Opinion
23Civ.4224 (DEH) (VF)
07-24-2024
JOSE LEWIS MUNIZ, Plaintiff, v. MAIL OFFICER MCCALL, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
DALE E. HO, United States District Judge
On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Lewis Muniz, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filling the Complaint. Plaintiff, who is in pre-trial detention at the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”) on Rikers Island, sues three corrections officers and the City of New York regarding the denial of a set of orisha beads that Plaintiff uses in his religious practices. Defendants move to dismiss. For the reasons given below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
See ECF No. 1.
See ECF No. 23.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and presumed to be true solely for purposes of adjudicating Defendants' motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his submissions are construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.
See Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2022). In all quotations from cases, citations, footnotes, brackets, ellipses, and emphases are omitted unless otherwise indicated.
See Saeli v. Chautauqua Cnty., 36 F.4th 445, 457 (2d Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff practices Santeria, and as part of his religious practice, he uses sets of orisha beads to perform prayer, communicate with orishas (akin to a saint or god), and receive protection from negative forces and events. On March 23, 2023, Plaintiff received two sets of orisha beads in the mail. One set of beads contained a picture of an orisha, while the other did not; both sets contained beads of various colors, though the set without a picture of an orisha had an additional color of bead.
See Compl. 5, 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 5, 12.
Defendant Roslyn McCall, a mail officer at GRVC, refused to give Plaintiff the set of beads with the picture of an orisha on it, citing the fact that the set was not one solid color.McCall allowed Plaintiff to keep the second set of beads. Although Plaintiff explained the need for the beads depicting an orisha for his religious practice, McCall declined to give them to him. Plaintiff was denied these multi-colored orisha beads even while other people incarcerated at GRVC are allowed to possess orisha beads that are multi-colored.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In response, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of Constituent and Grievance Services (“OCGS”). As of the filing of the Complaint, Plaintiff had not heard anything in response from Defendant Antoinette Cort, the warden of GRVC. Plaintiff also filed a 311 Complaint. In response, Defendant Captain Carlin Adams-Nicholas, another corrections officer, informed Plaintiff that she would conduct an investigation. When Plaintiff asked Adams-Nicholas about her investigation, she stated that she had completed the investigation and that Plaintiff “should be happy that one [set of beads] was given to [him].” Finally, a grievance counselor reported to Plaintiff that the mail officers did not consider Santeria to be a religion, which is why they refused to give him his beads.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7. The Court accepts Defendants' representations in their brief in support of the motion to dismiss regarding the identities of the Defendants. See Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 24.
Compl. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Because of the denial of his orisha beads, Plaintiff has suffered emotional and psychological harm and feels spiritually disconnected from his religious practice. He has also lost weight, has had trouble sleeping, and cannot concentrate.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 10.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” “In assessing the complaint, [a court] must construe it liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor.” However, the court must disregard any “conclusory allegations, such as ‘formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action.'” When reviewing pro se pleadings, a Court must interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470. F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights and of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is not obligated to articulate the legal claims he pursues-only the facts in support of such claims. The parties agree that the federal Constitution and RLUIPA provide the most appropriate legal basis for relief under the facts as alleged by Plaintiff. The Court has independently reviewed the Complaint and does not find additional claims potentially available to Plaintiff. Plaintiff brings these claims against Defendants McCall (the mail officer who denied him the set of orisha beads), Cort (the warden of GRVC), and Adams-Nicholas (the officer who investigated Plaintiff's complaints), and the City of New York. Defendants move to dismiss all claims. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff's opposition, which states that it is his submission with respect to the motion to dismiss in full, docketed. As set forth below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
See Compl. 2.
See Dingle v. Zon, 189 Fed.Appx. 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the complaint could support a claim under RLUIPA-despite that the face of the complaint alleges only specific, constitutional violations-the district court has an obligation to consider the claim.... Factual allegations alone are what matters [in the context of a pro se incarcerated litigant].”); accord Peters v. Ulster Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 23-210, 2023 WL 4873315, at *1 (2d Cir. July 27, 2023) (similar).
Defs.' Mem. of L. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 1 & n.1, ECF No. 24; Compl. 2.
Compl. 3.
See ECF No. 23.
See Opp'n 1, ECF No. 40.
A. Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights. Liberally construed, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant McCall violated Plaintiff's right to freely exercise his religion. All other federal constitutional claims (that is, as alleged against other Defendants and alleging violations of other constitutional provisions) fail.
See Compl. 2.
1. Free Exercise
“Prisoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.” “In the prison context, however, the right to free exercise of religion is balanced against the interests of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from administration of the penal system.” “[T]o assess a free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers legitimate penological objectives.”
Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003).
Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 127 (2d Cir. 2023).
Id. at 128.
