Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BS113245, David P. Yaffe, Judge.
Iverson, Yoakum Papiano & Hatch and Neil Papiano for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Alicia M. B. Fowler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Jerald L. Mosley, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jeff Mullins (Mullins) appeals from the judgment dismissing his petition for writ of mandate. His petition sought review of an order by defendant California Horse Racing Board (Board), suspending his trainer’s license. The trial court found that, after filing his petition, he entered into a written agreement with the Board waiving his right to appeal their decision. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mullins is a thoroughbred racehorse trainer. On January 16, 2008, the Board issued a ruling finding Mullins liable for racing one of his horses with a prohibited drug in its system over the permitted level. The Board suspended his license for 90 days. Mullins was ordered to serve 20 days of the suspension with the balance of 70 days stayed pending his satisfactory completion of a one-year probation term. The suspension was to be effective February 15, 2008.
On February 8, 2008, Mullins filed his petition for writ of administrative mandate seeking review of the Board’s decision and a stay of the suspension. The court denied his request for a stay on February 14, 2008. Mullins signed and faxed a letter to the Board chairman, Richard Shapiro (Shapiro), requesting a three-day stay of the 20-day portion of the suspension which was set to begin on February 15. Mullins wanted to run horses through Sunday, February 17. The letter closes with the words, “I will waive my right to any appeal as far as this suspension is concerned.” Shapiro, on behalf of the Board, signed the letter and the suspension was postponed until February 18. Mullins was allowed to enter horses in races on Saturday, February 16 and Sunday, February 17. Mullins then served the 20-day portion of the suspension commencing on February 18, 2008.
The Board, believing the matter had been settled, brought a motion asking the trial court to enforce the letter agreement and dismiss the petition. Mullins opposed the motion contending that he had not intended to waive his right to maintain the petition. The trial court granted the motion and judgment for dismissal was entered on November 7, 2008.
DISCUSSION
Mullins contends that the letter agreement was not a settlement agreement of the entire case. We disagree.
The Board’s motion for judgment dismissing Mullins’s petition was brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 (section 664.6). Under section 664.6, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement signed outside the presence of the court. The court may make a factual determination as to whether the parties have entered into a binding agreement. “The trial court’s factual findings on a motion to enforce a settlement pursuant to section 664.6 ‘are subject to limited appellate review and will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.) There is a strong public policy to encourage the voluntary settlement of litigation. (Id. at p. 1359.)
The letter Mullins sent to the Board provided as follows: “This is a formal request to Richard Shapiro from Jeff Mullins to request a stay, in the best interests of my owners, to allow their horses to run that have been entered through Sunday, February 17, 2008. After this time, I will start my twenty day suspension period on Monday, February 18, 2008 as required by the C.H.R.B. ruling. I will waive my right to any appeal as far as this suspension is concerned.”
In interpreting a written agreement, the goal of the court is to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed at the time, insofar as that intent can be ascertained and is lawful. (Civ. Code, § 1636; People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 525.) If the language of the agreement is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity, determination of the mutual intent of the parties and interpretation of the agreement is to be based on the language of the agreement alone. (Civ. Code, §§ 1638, 1639; People ex rel. Lockyer, supra, at p. 525.) The words used in the agreement “are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.” (Civ. Code, § 1644.)
Mullins submits that applying the rules of interpretation of agreements, he did not intend by his last sentence in his request for a stay to waive his entire pending appeal. Rather, his intention was only to waive his right to appeal the 20-day portion of the Board’s order. The Board submits that the letter clearly indicates that Mullins agreed to waive his entire petition. We agree with the Board.
The language of the letter demonstrates that Mullins waived his right to pursue the petition. In determining whether a contract has been formed, the element of intent is of prime importance. Intent is determined by objective intent, not by the personal or subjective intent, or belief, of a party. The theory is that a party’s intention to enter into a legally binding agreement, or contract, is judged by outward, objective facts as interpreted by a reasonable person, rather than by the party’s own secret, subjective intentions. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.)
The outward manifestations of intent are clear. Mullins asked for a three-day stay, was given a three-day stay, and waived his rights to pursue the pending petition. The language of the agreement concludes with the words, “I will waive my right to any appeal as far as this suspension is concerned.” When Mullins signed the letter, there was only one appeal pending: his petition to review and reverse the ruling suspending his license.
Even if we conclude that the language of the letter agreement is susceptible to two interpretations, one which supports a waiver of only the “twenty day suspension,” and one which supports the trial court’s decision that Mullins waived his right to appeal the entire suspension, the extrinsic evidence supports the trial court’s decision.
In support of its position, the Board filed a declaration by Shapiro, chairman of the Board and the individual who had signed the letter agreement. Shapiro declared that the letter agreement memorialized Mullins’s agreement to “dismiss this present action and waive his right to any future attempt to contest the decision of the Board suspending his trainer’s license.” Mullins submitted a declaration stating that he had not intended to waive his right to continue his “appeal of the CHRB’s decision,” that is, to waive his “right to have the Superior Court review the CHRB’s... decision.” The trial court found that Mullins’s declaration was not credible.
Mullins’s assertion that he only intended to waive any appeal of the 20-day suspension but wanted to pursue his petition to clear his record is not compelling. While Mullins insists in his petition that the Board’s decision was incorrect, it is unclear how the expungment of the 70-day suspension and his probation would clear his record without an expungement of his 20-day suspension that he served.
Additionally, Mullins stated that when he asked for a three-day postponement of the 20-day suspension, he was told that Shapiro “wanted to be sure [Mullins] wasn’t going to use the brief stay to bring any formal action seeking a further stay of the twenty day suspension.” The record does not support this contention. The petition for writ of mandate was filed on February 8, 2008, with an ex parte request for a stay of the license suspension. The ex parte request was denied on February 14, 2008. The denial resulted in the letter agreement submitted by Mullins, seeking a three-day stay from the Board. Even though the trial court had denied the stay request, Mullins would have us believe that the Board and Shapiro were afraid that Mullins would attempt to obtain another stay.
More importantly, however, Mullins’s declaration relied on his unstated, subjective intent. As previously stated, this cannot be used to show a party’s intent in entering into an agreement. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 811.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendant shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J.ZELON, J.