Opinion
24A-CR-796
11-20-2024
Conway Lee Munoz, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Eric J. Massey Banks & Brower, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Clinton Circuit Court The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 12C01-2204-F4-477
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Eric J. Massey Banks & Brower, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges May and DeBoer concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Following a bench trial, Conway Lee Munoz was convicted of burglary, a Level 4 felony. Munoz appeals and claims that: (1) the trial court committed fundamental error by accepting Munoz's written waiver of his right to a jury trial; and (2) insufficient evidence supports his burglary conviction. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Issues
[¶2] Munoz presents two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error by accepting Munoz's written waiver of his right to a jury trial.
II. Whether sufficient evidence supports Munoz's burglary conviction.
Facts
[¶3] On April 25, 2022, Joshua Collet was asleep in his bedroom in his apartment in Frankfort that he shared with his wife and five-year-old son. Collet woke up when his cats ran through his bedroom and a small dog, which he had never seen before, began to lick his face. Collet heard his son ask someone, "Who are you?" Tr. Vol. II p. 13. Collet then ran out of his bedroom and saw a strange man, later identified as Munoz, standing in his kitchen. Startled, Collet repeatedly asked Munoz what he was doing in the apartment. Munoz claimed that he had been in a nearby alley and heard someone call for help. Collet noticed that the camera app on Munoz's phone was active. Collet repeatedly told Munoz to get out of the apartment and, after a few minutes, Munoz left with his dog. Collet then called 911.
[¶4] Collet also looked at his front door and noticed that a plexiglass pane had been pushed in, creating a gap near the doorknob. The door had been undamaged prior to the incident with Munoz. Collet also noticed that his wallet, which had been lying on the kitchen counter about two feet from where Munoz had been standing, was missing. The wallet contained around $200 in cash, in twentydollar bills. Munoz and his wife searched the apartment for the wallet to no avail. The wallet was never found.
[¶5] Officers from the Frankfort Police Department responded to Collet's 911 call. When Collet described Munoz and his dog, one of the officers recalled seeing someone matching the description walking with a dog only a few blocks away shortly after the 911 call. Within the hour, the police located Munoz about six or seven blocks from Collet's apartment. The officers took Munoz to the police station, advised him of his rights, and interviewed him about the break-in at Collet's home. Munoz gave conflicting statements. He first claimed that he had not been inside the apartment, but later he claimed to have only been following his dog. He also claimed that he saw a small child in the apartment and thought the child needed help. Munoz claimed that he knocked on the door and noticed that the plexiglass had been pushed in, so he opened the door and entered the apartment. When taken into custody, Munoz had $168 in cash, mostly in twenty-dollar bills, on his person; he claimed to have gotten the cash from an ATM machine. Munoz claimed that a CVS store "knew what [he] bought," but then claimed that he had not bought anything. Id. at 31.
[¶6] On April 26, 2022, the State charged Munoz with burglary, a Level 4 felony, and residential entry, a Level 6 felony. At the initial hearing held on April 27, 2022, Munoz signed and initialed an advisement-of-rights form that explained that he had the right to a "public, speedy trial by jury." Appellant's App. p. 10. At Munoz's request, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Munoz.
[¶7] The trial court held a pre-trial hearing on March 1, 2023, and issued an order that day titled "ORDER FROM JURY TRIAL ADVISEMENT." Id. at 35. This order noted that the trial court, in anticipation of a jury trial, advised Munoz of his rights. The order also granted Munoz's request to continue the jury trial. A similar hearing was held and a similar order was issued on July 10, 2023. On August 15, 2023, Munoz, by counsel, filed a written waiver of his right to trial by jury. This waiver, which was electronically signed by both Munoz and his counsel, provided:
1. The Defendant understands that a jury trial consists of twelve (12) fair and impartial members of the community selected to sit and listen to the evidence presented in this case and unanimously decide if the State can prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime(s) he has been charged with in this case.
