Opinion
2016 CA 1595
06-02-2017
MARION MULLINS v. PREMIER WELLNESS ASSOCIATES, L.L.C.
Dale R. Baringer Benjamin J.B. Klein James R. Bullman Jarred R. Schick Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Marion Mullins Andrew Blanchfield Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Premier Wellness Associates, L.L.C.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE NINETEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 646,564, SECTION 24 HONORABLE R. MICHAEL CALDWELL, JUDGE Dale R. Baringer
Benjamin J.B. Klein
James R. Bullman
Jarred R. Schick
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Marion Mullins Andrew Blanchfield
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Premier Wellness Associates, L.L.C. BEFORE: PETTIGREW, McDONALD, AND PENZATO, JJ. McDONALD, J.
In this case a registered nurse filed suit against a health care corporation for unpaid wages pursuant to La. R.S. 23:631. Finding that she failed to prove the terms of employment, the district court dismissed the suit with prejudice. After a thorough review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 8, 2016, Marion Mullins filed suit in a summary proceeding against Premier Wellness Associates, L.L.C., maintaining that she had worked for Premier Wellness and its CEO, Dr. Permanand Satish Jason Beeharilal, from December 2012 until July 2015, but that she was never paid any of the wages that she earned. Ms. Mullins maintained that she had been the Chief Operating Officer of Premier Wellness, and that she and Dr. Beeharilal had agreed she would receive an annual salary of $80,640.00.
On June 17, 2016, Premier Wellness answered the suit, generally denying the allegations, except to admit that Dr. Beeharilal gave Ms. Mullins a Christmas gift of $2,000.00 in December of 2014 and that Ms. Mullins maintained additional employment with Champion Medical Center. Premier Wellness asked that judgment be rendered in its favor and against Ms. Mullins, and that the suit be dismissed.
Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial on July 29, 2016. Afterward, the district court found that Ms. Mullins had failed to prove the terms of her employment by a preponderance of the evidence, and dismissed the suit. Judgment was signed on September 1, 2016. Ms. Mullins appealed that judgment, and asserts that the district court erred in ruling that she did not prove the terms of her employment.
THE REVISED STATUTES
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:631 provides in part:
A. (1)(a) Upon the discharge of any laborer or other employee of any kind whatever, it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other employee to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, on or before the next regular payday or no later than fifteen days following the date of discharge, whichever occurs first.
(b) Upon the resignation of any laborer or other employee of any kind whatever, it shall be the duty of the person employing such laborer or other employee to pay the amount then due under the terms of employment, whether the employment is by the hour, day, week, or month, on or before the next regular payday for the pay cycle during which the employee was working at the time of separation or no later than fifteen days following the date of resignation, whichever occurs first.
(2) Payment shall be made at the place and in the manner which has been customary during the employment, except that payment may be made via United States mail to the laborer or other employee, provided postage has been prepaid and the envelope properly addressed with the employee's or laborer's current address as shown in the employer's records. In the event payment is made by mail the employer shall be deemed to have made such payment when it is mailed. The timeliness of the mailing may be shown by an official United States postmark or other official documentation from the United States Postal Service.
. . . . .
B. In the event of a dispute as to the amount due under this Section, the employer shall pay the undisputed portion of the amount due as provided for in Subsection A of this Section. The employee shall have the right to file an action to enforce such a wage claim and proceed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 2592.
DISCUSSION
To recover, Ms. Mullins has the burden of proving the alleged verbal contract of employment and the terms thereof. Hammond v. Taylor, 80 So.2d 888, 889 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1955); Walter v. Clark, 143 So.2d 113, 118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1962). A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder's, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. If the trial court or jury's findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Stobart v. State through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882-83 (La. 1993).
In its reasons for judgment, the district court found:
There has been no proof that . . . under the terms of employment . . . there was an agreement that Ms. Mullins would be paid a salary of any amount regardless of the profitability of the corporation. As I pointed out, there has been no testimony from the CPA. There have been no profit and loss statements. There has been no -- supposedly she had access to Quickbooks. There was nothing produced off of Quickbooks to show that [Premier Wellness], ever became profitable or ever got to the point where -- I mean, there was no testimony as to whether Dr. [Beeharilal] ever got paid anything out of this LLC, whether he took a salary or, again, no evidence whatsoever. The burden in any suit such as this is on the plaintiff to prove the elements of their case. Ms. Mullins may have other causes of action available to her. I don't give legal advice. I don't know if they exist or not. I'm just saying, under this statute, she was to be paid only under the terms of employment. There has been less than a preponderance of evidence to show that the terms of employment were that she would be paid as soon as there was any revenue of any kind. Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of proof to show that she was entitled to wages under the terms of employment during the period that she was at [Premier Wellness].
Ms. Mullins testified that she and Dr. Beeharilal met in August 2012 when she began working at Ochsner Medical Center and that they had become best friends. She stated that she had several jobs during the relevant time periods, working full time at Champion Medical Center, working as needed at Ochsner Medical Center, then working on her days off at Premier Wellness all at the same time. Ms. Mullins testified that she was an employee of Premier Wellness, and that she had a discussion with Dr. Beeharilal that she would receive a salary from the company when it had money coming in.
Dr. Beeharilal testified that he and Ms. Mullins had been best friends and that she had not been an employee of Premier Wellness, but that she had helped him out as a friend after he had undergone neck surgery in June of 2013. He testified that after neck surgery he was unable to work at the same level he worked at before the surgery and that he had trouble paying his mortgage. He stated that he started Premier Wellness to do aesthetic services, such as Botox parties, to try to generate more income. Dr. Beeharilal testified that Premier Wellness moved around to different locations and that he had trouble getting the company "off the ground" during the relevant time periods. He stated that Ms. Mullins had set up several Botox parties, but that no one showed up for them except for a few contacts that he already had. He also testified that he provided services for her in return for her help, including helping her with weight loss prior to her wedding.
After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the district court committed manifest error in finding that Ms. Mullins failed to prove the terms of her employment by a preponderance of the evidence. In her own testimony Ms. Mullins stated that she was to receive a salary from Premier Wellness when it had "money coming in," yet there was no evidence presented to show how much money the corporation made from December 2012 through July 2015, nor was there any evidence presented to show what benchmarks (gross revenue, net revenue, or the like) were to be used to determine whether money was "coming in" to Premier Wellness.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court judgment rendered September 1, 2016 in favor of Premier Wellness Associates, L.LC. and against Marion Mullins, dismissing her suit with prejudice, is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Marion Mullins.
AFFIRMED.