A principal will be held to have ratified the unauthorized action of his agent in dealing with his property by any conduct affirming the action, including the acceptance of benefits flowing therefrom, if the principal has knowledge of the agent's action. Rainwater v. Mason, 283 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1955); Murchison v. Davis, 4 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1928); Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Clark, 126 Tex. 262, 87 S.W.2d 471 (1935); Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 79 S.W.2d 619 (1935). When appellants accepted the royalty checks tendered as payment of their specified interest in the gas unit, which was properly described, they ratified the action of appellees in unitizing the leases despite the fact that appellants informed appellees that they were applying the sum tendered as a partial payment of the royalty due them under the terms of the lease.

Okla. 94, 44 P.2d 852, 855; Republic of China v. Merchants' Fire Assur. Corp., 9 Cir., 49 F.2d 862, 865; Ferinac v. Italian Importing Co., Iowa, 179 N.W. 823, 824; McGinley v. Maryland Cas. Co., 85 Mont. 1, 277 P. 414, 417, 72 A.L.R. 1; National Surety Co. v. Jackson County Bank, 4 Cir., 20 F.2d 644, 646; Waggoner v. Western Carolina Pub. Co., 190 N.C. 829, 130 S.E. 609; Kelley v. Isensee, 60 N.D. 149, 233 N.W. 245; Wm. Cameron Co. v. Gibson, Tex. Civ. App. 278 S.W. 522, writ refused; Roller v. Wooldridge, 46 Tex. 485, 495; Ellis v. Simmons, 5 Cir., 11 F.2d 596; Armour Fertilizer Works v. Maddox, 168 Ga. 429, 148 S.E. 152; Wilkins v. Waldo Lumber Co., 130 Me. 5, 153 A. 191; Miller v. Chatsworth Sav. Bank, 203 Iowa 411, 212 N.W. 722; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Beebe, 10 Cir., 54 F.2d 743; Horst v. Lightfoot, 103 Tex. 643, 648, 132 S.W. 761; Scott v. Lott, Tex. Civ. App. 247 S.W. 685; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, Tex. Civ. App. 11 S.W.2d 533, 539; Murchison v. Davis, Tex. Civ. App. 4 S.W.2d 1016, 1018; Lynch Davidson Co. v. Denman Lumber Co., Tex. Civ. App. 272 S.W. 803; Jason Weiler Sons v. Haskell Nat. Bank, Tex. Civ. App. 13 S.W.2d 384; Grayburg Oil Co. v. Powell, 118 Tex. 354, 26 S.W.2d 333; Owen v. King, Tex. Civ. App. 84 S.W.2d 743, reversed on other grounds 130 Tex. 614, 111 S.W.2d 695, 114 A.L.R. 859; Texas P. C. O. Co. v. Smith, Tex. Civ. App. 130 S.W.2d 425. Also see State Life Ins. Co. v. Duke, Tex. Civ. App. 69 S.W.2d 791, writ refused; Dunlap v. Villareal, Tex. Civ. App. 91 S.W.2d 1124; Kreis v. Kreis, Tex. Civ. App. 57 S.W.2d 1107; 2 Tex.Jur. 487. We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in submitting over defendant's objection question No. 14, and that, as a matter of law, plaintiff is bound by said agreement, which has been fully performed by defendant, and that plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this case.

Adams v. Houston Nat. Bank (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W.2d 878; Sullivan v. Doyle, 108 Tex. 368, 194 S.W. 136; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Bosworth, supra; Western Indemnity Co. v. Free and Accepted Masons (Tex.Com.App.) 268 S.W. 728; Murchison v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 4 S.W.2d 1016; Sartain v. Hamilton, supra. For the reasons indicated, the judgment in favor of defendant in error Daniels against plaintiff in error, United States Fidelity Guaranty Company, as to the item of $1,575 is reversed, and judgment here rendered that defendant in error Daniels take nothing as to plaintiff in error insurance company as to said item of $1,575; and, with this exception, the judgment in all other respects is affirmed.

This fixes their liability and it is of no importance whether the president of the company or the directors of the same gave the manager the right to purchase said goods on credit or not. Hayward Lumber Co. v. Cox (Tex.Civ.App.) 104 S.W. 403; Murchison v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.2d 1016; Zimpelman v. Keating, 72 Tex. 318, 12 S.W. 177; American National Bank v. Cruger, 91 Tex. 446, 44 S.W. 278; Campbell v. Jenkins (Tex.Civ.App.) 34 S.W. 673; J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Beavers (Tex.Civ.App.) 261 S.W. 440-446; Henderson v. Ry. Co., 17 Tex. 560, 67 Am.Dec. 675; Home Insurance Co. v. Ft. Worth Grain Elevator Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 262 S.W. 870; Id. (Tex.Com.App.) 269 S.W. 432; Trammell v. San Antonio Life Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 209 S.W. 786; Texas G. R. Co. v. Whiteside, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 119 S.W. 126; Merchants' Ice Co. v. Scott Dodson (Tex.Civ.App.) 186 S.W. 418; Lakeside Bridge Steel Co. v. Duvall, 179 Ark. 963, 19 S.W.2d 1107; 21 R.C.L. p. 932, § 111, p. 919, § 99; Williston on Contracts, p. 531, § 278.

The Indemnity Insurance Company of North America urges that the language of the judgment should be changed so as clearly to indicate that the entire case, both as to appellants and as to it, is reversed and remanded, and that such is the only procedure to be followed under the issues of this case. We are of the opinion that the judgment is, perhaps, susceptible of the meaning that the entire case as to all parties is reversed and remanded, and we will reform said judgment, so as to state positively and directly that the judgment of the district court as between the appellants and the Fort Worth Poultry Egg Company is reversed, and that such judgment as between the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America and the Fort Worth Poultry Egg Company is not disturbed. Hamilton v. Prescott, 73 Tex. 565, 11 S.W. 548; Wimple v. Patterson (Tex.Civ.App.) 117 S.W. 1037; Larson v. Middleton (Tex.Civ.App.) 19 S.W.2d 120; Adams v. Houston National Bank (Tex.Com.App.) 1 S.W.2d 878; Murchison v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.2d 1016; Sullivan v. Doyle, 108 Tex. 368, 194 S.W. 136. It appears that cost was taxed against the Fort Worth Poultry Egg Company and against the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America. This, of course, was error, for the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America did not join in the appeal and did not incur any of the cost in this court, and the motions to retax cost are granted and all the cost of this court is taxed against the Fort Worth Poultry Egg Company.

Poythress v. Ivey (Tex.Com.App.) 228 S.W. 157, 158, par. 1. Such being the case, his right to recover in a suit upon such collateral obligation is not affected by the fact that an action against the principal debtor on the original indebtedness is barred. Russell v. People's National Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 2 S.W.2d 961 et seq. (writ refused); Murchison v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.) 4 S.W.2d 1016, 1018; Denmark v. Avinger (Tex.Civ.App.) 257 S.W. 970, 971, 972, and authorities there cited; Peterson v. Rochelle (Tex.Civ.App.) 287 S.W. 1105, 1106. While the debts assigned as collateral security in the cases cited were evidenced by notes, we think the rule therein announced applies with equal force where the debt assigned is not so evidenced.