Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-cv-00054
07-18-2023
SANDRA MUNOZ, Plaintiff. v. SI 34TH-290 LLC, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
ANDREW M. EDISON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On February 22, 2023, Defendant Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (“Chipotle”) removed this slip-and-fall case to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Chipotle argues that its co-defendant, SI 34th-290 LLC (“SI 34th-290”), is improperly joined because Plaintiff Sandra Munoz (“Munoz”) “has no possibility of establishing a cause of action against” SI 34th-290. Dkt. 1 at 2. On June 30, 2023, I told Munoz that there are “only two possible outcomes” in this removed case: “This court either has jurisdiction (because SI 34th-290 is improperly joined) or it does not.” Dkt. 21 at 3. I told Munoz that she “must either dismiss SI 34th-290 from this litigation or respond to Chipotle's improper joinder argument by filing a motion to remand.” Id. Munoz has done neither.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). “Federal courts, both trial and appellate, have a continuing obligation to examine the basis for their jurisdiction. The issue may be raised by parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.” MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). If Munoz refuses to address the jurisdictional issues I have raised, then I will do it for her by ruling on Chipotle's improper joinder argument.
The Fifth Circuit has “recognized two ways to establish improper joinder: (1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). Chipotle argues the latter-that Munoz “has no possibility of establishing a cause of action against [SI 34th-290] because [it is] merely the landowner and landlord of the commercial property on which the subject Chipotle store is located and did not have control over the premise.” Dkt. 1 at 2-3.
“A lessor generally has no duty to tenants or their invitees for dangerous conditions on the leased premises.” Johnson Cnty. Sheriff's Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex. 1996). The three exceptions to this rule are: (1) where a lessor makes negligent repairs; (2) where a lessor conceals a defect on the premises; and (3) where a lessor causes “a defect on a portion of premises that remain under the lessor's control.” Id. None of these exceptions apply here, where Munoz alleges only that “she slipped and fell on water that was left on the floor.” Dkt. 1-4 at 13. More importantly, Munoz has not alleged that SI 34th-290 was negligent in making repairs, concealed a defect, or exercised control of the premises. Accordingly, I find that: (1) Munoz is unable to establish a cause of action against SI 34th-290; (2) SI 34th-290 is improperly joined; and (3) this court has subject matter jurisdiction over Munoz's claims against Chipotle.
Munoz has had ample opportunity to contest Chipotle's assertion that SI 34th-290 is a landowner/landlord without control of the premises on which Chipotle is located, yet she has failed to do so.
Munoz's claims against SI 34th-290 are DISMISSED.