In doing so, we consider whether any allegedly-improper arguments that were not objected to at trial in reasonable probability ""changed the jury's exercise of discretion in choosing between life imprisonment or death.'" Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 730 (23) ( 352 S.E.2d 762) (1987) (quoting Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 94 (8) (I) (2) ( 335 S.E.2d 567) (1985); compare Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 450-451 (2) ( 511 S.E.2d 165) (1999) ("This "reasonable probability' test applies only in the context of appellate review of a criminal case in which the death penalty was imposed."). We conclude, even assuming the arguments contested by Gissendaner were improper, that the jury's exercise of discretion would not have been affected by them and, therefore, that her sentence should not be disturbed.

Dixon, however, did not object to the State's closing argument, and, as a result, he cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. “ ‘A defendant must object to the alleged impropriety at the time it occurs in order to afford the trial court the opportunity to take remedial action. (Cit.)’ ... The failure to do so generally results in a waiver of the defendant's right to urge the impropriety of the argument on appeal.” Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999). Dixon's “failure to object below so as to invoke a ruling by the trial court precludes our consideration of the merits of [this] contention that the State's closing argument was improper.”

Mann argues that the instruction is confusing and misleading. The request for charge shows the challenged language was taken from Wright v. State, 209 Ga. App. 128, 129(2) ( 433 S.E.2d 99) (1993) (overruled on other grounds by Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 451(2) ( 511 S.E.2d 165) (1999)). It is a close question as to whether the instruction was given in error.

Appellant acknowledges, however, that he lodged no objection to these comments; accordingly, this claim is not preserved for appellate review. See Atkinson v. State, 301 Ga. 518 (801 SE2d 833 ) (2017); Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883 (2) (725 SE2d 305 ) (2012); Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450 (2) (511 SE2d 165 ) (1999). 3. Appellant also argues, as he did below, that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the above-quoted portion of the State’s closing argument.

On these facts, the appellant either was a party to murder and aggravated assault, or he was guilty of no crime at all. See Igidi v. State, 251 Ga.App. 581, 586(4), 554 S.E.2d 773 (2001); Hopkins v. State, 227 Ga.App. 567, 568(1), 489 S.E.2d 368 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 451(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it decided not to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter.

Similarly, Hall raises for the first time on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of Huguley and the district attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during his opening statement and closing argument. Hall's failure to make a timely objection to the trial court's ruling and the prosecutor's argument means he has also waived these issues on appeal. See Pinckney v. State, 285 Ga. 458(2), 678 S.E.2d 480 (2009); Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999). 4. Citing these and other actions by trial counsel, Hall asserts that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.

Brown, however, asserted no “perjury” objection at trial, and we find that this claim has not been preserved for appellate review. See Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999); Smith v. State, 311 Ga.App. 184, 189, 715 S.E.2d 434 (2011). Even if such an objection had been made, a review of the record shows only that there were inconsistencies between Little's testimony and the testimonies of the two surviving victims.

However, at trial the defense did not object to the now challenged comments by the prosecutor. In the appeal of a non-capital case, “the defendant's failure to object to the State's closing argument waives his right to rely on the alleged impropriety of that argument as a basis for reversal.” Fulton v. State, 278 Ga. 58, 62(7), 597 S.E.2d 396 (2004), quoting Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450(2), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999). Nevertheless, Scott now urges that, regardless of whether an objection was made at trial, he is entitled to consideration of the merits of his complaints because of this Court's recent ruling in State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).

However, Appellant's failure to raise this particular constitutional issue in the trial court forfeited his right to raise it on appeal. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 451(3), 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999). Therefore, if pre-trial counsel had raised the issue on interlocutory appeal, there clearly is no reasonable probability that the outcome of that appeal would have been different.

(Cit.)'. . . The failure to do so generally results in a waiver of the defendant's right to urge the impropriety of the argument on appeal." Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450 (2) ( 511 SE2d 165) (1999). Accordingly, appellant's "failure to object below so as to invoke a ruling by the trial court precludes our consideration of the merits of [this] contention that the State's closing argument was improper."