile in the street of a populous community with one leg protruding from one of the doors of the car in such a way as to make it liable to come in contact with passing objects, is negligent in conduct.

Certain conduct may be so obviously negligent as to justify a court in so describing it, and the conduct described by the court is of this character. Murphy v. Derby Street Ry. Co., 73 Conn. 249, 47 A. 120; Guilfoile v. Smith, 95 Conn. 442, 111 A. 593. There was no error in the charge of the court referred to in the tenth and eleventh assignments of error.