Thus, as it is unclear whether the "imposition of costs would 'work a significant hardship on [Mr. Palmquist]'", the Court declines to apply the indigency exception. Cf. Kuzman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17101, at *3 (quoting Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 121 (D. Mass. 2002)). b. The Parties' Relative Financial Resources
However, Rule 54(d) gives the court discretion to determine whether an award is appropriate, and in exercising this discretion, a district court may take into account "the limited financial resources of a plaintiff." Papas, 849 F.2d at 704; accord Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 121 (D. Mass. 2002). This Court has reviewed Ms. Kuzman's Affidavit in which she sets forth the state of her financial affairs and it concludes that the imposition of costs would "work a significant hardship on the plaintiff."
The $19,000 in costs can much more easily be absorbed by the defendant than the plaintiffs. SeeMulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 121, 122 (D.Mass.2002) (after awarding summary judgment to the defendant, court nevertheless declines to award costs in a Title VII case where the " imposition of costs in this case would work a significant hardship on the plaintiff, an individual of modest means who lost his job of many years under questionable circumstances" ). Finally, I have considered whether " the case involved significant public values" and " whether the plaintiff's claims had substantial merit."
In addition, the Court "may take into account the limited financial resources of a plaintiff in assessing costs." Papas, 849 F.2d at 704; accord Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 121 (D. Mass. 2002). The burden is on the losing party to demonstrate why costs should not be awarded to the prevailing party.
Courts recognize that even if a plaintiff does not prevail, a “colorable claim for wrongful discharge” may raise important issues, and a plaintiff should “not be ‘unduly intimidated' by the threat of imposition of costs” from pursuing such a claim. Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 121, 122 (D. Mass. 2002) (internal citation omitted)
In considering denial of costs based upon indigency, courts have generally weighed the disparity of resources of the parties, the merit of the plaintiff's claim and the impact of the award requested. See DeSaint v. Delta Air Lines, 2015 WL 4111428 (D. Mass. 2015); Anunciacao v. Caterpillar Japan, 283 F.R.D. 44, 45 (D.Mass.2012); Kuzman v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 2005 WL 1981498, at *2 (D.Me. 2005); Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 121, 122 (D.Mass.2002), As in many civil rights and employment cases, Plaintiff's complaint alleges important statutory issues and rights of public significance, such as those in the case of Mulvihill v. Spalding, which was cited by Plaintiff.
As Rector points out, the Illinois Department of Human Rights found "substantial evidence of sexual harassment," and this finding precipitated the commencement of this lawsuit where Rector alleged that she suffered sexual harassment and a related claim of retaliation. It is important that a plaintiff, such as Rector, is not "unduly intimidated" by the threat of imposition of costs in a case raising important issues such as sexual harassment, in instances where a state agency has previously substantiated that claim. Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 122 (D. Mass. 2002) (expressing concern that plaintiffs seeking to bring similar sexual harassment claims would be "'unduly intimidated' by the threat of imposition of costs in a case raising important issues."); see generally Kuzman v. Hannaford Bros. Co., Case No. CV-04-87-B-W, 2005 WL 1981498, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 10, 2005) (the court exercised discretion and denied the imposition of costs noting, among other things, that the plaintiff attempted to vindicate important statutory rights under Title VII, the case involved issues of public significance, and the plaintiff's claims, though unsuccessful, had merit). Thus, as a matter of public policy and public importance, the Court will exercise its discretion and deny Wexford's Bill of Costs.
Plaintiff urges the Court to deny the Bill of Costs in its entirety in order to avoid chilling the rights of aggrieved citizens like Long. Some courts have noted that "where the issues are fairly disputed, it is important that the plaintiff not be 'unduly intimidated' by the threat of imposition of costs." Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc. 239 F.Supp.2d 121, 122 (D. Mass. 2002) citing Coulter v. Newmont Gold Co., 873 F.Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1994). While there is no clear test or set of criteria outlined in caselaw to apply to this case, courts have considered some equitable bases such as the economic disparity of parties and the limited resources of the losing party among other factors. Mulvihill at 121; Coulter at 397; and Moore v. Hughes Helicopters Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs who object to the payment of costs to the prevailing party must bear the burden of proving circumstances to overcome the Rule 54(d) presumption in favor of an award.
The First Circuit has noted that a Court "may take into account the limited financial resources of a plaintiff in assessing costs." Papas, 849 F.2d at 704; accord Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2002). Determination of whether an indigency exception should be applied is dependent on the Clerk making "a threshold factual finding that the losing party is incapable of paying the court-imposed costs at this time or in the future."
Papas v. Hanlon, 849 F.2d 702, 704 (1st Cir. 1988). While courts in this circuit have denied costs where they risk imposing a severe hardship on a party, see Anunciacao v. Caterpillar Japan, Ltd., 283 F.R.D. 44, 45 (D. Mass. 2012); Kuzman v. Hannaford Bros. Co., No. CV-04-87-B-W, 2005 WL 1981498, at *2 (D. Me. Aug. 10, 2005); Mulvihill v. Spalding Worldwide Sports, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 121, 122 (D. Mass. 2002), the Court believes that the total costs in this action, which total $1398.50 after deducting $596.62 in photocopy costs and pro hac vice fees, are not overly burdensome. Accordingly, the Court declines to reduce the costs further.