Plaintiff alleges a sincerely-held religious belief. He alleges that use of the orisha beads is one of the main tenets of his Santeria religion, necessary for prayer and communication with his gods, and that wearing his orisha beads protects him from negative forces and events.Courts in this District have recognized the importance of orisha beads to adherents of Santeria, including the “great significance” of “[t]he colors of the beads, and color combinations of bead strands.”
See Compl. 7.
Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.Supp. 194, 201-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Sotomayor, J.); accord Vann v. Fischer, No. 11 Civ. 1958, 2012 WL 2384428, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012).
Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges that the denial of his orisha beads infringes upon his religious beliefs. “[A] prisoner claiming a violation of the right to the free exercise of religion . . . need not make a showing of a substantial burden.” Plaintiff alleges that without his preferred orisha beads, he cannot communicate with his gods and perform prayer. Depriving him of them, therefore, qualifies as an infringement on his religious exercise.
Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 122.
See Compl. 7, 17-18.
See Campos, 854 F.Supp. at 209-10 (“Even a novice, wholly unfamiliar with Santeria, can glean from [the record] that the wearing of beads is a bona fide tenet of a significant number of Santeria practitioners and that the failure to wear the beads is sincerely believed to result in life altering adverse consequences.”).
Finally, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges the absence of a penological interest in depriving him of his orisha beads. The Complaint alleges that other inmates are allowed to possess orisha beads with multiple colors. This is sufficient to establish the lack of a penological interest in depriving Plaintiff of the beads in question. Defendants argue that restrictions on the colors of prayer beads further a legitimate interest in suppressing displays of gang affiliation. However, this argument raises factual questions not appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss, including, e.g., the colors of both sets of orisha beads, the colors used by gangs in the GRVC, and the reasonableness of Defendants' policy-matters “largely . . . to be addressed after the discovery of relevant evidence.”
Compl. 12.
See Vann, 2012 WL 2384428, at *7 (“Plaintiff argues, in effect, that a legitimate penological interest requiring confiscation of his beads would also require the confiscation of other, similar items used in other religions.... Plaintiff[']s logic is strong enough to allege the absence of such a justification.”).
See Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F.Supp. 440, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Since beads are used as a symbol of identity, unity, and authority by various gangs, prison officials have a compelling interest in restricting the use of the beads.”).
Vann, 2012 WL 2384428, at *7.
Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a violation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. However, “[t]o establish a defendant's individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show the defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” The Complaint alleges that McCall refused to give Plaintiff both sets of his orisha beads, which is sufficient to establish personal liability under § 1983. In contrast, the Complaint alleges that Adams-Nicholas conducted an investigation into the denial of the orisha beads and told Plaintiff that he had “some nerve to complain about beads and [he] should be happy that one pair was given to [him].” This allegation, even if true, does not establish personal involvement in the underlying constitutional violation. Plaintiff also admits that he has not had any personal involvement with GRVC Warden Cort. Accordingly, the Complaint does not allege facts supporting a § 1983 claim against Adams-Nicholas and Cort.
Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 129.
Compl. 5.
Id. at 6.
Opp'n 5.
Finally, Plaintiff brings claims against the City of New York. “[A] municipality can be held liable under [§] 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the municipality.” “[T]o sue a municipality, such as the City of New York, under [§] 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality's employees . . . engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights.” The Complaint contains no allegations that, even if liberally construed, make this showing. In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that the City has a policy of not considering Santeria a religion and that it is treated unfavorably compared to other religions. However, this argument is undercut by the allegations in the Complaint that other inmates are allowed to possess orisha beads, indicating that the City does in fact recognize Santeria religious practice.
Diarra v. City of New York, 771 Fed.Appx. 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)).
Muflihi v. Rikers Island Emps., No. 24 Civ. 395, 2024 WL 2058431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024).
See Opp'n 5-6.
See Compl. 5.
In sum, the Complaint sufficiently alleges a claim under § 1983 against Defendant McCall for violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Free Exercise Clause. It does not sufficiently allege claims against Defendants Cort, Adams-Nicholas, and the City of New York.
2. Equal Protection
Plaintiff also alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. “To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that: ‘(1) plaintiff, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'” In the context of a prisoner's equal protection claim, a court must examine “the reasonableness of the prison rules and policies . . . to determine whether distinctions made between religious groups in prison are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Plaintiff alleges that other inmates are allowed to wear and possess multi-colored orisha beads, and therefore he is not being treated fairly. However, these allegations indicate that GRVC officials do not discriminate on the basis of practicing Santeria, because other prisoners who practice Santeria are allowed to possess orisha beads. Accordingly, the Complaint does not contain allegations of distinctions between different religious groups, and therefore does not allege facts in support of a class-based equal protection claim.
Compl. 5.
Rogers v. Fontaine, No. 23 Civ. 1350, 2024 WL 83338, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 8, 2024) (quoting Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Dingle, 189 Fed.Appx. at 10-11.
Compl. 5, 12.