2. The Defendant understands that his waiver would consist of this Honorable Court hearing this matter in the form of a bench trial.
3. The Defendant hereby freely and voluntarily waives his right to a trial by jury. The Defendant agrees he has not been threatened or coerced into giving up his right to a trial by jury.
4. The Defendant has consulted with counsel and believes a waiver of trial by jury is in his best interest.
5. Defense counsel has conferred with [the] deputy prosecutor [ ] and she agrees on behalf of the State of Indiana to this waiver.Id. at 56. The trial court accepted the waiver the following day, vacated the jury trial date, and set the matter for a bench trial.
[¶8] A bench trial was held on December 18, 2023, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. On January 10, 2024, the trial court issued an order finding Munoz guilty of burglary, a Level 4 felony. The trial court sentenced Munoz to seven years, with five years thereof to be served in the Department of Correction, one year on Community Corrections, and one year suspended to probation. Munoz now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. The trial court did not commit fundamental error by accepting Munoz's waiver of his right to a jury trial.
[¶9] Munoz first argues that the trial court erred by accepting Munoz's waiver of his right to a jury trial. Munoz claims his waiver was invalid under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Code Section 35-37-1-2. Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury ...." Indiana Code Section 35-37-1-2 provides that "[t]he defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to the court. Unless a defendant waives the right to a jury trial under the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure, all other trials must be by jury."
[¶10] In Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154 (Ind. 2016), our Supreme Court noted that the right to a trial by jury is "a bedrock of our criminal justice system" that is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 1158. Although both the "federal and Indiana constitutional jury trial rights guarantee the same general protection-a criminal defendant must receive a jury trial, unless he waives it," Indiana's jury trial right provides greater protection" in that our Supreme Court has long held that a jury-trial waiver is valid "only if it is communicated personally by the defendant." Id. (citing Kellems v. State, 849 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (Ind. 2006)). A trial court's failure to confirm a defendant's personal waiver before proceeding to a bench trial is fundamental error. Id. at 1160.
[¶11] Fundamental error occurs "'only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.'" Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 490 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013)). "The error claimed must either 'make a fair trial impossible' or 'constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.'" Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)).
[¶12] Our Supreme Court has long held that "[a] defendant's filing of a signed waiver of the right to a jury trial constitutes an affirmative act necessary for waiver in the context of a felony case and adequately reflects the defendant's personal desire to waive this right." Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 1997) (citing Kimball v. State, 474 N.E.2d 982 (Ind. 1985)); see also Dixie v. State, 726 N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ind. 2000); Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269, 278 (Ind. 1998); Good v. State, 267 Ind. 29, 32, 366 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (1977) (all holding that written waiver of right to jury trial is sufficient).
[¶13] Munoz argues, however, that his written waiver should not have been sufficient because it contains only his electronic signature and was not filed during or in conjunction with a pre-trial or other hearing. We disagree. The trial court here twice issued orders noting that it had advised Munoz of his rights. Munoz signed and initialed a pre-trial order that specifically advised him of his right to a jury trial. And Munoz electronically signed the waiver of his right to a jury trial, which explicitly noted that Munoz understood his rights and waived them voluntarily. An electronic signature has the same force and effect as a written signature. Green v. State, 945 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code § 26-2-8-106); Borjas v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011).
[¶14] Munoz's attempt to distinguish this case from Poore, 681 N.E.2d 204, is unavailing. In that case, our Supreme Court upheld the validity of the defendant's written waiver of his right to a jury trial. Id. at 208. In Poore, the defendant signed the waiver at a pretrial conference. Id. Although no transcript of the conference was available, the chronological case summary noted that "Def. files Waiver of Jury Trial.... Court finds knowing and intelligent waiver of Jury Trial." Id. at 206 (record citation omitted).
