" United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487, 19 L.Ed. 278, 280 (1868). Although most courts agree that certain possessions are justified, see Annot., 39 A.L.R.4th 967 (1985), there is little agreement on the name the defense is to be called. See Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (defense variously referred to as self-defense, necessity, and duress); Ambrister v. State, 462 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (necessity); United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting self-defense, duress, and necessity; "justification" is better term); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479, 484 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1983) (differences between duress, self-defense, and necessity "are not important in this case"); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1161 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting duress and necessity; "justification" is better term); United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 272 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1982) (facts fit under both self-defense and necessity); State v. Crawford, 308 Md. 683, 521 A.2d 1193, 1197 n. 1 (1987) (necessity). See generally 1 W. LaFave A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 5.3, 5.4, 5.7 (1986); P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984); H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction ch. 6 (1968).

Based on that factual scenario, the trial court refused to allow Taylor to raise the defense of self-defense. On appeal, after quoting State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304 (La.1985), and Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984), and without providing any other analysis, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the offense set forth in § 13A–11–72 is not a strict-liability offense and that self-defense is a valid defense to the charge of possessing a firearm. Accordingly, the supreme court set aside Taylor's conviction and ordered a new trial.

A ruling by this Court to extend the defense of duress to possession of weapons will in our opinion exacerbate a constant threat in a volatile situation. Absent exceptional circumstances such as those referred to in People v Crooks, 151 Mich. App. 389; 390 N.W.2d 250 (1986), lv den 426 Mich. 870 (1986), citing Mungin v State, 458 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla App, 1984), an inmate should not possess a weapon. [ 174 Mich. App. 342-343.

To grant judicial sanction to the otherwise unlawful possession of a deadly weapon by prisoners, whatever the reason would undoubtedly result in murder, mayhem and utter chaos throughout our entire penal institutions, with which authorities would be unable to cope. [ Mungin v State, 458 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla App, 1984). Emphasis in Mungin.]

These courts generally allow affirmative defenses to be raised where an unarmed inmate is attacked by an armed inmate and the unarmed inmate temporarily uses the other inmate's weapon in self-defense. See State v. Vandiver, 757 S.W.2d at 311-12; People v. Perry, 377 N.W.2d 911, 914-15 (Mich.Ct.App. 1985); Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293, 297 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984). An affirmative defense is available for the moment when the inmate is attacked and he fears imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.

State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304 (La. 1985). In Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984), the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's judgment concerning the presentation of evidence (in this case the weapon was a knife) as to self-defense, stating: "The determination of whether the accused committed the offense charged, acting in his own defense, is a matter for consideration by the jury, not the trial judge.

The most common scenario warranting application of this exception is the situation in which an unarmed prisoner is attacked by an armed prisoner and the unarmed prisoner temporarily uses the other prisoner's weapon in self-defense. Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984), cert. denied, 464 So.2d 556 (1985); State v. Vandiver, 757 S.W.2d 308 (Mo.Ct.App. 1988). In this limited situation, a defense of duress is available to the prisoner who obtains a deadly weapon at the moment when he is attacked and fears imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.

A number of jurisdictions support our point of view. See, e.g., People v. King, 22 Cal.3d 12, 148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000 (1978); Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 464 So.2d 556 (1985); State v. Walton, 311 N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1981); Duvall v. Commonwealth, 593 S.W.2d 884 (Ky.App. 1980) (by implication); State v. Blache, 480 So.2d 304 (La. 1985); State v. Spaulding, 296 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1980); Osborne v. State, 404 So.2d 545 (Miss.

See United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) (bartender, stabbed by a man with a knife, seized a gun while his assailant was on top of him); People v. King, supra (weapon handed to defendant as intruders attempted to force their way into an apartment). Cf. Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (a prison inmate may temporarily possess a weapon taken from a would be aggressor when it is used to defend against the imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury). We shall assume, without deciding, that, because of reasonable statutory implication (see G.L.c. 140, § 129C [ m] [1984 ed.]; but see G.L.c. 269, § 12E [1984 ed.]), or because of constitutional or common law principles (see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 n. 11 [1980]), unlicensed temporary possession of a firearm in a public place might be lawful in spite of G.L.c. 269, § 10 ( a), in certain necessitous circumstances.

Appellant also cites cases from other jurisdictions which “permit a defendant to present evidence of a defense to an inmate not to possess a weapon” charge. Appellant's Brief at 15 (citing, inter alia, People v. Blair, 157 Mich.App. 43, 403 N.W.2d 96 (1987); State v. Vandiver, 757 S.W.2d 308 (Mo.App.1988); Mungin v. State, 458 So.2d 293 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984)). The defense these cases recognize is as follows: “Where an unarmed prisoner is attacked by another prisoner who is carrying a weapon and the unarmed prisoner takes the weapon away from his aggressor, then the would-be victim will not be prosecuted for his temporary possession of the weapon which he has wrested from his attacker.”