Opinion
Case No. CV 20-10110-JFW(GJSx)
09-07-2021
Jovany MUNOZ v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.
James Richard Boyd, Dennis Jay Price, II, Raymond George Ballister, Jr., Russell C. Handy, Center for Disability Access, San Diego, CA, Michelle Uzeta, Michelle Uzeta Law Offices, Monrovia, CA, for Jovany Munoz. Keever Anya Rhodes Muir, Office of the County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for County of Los Angeles.
James Richard Boyd, Dennis Jay Price, II, Raymond George Ballister, Jr., Russell C. Handy, Center for Disability Access, San Diego, CA, Michelle Uzeta, Michelle Uzeta Law Offices, Monrovia, CA, for Jovany Munoz.
Keever Anya Rhodes Muir, Office of the County Counsel, Los Angeles, CA, for County of Los Angeles.
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT [filed 7/16/2021; Docket No. 23];
JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On July 16, 2021, Defendant County of Los Angeles ("Defendant" or the "County") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment. On July 26, 2021, Plaintiff Jovany Munoz ("Plaintiff") filed his Opposition. On August 2, 2021, Defendant filed a Reply. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court found the matter appropriate for submission on the papers without oral argument. The matter was, therefore, removed from the Court's August 23, 2021 hearing calendar and the parties were given advance notice. After considering the moving, opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and, to the extent any of these facts are disputed, they are not material to the disposition of this order. In addition, to the extent that the Court has relied on evidence to which the parties have objected, the Court has considered and overruled those objections. As to the remaining objections, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to rule on those objections because the disputed evidence was not relied on by the Court.
Plaintiff resides on the 6500 block of Hereford Drive in Los Angeles County. Plaintiff has physical impairments resulting from paraplegia, causing him to rely on a wheelchair for mobility. Plaintiff's son also has physical impairments due to cerebral palsy and also uses a wheelchair for mobility.
The County is a political subdivision of the State of California, and is a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and the laws of the State of California. The sidewalks on the 6300 to 6600 blocks of Hereford Drive are considered public places located in the unincorporated area of East Los Angeles. The County operates, controls, and maintains the sidewalks as a "program." Accordingly, the County is required to maintain the sidewalks such that they are accessible to individuals with disabilities in accordance with Title II of the ADA. See Barden v. City of Sacramento , 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)
Plaintiff and his family moved to Hereford Drive in June 2018. Plaintiff enjoys traveling on the sidewalks near his residence on a regular basis. However, Plaintiff and his son are frequently prevented from enjoying those trips because they encounter barriers in the form of vehicles parked across the sidewalks, driveway aprons, and driveway ramps. To avoid these barriers, Plaintiff is often forced to navigate around those vehicles and at times is forced to ride in the middle of the street without any protection from traffic. On occasion, Plaintiff cannot even reach the street because the vehicles block the only accessible wheelchair exits such as curb ramps and driveway ramps which results in Plaintiff and his son being effectively trapped. As a result of this intolerable situation, Plaintiff has experienced anger, frustration and embarrassment.
Plaintiff has contacted the County on numerous occasions regarding the obstructions on the Hereford sidewalks, through calls, claims, and requests for reasonable modifications. Through his numerous contacts, the County has been placed on notice of the nature and extent of the vehicular obstructions on the Hereford sidewalks and the impact those obstructions have on Plaintiff. Plaintiff asked the County to "take affirmative action" and "take the steps necessary to ensure that the sidewalks [ ] are accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities." On at least three occasions, Plaintiff requested that the County to take specific actions including: (1) placing signage along Hereford Drive notifying residents and visitors of the prohibitions against parking on the sidewalks or in a way that blocks driveways or curb ramps; (2) increasing patrols on Hereford Drive; (3) increasing the citation and/or towing of vehicles parked on the sidewalks or in a way that blocks driveways or curb ramps on Hereford Drive; and (4) providing written notice to residents on Hereford Drive of the prohibition against sidewalk parking and the County's plan to increase patrols, citations, and the towing of illegally parked vehicles.
During the period from January 1, 2017 to June 13, 2021, the County has issued a total of 10 citations to drivers for illegally parking on the Hereford sidewalks. The County did not tow any vehicles for parking on the sidewalks during this same period. According to Plaintiff, the obstructions on the sidewalk continue to be a daily occurrence, and neither Plaintiff nor his wife have seen parking enforcement or the Sheriff's Department patrolling or issuing parking citations on Hereford Drive since July 2020. On November 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the County alleging that the County discriminated against him in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and California's Disabled Persons Act ("DPA"), Cal. Civ. Code § 54. The County moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, partial summary judgment.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party meets its burden, a party opposing a properly made and supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere denials but must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). In particular, when the non-moving party bears the burden of proving an element essential to its case, that party must make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the existence of that element or be subject to summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
An issue is genuine if evidence is produced that would allow a rational trier of fact to reach a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court must assume the truth of direct evidence set forth by the opposing party. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp. 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992). However, where circumstantial evidence is presented, the Court may consider the plausibility and reasonableness of inferences arising therefrom. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; TW Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n , 809 F.2d 626, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1987). In that regard, "a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence will not be sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party must introduce some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’ " Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc. , 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997).
