Opinion
2:19-cv-674-SPC-MRM
01-10-2022
SHANON MURILLO and JUAN MENDOZA, Plaintiffs, v. CAPE CORAL ROOFING AND SHEET METAL, INC., and ALEXANDER GOMEZ, Defendants.
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SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Mac R. McCoy's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 43) on Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 38). Judge McCoy recommends granting the Motion in part. Neither party objects to the Report and Recommendation, and the time to do so has expired.
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, ” the magistrate judge's R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In the absence of specific objections, there is no requirement that a district judge review the R&R de novo. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n.9 (11th Cir. 1993). Instead, when parties don't object, a district court need only correct plain error as demanded by the interests of justice. See, e.g., Symonette v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 Fed.Appx. 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-52 (1985). Plain error exists if (1) “an error occurred”; (2) “the error was plain”; (3) “it affected substantial rights”; and (4) “not correcting the error would seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceedings.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999).
After examining the file independently and upon considering Judge McCoy's findings and recommendations, the Court accepts in part and adopts in part the R&R and modifies the R&R to the extent that post-judgment interest is awarded even though Plaintiffs' Motion does not request it. (Doc. 43 at 32). Under the United States Code, post-judgment interest is statutorily mandated for money judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.”); see also BankAtlantic v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1053 (11th Cir. 1994) (Post-judgment interest is mandatory and the right to it is not waived by the failure to request it.).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 43) is ACCEPTED in part and ADOPTED in part and modified as set forth in this Opinion and Order.
2. Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 10) is STRICKEN. The Clerk is directed to strike Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 10) and indicate on the docket that it is stricken pursuant to this Order.
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 38) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
a. Default judgment is entered against Defendants in favor of Plaintiff Murillo as to both Counts 1 and 2 for a total amount of $5,131.02 in unpaid wages and $5,131.02 in liquidated damages.
b. Default judgment is entered against Defendants in favor of Plaintiff Mendoza as to both Counts 1 and 2 for a total amount of $5,379.49 in unpaid wages and $5,379.49 in liquidated damages.
c. Plaintiffs are awarded $565.00 in costs.
4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly as set forth in paragraph 3, terminate all pending motions and deadlines, and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida.
Copies: All Parties of Record