Opinion
CV186022108S
12-21-2018
Keith MURPHY v. Maria ALEJANDRO
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Price-Boreland, J.
The issue presented is whether this court should grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the notice to quit fails to unequivocally state one of the specifically enumerated grounds for termination of the lease under General Statutes § 47a-23(a), therefore depriving this court of subject matter jurisdiction. The court hereby grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
FACTS
On August 7, 2018, the plaintiff, Keith Murphy, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Maria Alejandro, a tenant of the premises leased by the plaintiff. In count one, the plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to terminate the defendant’s tenancy pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1), 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a)(4), and §§ 8(d)(3)(c), et seq. of the Housing Assistance Payments Contract entered into between Murphy and Alejandro.
24 C.F.R. § 247.3 sets forth the grounds in which a landlord may terminate a tenancy in a subsidized housing project. Here, the plaintiff relies on the good cause provision of 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a)(4) to justify the termination of the defendant’s subsidized tenancy. Section 8(d)(3)(c) of the Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) contract between the plaintiff and the Middletown Housing Authority also provides that good cause is a ground for termination of the HAP contract. That provision reads, "After the initial lease term, such good cause may include [a] business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy (such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, the owner’s desire to rent the unit for a higher rent)."
In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On or about September 30, 2016, Murphy and Alejandro entered into a one-year written lease agreement for the premises located at 42 Inverness Lane, Middletown, Connecticut (premises). The agreement was governed by two contracts: the residential lease, signed by Murphy and Alejandro; see Compl., Exhibit A; and a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract, signed by a representative of the Middletown Housing Authority (housing authority) and Murphy, which provided Alejandro with section eight rental assistance from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). See Compl., Exhibit B.
On May 3, 2018, the defendant was served with a notice to quit informing her that her lease was being terminated on July 1, 2018, and that "The Owner Desires to Rent the Unit at a Higher Price." The notice cites the code of federal regulations, the HAP contract, and § 47a-23(a)(1). Thereafter, on May 14, 2018, the plaintiff furnished the same on the housing authority.
On October 16, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the legal sufficiency of the notice. Thereafter, on November 18, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion in opposition to the defendant’s motion. On November 5, 2018, the court heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court will begin its analysis with the applicable standard of review. "The motion to dismiss is governed by Practice Book §§ 10-30 through 10-34. Properly granted on jurisdictional grounds, it essentially asserts that, as a matter of law and fact, a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action that is properly before the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulcahy v. Mossa, 89 Conn.App. 115, 128, 872 A.2d 453, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 917, 879 A.2d 894 (2005). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003).
"Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it ... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction ... The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 305 Conn. 523, 531-32, 46 A.3d 102 (2012). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003)
ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s notice to quit is insufficient because it does not unequivocally state any of the reasons for terminating her tenancy permitted by § 47a-23(a). The defendant further contends that the notice to quit statute must be strictly complied with and the language in the notice to quit stating, "Your Lease Has Ended and the Owner Desires to Rent the Unit at a Higher Price," does not comply with § 47a-23(a) because it is not a specifically enumerated reason within the statute. The plaintiff counters that the language within the notice is sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction over this action because it is the functional equivalent of lapse of time under General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1). The plaintiff maintains that, contrary to the defendant’s argument that the language within the notice to quit is insufficient, a notice to quit itself is a pleading and all pleadings are to be construed liberally, not narrowly and technically. As a result, the plaintiff argues that because the language within the notice uses "words of similar import," to construe the notice liberally, would maintain its sufficiency. The court agrees with the defendant.
"Before a landlord may pursue its statutory remedy of summary process under [§ 47a-23(a) ], the landlord must prove its compliance with all the applicable preconditions set by state and federal law for termination of a lease." Buettner v. Bifolck, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-11-4014781-S (April 15, 2011, Baldini, J.). "As a condition precedent to a summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Van Sickle, 52 Conn.App. 37, 44, 726 A.2d 600 (1999). "A defective notice to quit deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction." Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session at Norwalk, Docket No. SNSP-038005 (August 28, 2014, Tierney, J.). Moreover, "[a] notice to quit must be unequivocal for it to be sufficient to terminate a tenancy." Buettner v. Bifolck, supra.
Our Supreme Court has ruled, "[a] landlord seeking to evict a tenant from federally subsidized apartments must [send] such a tenant a ... termination notice that complies with [both federal and state law]." Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 132, 520 A.2d 173 (1987). More specifically, "[a landlord] is required to issue a termination notice compliant with 24 C.F.R. § 247.4, and a notice to quit that satisfies the regulation set forth in 24 C.F.R. 880.607(c)." Bridgeport Towers, LLC v. Berrios, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Housing Session at Bridgeport, Docket No. BSRP-079841 (November 1, 2013, Rodriguez, J.) . There being no dispute as to whether the plaintiff’s notice to quit complies with federal law, this court will consider its compliance with state law pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-23.
Section 47a-23(a) states the grounds for which a landlord can terminate a tenancy. Section 47a-23(a) provides in relevant part, "[w]hen the owner or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building, any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit, any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, and (1) when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time; (B) by reason of any expressed stipulation therein; (C) violation of the rental agreement or lease or of any rules or regulations adopted in accordance with section 47a-9 or 21-70; (D) nonpayment of rent within the grace period provided for residential property in section 47a-15a or 21-83; (E) nonpayment of rent when due for commercial property; (F) violation of section 47a-11 or subsection (b) of section 21-82; (G) nuisance ... [the lessor] shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy."