[¶15] Munoz claims that, in contrast, his written waiver was not filed at a pre-trial hearing and the trial court made no inquiry into the waiver. Munoz, however, cites no authority to support his claim that a written waiver is valid only if signed in open court or filed at a pre-trial hearing; our research has also revealed no case requiring such additional facts before a trial court may accept a written waiver of the right to a jury trial. Moreover, we have held that "'[e]ven though it may be preferable for the trial court, by way of an on-the-record hearing, to advise the defendant of his right to a trial by jury and the consequences of waiving that right, such is not required by either the United States or the Indiana constitutions, or by statute.'" McSchooler v. State, 15 N.E.3d 678, 682-83 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) (quoting Hutchins v. State, 493 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind. 1986)); accord Poore, 681 N.E.2d at 208. Instead, "'[a] knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of a jury trial may be accomplished by a written waiver[.]'" McSchooler, 15 N.E.3d at 682 (quoting Kimball, 474 N.E.2d at 986).
Munoz acknowledges that such a colloquy is not required, but he argues that it should be required. Our Supreme Court has authoritatively spoken on this issue, and we cannot second-guess its opinions on the matter. See State v. Hardy, 7 N.E.3d 396, 402 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014) ("We are bound by our Supreme Court's decisions, and its precedent is binding until it is changed by the Supreme Court or legislative enactment").
[¶16] We thus conclude that Munoz has not shown any error, much less fundamental error, by the trial court's acceptance of Munoz's signed, written waiver of his right to a jury trial.
II. Sufficient evidence supports Munoz's conviction for burglary.
[¶17] Munoz also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary. "Claims of insufficient evidence 'warrant a deferential standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.'" Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 429 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022) (quoting Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. On appeal, "[w]e consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence." Id. (citing Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262). "'We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,'" and we will affirm a conviction "'unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262). It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; instead, the evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).
[¶18] To convict Munoz of burglary, a Level 4 felony, the State had to prove that Munoz: (1) broke and entered, (2) the dwelling of another person, (3) with the intent to commit a felony or theft in it. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1). Munoz does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he broke and entered into Collet's home. He claims only that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he intended, as charged, to commit theft in Collet's home. We disagree.
[¶19] To establish the element that the defendant intended to commit a felony or theft at the time he broke and entered, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intent to commit the felony or theft specified in the charge. Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1219, 1230 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (citing Freshwater v. State, 853 N.E.2d 941, 942 (Ind. 2006)). "'Burglars rarely announce their intentions at the moment of entry, and indeed many times there is no one around to hear them even if they were to do so." Smith v. State, 210 N.E.3d 312, 321 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012)). Thus, a defendant's intent to commit a specific felony or theft at the time of the breaking and entering may be inferred from the circumstances. Id. (citing Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 229-30). "The evidentiary inference pointing to the defendant's intent must be separate from the inference of the defendant's breaking and entering." Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 230. "Evidence of intent need not be insurmountable, but there must be a specific fact that provides a solid basis to support a reasonable inference that the defendant had the specific intent to commit a felony." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
[¶20] Here, Collet testified that he always kept his wallet on the counter. When Collet confronted Munoz, Munoz was standing only two feet from where Collet kept his wallet. After Munoz left Collet's home, Collet could not find his wallet, even after he and his wife searched the apartment. Collet's wallet contained $200 in cash in twenty-dollar bills. When Munoz was apprehended, he had just under $200 on his person, mostly in twenty-dollar bills.
[¶21] From this, the trial court, acting as the trier of fact, could reasonably conclude that, when Munoz broke and entered Collet's apartment, he did so with the intent to commit theft inside. See Baker, 968 N.E.2d at 231 (holding that evidence that defendant had opened several cupboards and drawers while inside the church he had broken into permitted a reasonable inference of his intent to commit theft at the time of entry). Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Munoz's conviction for burglary.
Conclusion
[¶22] The trial court did not commit fundamental error by accepting Munoz's signed, written waiver of his right to a jury trial, and the State presented sufficient evidence to support Munoz's conviction for burglary. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.
[¶23] Affirmed.
May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.