Mumper v. State

Full title: RYAN CHARLES MUMPER, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jan 29, 2009

No. 05-08-00141-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 29, 2009)

Opinion

No. 05-08-00141-CR

Opinion issued January 29, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 003-84748-07.

Before Justices BRIDGES, RICHTER, and MAZZANT. Opinion By Justice MAZZANT.

OPINION

AMOS L. MAZZANT, Justice.

Ryan Charles Mumper pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to seventy-two hours in county jail and a $1 fine. In one issue, he claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The State concedes the motion should have been granted. We reverse and remand.

Discussion

On June 13, 2007, McKinney Police Officer Ursula Mayorga arrested appellant for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated after his vehicle stopped over the marked "stop line" at a stop-sign-controlled intersection. The stop sign in question, which was at the intersection of Glen Oaks Drive and Lake Forest Drive in McKinney, Texas, has both a "stop line" and a crosswalk. According to the undisputed facts, on June 13, 2007, at 1:44 a.m., appellant was driving his Hyundai Elantra east on Glen Oaks in McKinney, Texas. There were no other cars on the road except for appellant and Officer Mayorga. Before appellant reached the intersection of Glen Oaks and Lake Forest, he signaled a right turn and stopped his car with his front tires just past the marked "stop line" and the back tires behind the "stop line." Neither of appellant's car tires reached the marked line of the crosswalk during the stop. Appellant filed a motion to suppress and first supplemental motion to suppress, arguing that his initial detention was without reasonable suspicion or probable cause because he did not commit a traffic offense. The motions were heard and denied by the trial court after a hearing. No witnesses were called at the hearing. The parties agreed at the hearing that there was no basis for the stop other than the officer's belief that appellant failed to stop at the "stop line." In his only issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he claims the initial detention was without reasonable suspicion or probable cause because he did not commit a traffic offense under section 544.010 of the Texas Transportation Code, which governs stop signs and yield signs. Section 544.010(c) requires drivers approaching a stop sign to:

[S]top before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. In the absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. In the absence of a stop line, the operator shall stop at the place nearest the intersecting roadway where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway.

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c) (Vernon 1999). A motion to suppress is reviewed with a bifurcated standard, affording almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and reviewing its application of the law de novo. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). An officer conducts a lawful temporary investigative detention when the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id. A reasonable-suspicion determination is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492-93. An investigative detention that is not based on reasonable suspicion is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In this case, the State concedes that appellant did not violate section 544.010(c) because the intersection in question has a crosswalk and appellant stopped before entering it. Although we are aware of no cases interpreting section 544.010(c) under circumstances such as these, the plain language of the statute requires a driver to stop at a marked "stop line" only in the absence of a crosswalk. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010(c) (Vernon 1999); see also Ex parte Noyola, 215 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (we give effect to the plain meaning of the statutory text unless application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences the Legislature could not possibly have intended). Therefore, since the undisputed facts show that appellant stopped with his front tires beyond the marked "stop line" but before the crosswalk and there is no basis for the stop apart from the officer's belief that appellant failed to stop at the "stop line," the trial court should have granted appellant's motion to suppress. We sustain appellant's issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause to the trial court.