In ruling on a summary judgment motion, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions ...." Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. DISCUSSION
Title II of the ADA prohibits state and local governments from discriminating against persons with disabilities. The relevant statutory language provides: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "This prohibition against discrimination is universally understood as a requirement to provide ‘meaningful access.’ " Lonberg v. City of Riverside , 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). "An individual is excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public program if ‘a public entity's facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities.’ " Daubert v. Lindsay Unified Sch. Dist. , 760 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 ).
To prevail on a Title II claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) this exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Cohen v. City of Culver City , 754 F.3d 690, 695 (9th Cir. 2014) ; Payan v. Los Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 11 F. 4th 729, 737–38 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2021).
The Ninth Circuit has held that "maintaining public sidewalks is a normal function of a city" and "without a doubt something that the City does" and therefore "maintaining their accessibility for individuals with disabilities therefore falls within the scope of Title II." Barden v. City of Sacramento , 292 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). "Obstructed sidewalks exclude disabled persons from ordinary communal life and force them to risk serious injury to undertake daily activities. This is precisely the sort of ‘subtle’ discrimination stemming from ‘thoughtlessness and indifference’ that the ADA aims to abolish." Cohen v. City of Culver City , 754 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc. , 631 F.3d 939, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2011) ).
The County argues, in relevant part, that Title II of the ADA pertains only to architectural and structural barriers and not to transitory vehicles left by third parties that the County does not control and from which the County does not receive a benefit. The Court rejects that argument. In analogous situations, courts within the Ninth Circuit have concluded that temporary or removable obstructions, even when placed by third parties, may constitute an ADA violation when those obstructions are systematic or pervasive or persist for an unreasonable amount of time. See Cohen , 754 F.3d at 699-700 (concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether City of Culver City maintained its sidewalks in operable working condition where the City "allowed" a private vendor to obstruct a curb ramp); Montoya v. City of San Diego , 434 F. Supp. 3d 830, 838-841 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (concluding that plaintiffs had adequately pled a Title II claim, where they alleged that the City of San Diego had failed to ensure the sidewalks, crosswalks, transit stops, curb ramps, pedestrian crossing and other walkways were kept free of "Dockless Vehicle obstructions," failed to adopt, enforce, and implement ordinances to control the proliferation of scooters, and failed to timely respond to and remedy complaints about those barriers); LA All. for Hum. Rts. v. City of Los Angeles , 2021 WL 1546235, at *52 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021) (finding that the named plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their ADA claim, which alleged that the City and County of Los Angeles failed to effectively maintain at least 36 inches of "passable sidewalk" due to the erection of tents by homeless individuals that obstruct city sidewalks); cf. Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc. , 631 F.3d 939, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Title III ADA claim where he encountered obstructed and blocked aisles on each of his eleven separate visits, and that given the frequency of the issue, the Store failed to remedy the issue promptly or within a reasonable period of time).
The County argues that a determining factor in Cohen was that the City of Culver City sponsored the annual car show and "allowed" the vendor's display to block the disabled access curb. As initial matter, although the City of Culver City sponsored the car show, it "never approved the specific layout or placement of the vendors' booths at the car show." 754 F.3d at 700 n.8. In any event, and more importantly, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in this case, the Court concludes that a jury could determine that the County has "allowed" cars to block the sidewalks on Hereford Drive in light of their knowledge of the nearly daily barriers faced by Plaintiff and the County's failure to effectively address the issue.
In reaching its holding, the Ninth Circuit partially relied on the fact that "at least some of the obstructions here appear to have resulted from the affirmative actions of Pier 1 and its employees." Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc. , 779 F.3d 1001, 1009 (9th Cir.2015). The Ninth Circuit relied on this fact primarily to distinguish the Seventh Circuit's decision in Foley v. City of Lafayette, Inc. , 359 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2004), where the Seventh Circuit concluded that a single weather-related breakdown of elevator service was not a violation of the ADA. The fact does not appear to be crucial to the Ninth Circuit's holding, however, given that the Ninth Circuit also stated that "[t]he DOJ interpretive authorities make clear that the presence of items in aisles is not ‘temporary’ ... just because the obstructing items in the aisles were placed there by customers and would have been moved on request or eventually." Id. at 1008.
Accordingly, the Court rejects the County's argument that Title II of the ADA is inapplicable to Plaintiff's claims. With respect to the County's remaining arguments, the Court has reviewed the evidence and concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the grant of summary judgment in its favor.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County's Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED .
IT IS SO ORDERED.