What evidence constitutes contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact, and each case must be determined according to its own facts and circumstances. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) Whether he was contributorily negligent was a question properly submitted to the jury and, as we cannot say a conclusion opposite to its determination is clearly evident, the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on that ground. Our conclusion that sufficient evidence was presented to make the issue of Breslin's negligence a proper question for the jury bears upon two more contentions of the parties in this appeal. First, Betley asserts that Breslin was negligent as to him in failing to yield the right-of-way, not keeping a proper lookout, and not decreasing his speed to avoid a collision.

• 1, 2 In an action predicated on negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove the exercise of due care for his own safety. Whether the evidence establishes his due care must be determined from the facts of each case. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) In Illinois law there is a presumption that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen is incapable of negligence. ( Strasma v. Lemke (1969), 111 Ill. App.2d 377, 250 N.E.2d 305.

( Jines v. Greyhound Corp., 33 Ill.2d 83; Swenson v. City of Rockford, 9 Ill.2d 122.) The degree of evidence sufficient to establish contributory negligence must be determined from the facts of each case. ( Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill. App.2d 137.) However, contributory negligence will be found as a matter of law only where the evidence is such that all reasonable men would reach the same conclusion. ( Wojtowicz v. Sarno, 45 Ill. App.2d 223.

Contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. ( Jines v. Greyhound Corp. (1965), 33 Ill.2d 83, 210 N.E.2d 562.) What evidence constitutes contributory negligence is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) For contributory negligence to be found as a matter of law it must be shown that all the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff's negligence when viewed most favorably towards her so overwhelmingly establishes negligence that no verdict in her favor could ever stand. Moore v. Checker Taxi Company, Inc. (1971), (Ill.App.2d), 273 N.E.2d 514.

• 1-5 Whether or not a particular set of facts presents reasons for finding negligence as a matter of law is for the determination of the trial court. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809; Grill v. Bradley (1959), 22 Ill. App.2d 535, 161 N.E.2d 347.) If the evidence is not overwhelmingly one-sided, but requires the weighing of conflicting testimony or permits the drawing of different inferences, the issues are for the jury to decide. It is the function of the jury as a fact-finding body to resolve conflicts in evidence and to make the ultimate determination of liability. ( Snyder v. Black (1964), 53 Ill. App.2d 327, 203 N.E.2d 1.) The court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict.

• 2, 3 For the trial court to find contributory negligence as a matter of law, it must be shown that all the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff's negligence, when viewed most favorably toward her, so overwhelmingly establishes her negligence that no verdict in her favor could ever stand. ( Moore v. Checker Taxi Co. (1971), (Ill.App.2d), No. 54981, filed 7/15/71; Maddox v. Grisham (1970), 124 Ill. App.2d 421, 260 N.E.2d 336.) What evidence constitutes contributory negligence must be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) Whether Mrs. Winston was guilty of negligence in failing to observe the bus before she entered Cottage Grove, or whether she failed to take sufficient precaution for her own safety once in the street, presented questions of fact and not of law. The jurors were instructed as to the law of contributory negligence, they observed the witnesses, heard their testimony and saw several pictures of the intersection.

( Olson v. Weingard, 77 Ill. App.2d 274, 222 N.E.2d 24; Swenson v. City of Rockford, 9 Ill.2d 122, 136 N.E.2d 777; 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence, §§ 7, 295.) Each case must be determined on its own facts. ( Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) To have proved that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, defendant had to show that all the evidence, viewed most favorably to her, so overwhelmingly established plaintiff's negligence that no verdict in her favor could ever stand.

• 1, 2 What evidence constitutes contributory negligence is ordinarily a question of fact and each case must be determined on its own facts and circumstances. ( Murad v. Witek (1964), 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809.) Since Checker seeks judgment as a matter of law, it must show that all the evidence bearing upon Moore's negligence, when viewed most favorably toward him, so overwhelmingly established his negligence that no verdict in his favor could ever stand. Maddox v. Grisham (1970), 124 Ill. App.2d 421, 260 N.E.2d 336; Bebb v. Yellow Cab Co. (1970), 120 Ill. App.2d 454, 257 N.E.2d 164.

[1] It is the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because she was following the car ahead of her so closely that she was unable to stop without coming in contact with it. Several cases are cited in support of the proposition that a party who collides with a stopped vehicle is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. However, as this court observed in Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809 (1964), such cases must be decided on their own particular facts. Traffic conditions on modern expressways differ sharply from those on side streets, arterial streets or even highways.

When the evidence is considered in its most favorable aspect to the plaintiff and there is a total failure to prove a necessary element of his case, the motion for a directed verdict should be sustained. Brill v. Davajon, 51 Ill. App.2d 445, 201 N.E.2d 253; Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill. App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809; Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 46 Ill. App.2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355; Wojtowicz v. Sarno, 45 Ill. App.2d 223, 195 N.E.2d 218. The question in this case is whether the plaintiff's evidence proved or tended to prove the elements of his cause of action. [4-6] In a malpractice action a physician will be held responsible for injuries resulting from his want of reasonable care, skill and diligence in his practice.