Nor does Plaintiff adequately allege facts in support of a class-of-one equal protection claim. “While the Equal Protection Clause is most commonly used to bring claims alleging discrimination based on membership in a protected class,” a plaintiff may also bring a “class of one” equal protection claim. “A class-of-one claim exists where the plaintiff alleges that []he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” “Class-of-one plaintiffs must show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.” Plaintiff does not meet this bar: he alleges that other prisoners are allowed to possess orisha beads and that he is being singled out and targeted by staff in the mailroom.However, even liberally construed, he does not plead facts suggesting that he is similarly situated to these prisoners to such an extent that “there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Accordingly, the Complaint does not sufficiently plead a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Neilson v. D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2005).
Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc. v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2010).
Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010); accord Walker v. Capra, No. 22 Civ. 7638, 2024 WL 21938, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2024) (“It is well established that this pleading standard is demanding.”)
See Compl. 5, 7.
Kusel, 626 F.3d at 140.
3. Due Process
Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of procedural due process with respect to the denial of his orisha beads, because of the lack of involvement of a chaplain and security officers.Defendants acknowledge that under prison policies, staff in receipt of a request to exercise religious beliefs or practices “shall refer requests of a religious nature of the Administrative Chaplain.” “However, neither state policies nor state statutes create federally protected due process entitlements to specific state-mandated procedures.” Further, “[a]n inmate has no constitutional right to an administrative remedy or grievance program, to have his grievance properly processed or investigated, or to receive a response to a grievance he has filed.”Accordingly, Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead a violation of his procedural due process rights.
See Compl. 8; see also Opp'n 4-5 (arguing also that the lack of a response to Plaintiff's grievance constituted a violation of procedural due process).
See Reply 9, ECF No. 42 (quoting New York City Department of Correction Directive 3261, Section III.F.2, available at https://www.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/directives/Directive3261ReligiousPrograms.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D8F-NGUZ]).
Riddick v. Semple, 731 Fed.Appx. 11, 13 (2d Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of a prisoner's procedural due process claim based on the restriction of access to grievance procedures).
Zachs v. Barone, No. 24 Civ. 171, 2024 WL 2293158, at *4 (D. Conn. May 21, 2024).
B. RLUIPA
Under RLUIPA, “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution.” “[A] plaintiff must first demonstrate that the state has imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of her religion; the burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate that the challenged policy or action furthered a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”
Williams v. Annucci, 895 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2018).
Id.
At this stage in the proceedings, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts in support of a RLUIPA claim. As discussed, the Complaint alleges facts indicating that the denial of orisha beads burdens Plaintiff's religious practice. Although it is not necessary for a plaintiff to allege a substantial burden in order to establish a constitutional violation, the Complaint in this case (construed liberally in favor of Plaintiff) does allege a substantial burden on Plaintiff's exercise of religion, given the centrality of orisha beads to Plaintiff's practice of Santeria.
See Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 122.
Cf. Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987, 993 (2d Cir. 2023) (preventing plaintiff from “engag[ing] in a fundamental act of worship for over five months” constituted a substantial burden); Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 35 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In the context of religious feasts and fasting, . . . a small number of noncompliant meals-even a single violation-can be a substantial burden.”).
RLUIPA allows a plaintiff to “obtain appropriate relief against a government,” and defines “government” to include “a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State” and “any . . . official” thereof. “RLUIPA does not create a private right of action against state officials in their individual capacities.” “[U]nder RLUIPA, an incarcerated person may only seek injunctive relief against a state official.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), -5(4)(A).
Washington v. Gonyea, 731 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Muflihi, 2024 WL 2058431, at *2 n.2 (“RLUIPA does not provide for monetary damages against state officials sued in their official capacities.”).
The Court construes the Complaint as seeking injunctive relief in the form of Defendants turning over the withheld set of orisha beads. Accordingly, Plaintiff may maintain a RLUIPA claim against Defendants McCall and Cort (in their official capacities as a mail officer and warden at GRVC) and the City of New York (as the operator of GRVC). As discussed, a § 1983 claim requires a showing of personal involvement on the part of each Defendant in the underlying constitutional violation, which in the case of the City of New York, means a showing of a policy or practice of unconstitutional activity. In contrast, a RLUIPA claim may properly be brought against any party who could be enjoined to afford the relief sought by the plaintiff. Here, that includes Cort and the City of New York. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the warden of the GRVC (Cort) and the entity which operates it (the City) could cause mailroom staff to turn over the relevant set of orisha beads to Plaintiff, making them proper defendants with respect to Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
However, it is unclear from the Complaint what, if any, injunctive relief Adams-Nicholas (the officer who investigated Plaintiff's claims) could offer Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted to the extent the Complaint alleges a RLUIPA claim against Adams-Nicholas and denied to the extent that it alleges a RLUIPA claim against the other Defendants.
* * *
It is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 for a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, as alleged against McCall, and under RLUIPA, as alleged against McCall, Cort, and the City of New York, survive. All other claims are dismissed.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at ECF No. 23 and to mail a copy of this order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.