Opinion
Civil Action 4:23-cv-03946
07-17-2024
ANDREW J. MULLER, Plaintiff. v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE
ANDREW M. EDISON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before me in this action for judicial review of a final agency decision is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion to Transfer to the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”). See Dkt. 16. Plaintiff Andrew J. Muller (“Muller”) opposes venue transfer.
It is black letter law that “the Tucker Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Claims Court” for non-tort claims against the federal government when the requested relief exceeds $10,000. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). In this lawsuit, Muller seeks correction of his military service records and an order requiring the Department of the Navy to provide him a Medical Evaluation Board (“MEB”)/Physical Evaluation Board (“PEB”) “in order to provide a medical evaluation of record” that “would pre-date his Court-Martial Conviction.” Dkt. 15 at 2-3. Muller does not dispute that a favorable MEB/PEB would result in backdated medical retirement benefits in excess of $10,000. Rather, Muller contends that this case should be not transferred because he merely seeks an order directing an MEB/PEB, as opposed to the benefits that would flow if such an order were issued and he received a favorable determination. In support of this contrived argument, Muller cites Reaves v. United States, 128 Fed.Cl. 196 (2016), for the proposition that this court may order a medical evaluation. See Dkt. 19 at 23. Yet, Reaves was transferred to the Claims Court from a federal district court because “backdated medical retirement benefits would exceed $10,000,” meaning “exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims [wa]s vested in the Claims Court.” Reaves v. Hagel, No. 5:12-cv-795, 2013 WL 5674981, at *8 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 17, 2013). The same result is required here. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has expressly held “that a plaintiff cannot avoid Tucker Act jurisdiction simply by characterizing an action as equitable in nature.” Amoco Prod. Co., 815 F.2d at 361. District courts are required to “‘pierce' the pleadings so that artful pleading does not undercut the jurisdiction of the Claims Court (that is, Congress'[s] intent in enacting the Tucker Act).” Id. “Where,” as here, “the real effort of the complaining party is to obtain money from the federal government, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court cannot be evaded or avoided by framing a district court complaint to appear to seek only injunctive, mandatory or declaratory relief against government officials or the government itself.” Id. (cleaned up).
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Transfer (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this case is TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of Federal Claims.
Because “the federal courts retain jurisdiction and proceedings in . . . federal court continue,” this order is not dispositive of this case. Arena IP, LLC v. New Eng. Patriots, LLC, No. 4:23-cv-00428, 2023 WL 8711081, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2023) (explaining why “the better view” is that an order transferring venue is not dispositive under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). As a result, I can issue this Order as opposed to a Report and Recommendation.