The right to move for a new trial in a criminal case is purely statutory and the statutory provisions must be complied with in all respects. Drew v. State, 743 S.W.2d 207, 223 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 570-71 (Tex.App.— Texarkana 1992), vacated for reconsideration on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), adopted and incorporated on reconsideration, 856 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.App.— Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd). All of the cases limiting Philbrook's application invoke the civil policy that "decisions of the courts of appeals [should] turn on substance rather than procedural technicality", a policy that the Court of Criminal Appeals has yet to adopt, and most also invoke the "bona fide attempt" rule, a rule specifically rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Randle Murdock was convicted of the offense of illegal investment and sentenced to twenty-five years' confinement and a fine of $300,000. This Court affirmed his conviction in Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992), vacated, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to this Court in order that we might reconsider Murdock's point of error alleging that the court improperly admitted evidence about unadjudicated offenses in light of its recent opinion in Grunsfeld v. State, 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992).
, he does not argue that Texas provides any greater protection than the Sixth Amendment, and we will therefore address the issue "under established federal guidelines as applied by Texas courts." See Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992) (determining that Texas constitution affords no greater right to confrontation than Sixth Amendment), vacated on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Therefore, to the extent that Ellis stands for the proposition that trial courts must include all statutory terms of probation in the jury charge, it has since been implicitly overruled. SeeMurdock v. State , 840 S.W.2d 558, 570 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992), vacated on other grounds , 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We hold that the trial court did not err in failing to include all possible conditions of community supervision in the jury charge.
We hold it was not error for the trial court not to include all possible conditions the trial court could impose if appellant were sentenced to community supervision. See Wade v. State, 951 S.W.2d 886, 893 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref'd) (holding that the trial court did not err by not including a complete list of statutory terms and conditions of community supervision in jury charge); Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 570 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992), vacated on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court did not err by not including all the conditions of probation that the court could impose). Appellant's first issue is overruled.
However, Texas courts decline to apply the state Confrontation Clause guarantee in a broader manner than the federal Confrontation Clause guarantee. See King v. State, 189 S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992), vacated on other grounds,845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (per curiam). Appellant's state right to cross-examination was not violated.
Thus, to the extent that Ellis stands for the proposition that trial courts must include all statutory terms of probation in the jury charge, it has since been implicitly overruled. See id.; Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 570 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992), vacated on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Because the trial court was not required under applicable law to include all of the conditions of probation in the jury charge on punishment, we overrule Appellant's third issue.
Texas courts have declined to apply the state Confrontation Clause guarantee in a broader manner than the federal Confrontation Clause guarantee. Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 564 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992), vacated on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Moreover, articles 1.05 and 1.25 of the code of criminal procedure do not grant broader rights of confrontation than the Texas Constitution. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1.05, 1.25.
However, the corroboration requirement of article 38.14 is not a rule of admissibility of evidence. See Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992), vacated for remand reconsideration on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), adopted incorporated on remand, 856 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, pet. ref'd). In addition, extraneous offense evidence is admissible under rule 404(b) for the purpose of corroboration under article 38.14. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 564 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995), disavowed on other grounds by Moseley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 n. 18 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
Id.Ellis v. State, 723 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) and Yarbrough v. State, 779 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989), the only authority Appellant cites in support of his contention that the trial court erred in denying his specially-requested instructions, are either no longer the law or suggest that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's request. A trial court does not err by not charging the jury as to all possible conditions of probation. Yarbrough, 779 S.W.2d at 845; see also Murdock v. State, 840 S.W.2d 558, 570 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992) (holding that if Ellis ever stood for the proposition that a trial judge was required to include all of the statutory terms of probation in the charge, it has since been overruled sub silentio), rev'd on other grounds, 845 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). We hold that sex offender registration is a collateral matter to the issue of how long a sentence and how large a fine the jury should impose.