Opinion
6:24-cv-1344-JSS-DCI
07-24-2024
CHESTER ROBERT MURNAHAN, Plaintiff, v. HETHER NEWMAN, TED MARRERO, and ORANGE COUNTY COURT SENTENCE, Defendants.
ORDER
JULIE S. SNEED, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint (“Complaint,” Dkt. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court takes judicial notice of another civil rights action that Plaintiff filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, which was opened on June 5, 2024. See Murnahan v. Orange County Court, No. 3:24-cv-249-LC-ZCB (N.D. Fla.). In that case, Plaintiff sues this case's Defendants for the same alleged civil rights violations occurring on December 18, 2001. (Compare Dkt. 1 at 6, 11-12, with Murnahan, No 3:24-cv-00249-LC-ZCB, Dkt. 1 at 7, 17-18).)
Plaintiff did not date the Complaint when he signed it. (See Dkt. 1.) In addition, the Complaint does not have a prison stamp indicating the date Plaintiff delivered it to prison officials for mailing. (See id.) The mailing envelope, however, reflects that the Complaint was mailed from the prison on July 15, 2024. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 2.) The court, therefore, concludes that this is the filing date under the mailbox rule. See, e.g., Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A] pro se prisoner's court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.”).
In both cases, Plaintiff alleges that he was never found competent in his state criminal case (State v. Murnahan, No. 99-10926) in Orange County, Florida, and Defendants violated his First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Compare Dkt. 1 at 6, with Complaint, Murnahan v. Orange County Court, No 3:24-cv-249-LC-ZCB (N.D. Fla.), Dkt. 1 at 7.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks the dismissal of the charges in the state court case. (See Dkt. 1 at 6; Murnahan, No 3:24-cv-00249-LC-ZCB, Dkt. 1 at 7.)
“[I]t is well settled that a plaintiff may not file duplicative complaints in order to expand [his] legal rights.” Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 857 F.3d 833, 841 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). This “claim-splitting doctrine” promotes fairness and judicial economy by “ensur[ing] that a plaintiff may not split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fails.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine applies where “a plaintiff maintain[s] two separate actions involving the same subject matter, at the same time, . . . against the same defendant[s].” Rumbough v. Comenity Capital Bank, 748 Fed.Appx. 253, 255 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Vanover, 857 F.3d at 840-42). In sum, the claim-splitting doctrine prohibits a party “from simultaneously pursuing nearly identical claims against the same parties in different courts.” Klayman v. Porter, No. 22-13025, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 4821, at *10 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations arise from the same events and challenge the same conduct by the same defendants. Thus, assuming Plaintiff intended to initiate a new civil rights action, he has engaged in improper claim-splitting. Because Plaintiff's first case, in the Northern District of Florida, involves the same claims at issue in this case, this case must be dismissed.
Accordingly:
1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Plaintiff may pursue the claims in his earlier case (Murnahan v. Orange County Court, No 3:24-cv-249-LC-ZCB, (N.D. Fla.)).
3. The clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and to CLOSE this case.