Although the plaintiff correctly argues that our courts should not construe pleadings narrowly and technically, Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997), our courts have also ruled that because "[s]ummary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination ... the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed" (Emphasis added.) Housing Authority v. DeRoche, 112 Conn.App. 355, 361, 962 A.2d 904 (2009); accord HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn.App. 638, 643, 792 A.2d 165 (2002). "[U]nless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive." Bridgeport Hospital v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995); see also HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez, supra, 68 Conn.App. 645 (holding argument that grounds for termination of lease in § 47a-23(a) are not exclusive is at odds with Connecticut summary process jurisprudence and statutory construction). Therefore, "only the grounds listed [in § 47a-23(a) ] or words of similar import are permissible reasons for a valid notice to quit." Moore v. Calloway, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session at New Haven, Docket No. NH-875 (July 3, 2008, Crawford, J.). As such, there is no question that the phrase "The Owner Desires to Rent the Unit at a Higher Price," is insufficient to terminate the defendant’s tenancy, as it is not a statutorily enumerated ground for termination of a lease under § 47a-23(a). Accordingly, the court will consider whether the remainder of the notice to quit complies with the statutorily prescribed language of § 47a-23(a).
Our courts have long held that "[s]ummary process statutes are strictly construed, and a paramount consideration is the goal of insulating the tenant from confusion and uncertainty." Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 589-90, 33 A.3d 802 (2011). Thus, "[i]n order to demonstrate its compliance with the notices required for proper termination, a landlord must show that the notices given to the tenant apprised her of the information a tenant needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory, or arbitrary eviction." Seventeen High Street, LLC v. Shoff-Darby Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Housing Session at Norwalk, Docket No. SPNO-9502-17033 (April 21, 1995, Tierney, J.) .
In Daniel v. Gonzalez, our Superior Court considered the issue of whether the termination of a lease by lapse of time was sufficient by use of the language "your lease will not be renewed for the month of July 1983" in a notice to quit. See Daniel v. Gonzalez, Superior Court, Docket No. SPH-830719858-HD-444 (August 23, 1983, Aronson, J.). In the court’s memorandum of decision, Aronson, J., held that such language was ambiguous and could imply "a failure to pay rent; failure to comply with expressed stipulation in the rental agreement; or violation of tenant’s responsibilities ..." Id.
Our Superior Court considered the same issue again in Bohan v. Radcliffe, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session at New Haven, Docket Nos. SPNH-8412-08099, SPNH-8412-08100 (January 17, 1985, Barnett, J.). In Bohan, the court granted a defendant-tenant’s motion to dismiss because the language in the notice to quit stating "your tenancy has been terminated" did "not conform to legislative requirements" and did not apprise the defendant of sufficient notice to prepare a defense. Id., 3. The court added, "[t]he language ‘your tenancy has been terminated’ is no more than a generic statement of the landlord’s action. Such wordage could encompass all, or conceivably none, of the permissible grounds listed in § 47a-23(a)." Id.
The notice to quit at issue states the following: "Your Lease Has Ended and The Owner Desires to Rent the Unit at a Higher Price ( 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a)(4) ; Housing Assistance Payments Contract Part B §§ 8(d)(3)(c) et seq.; Residential Lease Agreement of September 30, 2016 at §§ 20 et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-23(a)(1) ). The term of your lease agreement was October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017. As of the date of this Notice, the Lease Agreement has not been extended. As such, your initial lease term has ended, and your tenancy is month-to-month. The landlord desires to rent the unit at a higher price in a difference market. As such, consistent with 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a)(4); the Housing Assistance Payments Contract Part B §§ 8(d)(3)(c) et seq.; the Residential Lease Agreement of September 30, 2016 at §§ 20 et seq.; and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-23(a)(1), your tenancy will terminate on July 1, 2018."
Similar to Daniel and Bohan, the plaintiff’s notice to quit lacks the language sufficient to meet the requirements of § 47a-23(a). The language "your lease has ended" and "the lease agreement has not been extended" are no more than "generic statement[s] of the landlord’s action" in declining to renew the defendant’s lease agreement; Bohan v. Radcliffe, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. SPNH-8412-08099; and such language is ambiguous, such that it could imply other grounds for termination of the lease. Daniel v. Gonzalez, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. SPH-830779858-HD-444. Moreover, although the plaintiff cites the code of federal regulations, the HAP contract between the plaintiff and the housing authority, and § 47a-23(a), only serves to confuse and cast uncertainty as to the reasons for the termination of the defendant’s tenancy. See Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, supra, 132 Conn.App. 589-90. Accordingly, the language in the plaintiff’s notice to quit is equivocal, as it does not sufficiently apprise the defendant of the information necessary to understand the reason for her eviction and therefore the to protect herself against the eviction. See Seventeen High Street, LLC v. Shoff-Darby Ins. Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. SPNO-9502-17033. Accordingly, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The court grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to provide an equivocal notice to quit and the court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.