Opinion
Case No. 2:99-CV-981 JTG.
June 2, 2005
ORDER
Petitioner, Michael Munson, petitions for habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 (2005). The Court denies him.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was charged with one count each of aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and aggravated burglary. He requested that Judge Heffernan, who had been assigned his case, be removed. He argued that she was prejudiced against him because she had presided over an earlier case in which he was a defendant. His request was denied.
Reserving no issues for appeal, Petitioner pled guilty to all three counts. He later filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the next day — after defense counsel told him of the motion's implications and advised him not to proceed — he filed a motion to strike the motion to withdraw.
During the sentencing hearing, information was introduced about Petitioner's belief in Satan worship. After Petitioner challenged that testimony, the trial court struck it and stated she would not consider the testimony in determining his sentence.
Petitioner petitioned for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. There, he raised the following issues: (1) whether he was unfairly prejudiced by Judge Heffernan's failure to recuse; (2) whether the state sentencing statute allowing the court to consider "any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty . . . consider[ed] relevant" was overly broad and vague, allowing the trial court to unfairly take into account his Satan worship; and (3) whether his counsel was ineffective in advising him to move to strike his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Affirming Petitioner's conviction, the court determined (1) Petitioner waived the matter of Judge Heffernan's recusal as he had not reserved it in his guilty plea; (2) because the trial court struck the evidence of Satan worship and did not consider it in sentencing, Petitioner had no standing to challenge the statute allegedly allowing the court to consider such testimony; and (3) because Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, it was highly unlikely that the trial court would have granted his motion to withdraw it, and therefore no prejudice stemmed from counsel's advice to move to strike the motion.
Now, in this federal habeas petition, Petitioner brings to this Court the same three issues he raised in the highest Utah state court. The issues are thus properly exhausted.
ANALYSIS I. Procedural Default
The Utah Supreme Court did not address the merits of Petitioner's first two grounds for relief — Judge Heffernan's recusal and the sentencing statute's constitutionality — denying them respectively on the procedural bases of waiver and standing. Regarding waiver in this context, Utah law states that unless "a defendant . . . enter[s] a conditional guilty plea and expressly reserves pre-plea issues for appeal" those issues are waived. State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1998) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Utah Ct.App. 1988)). Regarding standing in this context, Utah law holds that "`before a party may attack the constitutionality of a statute he must be adversely affected by that very statute.'" See id. (quoting Sims v. Smith, 571 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1977)). Because Petitioner waived his judicial bias claim by not raising it in a conditional plea and was not "adversely affected" by the sentencing statute possibly allowing consideration of Satan worship, he was procedurally barred from raising these federal constitutional issues before the Utah Supreme Court.
"This court may not consider issues raised in a habeas petition `that have been defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate procedural ground unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'" Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (alteration omitted) (quoting English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998)). Here, Petitioner has argued neither cause and prejudice nor a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse his procedural default. This Court therefore denies federal habeas relief as to the two claims discussed in this section.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in advising him to move to strike his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserts that newly appointed counsel — who was not at the plea hearing — "failed to investigate and review the transcripts from the Plea Hearings to determine that Petitioner was confused and did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty." He reasons that had he not followed counsel's guidance he would have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
A. Standard of Review
Section 2254, under which this habeas petition was filed, states in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d) (2005).
Under § 2254(d)(1), this Court may grant habeas relief only when the state court has formed "a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, decided the case differently than the Supreme Court has decided a case with a materially indistinguishable set of facts, or unreasonably applied the governing legal principle to the facts of the petitioner's case." Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000)). This deferential standard does not allow a federal habeas court to issue a writ merely because it determines in its own view that the state decision erroneously applied clearly established federal law. See id. "`Rather that application must also be unreasonable.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1522). Moreover, federal courts must presume state court factual findings are correct. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(e)(1) (2005)). Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(e)(1) (2005)).
Finally, "[i]t is, of course, well settled that the fact that constitutional error occurred in the proceedings that led to a state-court conviction may not alone be sufficient reason for concluding that a prisoner is entitled to the remedy of habeas." Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1503. This Court must "give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law." Id. at 1509. Still, "errors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly justify the issuance of the federal writ." Id. at 1503.
B. Application of Standard of Review
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis of Petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim by setting forth the following well-established two-pronged test:
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, "`a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994) (quoting Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)). To establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different." State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1988).State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998).
The court supported its analysis by citing to three of its prior cases, all of which use the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 521; Bundy, 763 P.2d at 805; Lovell, 758 P.2d at 913. Thus, the state court applied the correct governing Supreme Court precedent. See Johnlouis v. Williams, No. 02-2272, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6902, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 2003) (unpublished). Further, Petitioner has neither argued nor shown that the Utah Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland and its progeny and/or made unreasonable factual determinations.
The supreme court observed that, "to show prejudice, [Petitioner] must show there is a reasonable probability the court would have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea." Munson, 972 P.2d at 422. The court went on to point out that the motion would have been granted only if Petitioner could have shown "that the plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily." See id. The court then carefully analyzed the transcript of the plea colloquy, giving examples of exchanges between Petitioner and the trial court, before concluding that his plea was indeed knowing and voluntary. Having made that determination, the court noted Petitioner was not prejudiced by following his attorney's advice and therefore could not prevail on his ineffective-assistance claim. See id.
This Court cannot say that the Utah Supreme Court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d)(1) (2005). Indeed, the court specifically used a Supreme Court holding to frame its analysis. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And, under a reasonable reading of Supreme Court precedent, Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to raise issues that would not have changed the fact that he was stuck with his plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (holding successful ineffective-assistance claim requires that counsel's deficient performance must have "affected the outcome").