The agreement, however, functioned as a license and did not convey actual ownership of the Grassy Strip to the hotel. [A] license in real property is a mere privilege to act on the land of another, which does not produce an interest in the property. ... [It] does not convey a possessory interest in land .... Murphy, Inc. v. Remodeling, Etc., Inc ., 62 Conn. App. 517, 522, 772 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 916, 773 A.2d 945 (2001). The agreement between the hotel and the town was for a term of one year and did not terminate the town's ongoing ownership of the Grassy Strip.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy, Inc. v. Remodeling, Etc., Inc. , 62 Conn. App. 517, 522, 772 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 916, 773 A.2d 945 (2001). The agreement between the hotel and the town was for a term of one year and did not terminate the town's ongoing ownership of the Grassy Strip.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy, Inc. v. Remodeling, Etc., Inc., 62 Conn.App. 517, 522, 772 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 916, 773 A.2d 945 (2001). Our standard of review, therefore, is plenary.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy, Inc. v. Remodeling, Etc., Inc., 62 Conn. App. 517, 522-23, 772 A.2d 154, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 916, 773 A.2d 945 (2001). In Murphy, Inc., the court found that the unambiguous language of an agreement titled "`[l]ease [a]greement'" did not indicate any intention to surrender exclusive possession of the premises despite containing "words customarily used in a lease, i.e., `lessor,' `lessee' and `lease,'" and therefore, was not a lease but a license.