Opinion
No. 2-667 / 01-1798
Filed November 25, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Franklin County, John S. Mackey, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's ruling granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Raymond Drew of Raymond P. Drew, P.C., Hampton, for appellant.
Frank Comito and Kent Gummert of Gaudineer, Comito George, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Gerda Muller appeals from the district court's ruling granting Deputy Sheriff C.J. Noelck and Franklin County summary judgment on her claims of violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. She contends the district court erred in making credibility assessments and deciding, as a matter of law, that Deputy Noelck had discretion to override the results of her breath test. She also contends summary judgment should not have been granted because there are material facts in dispute. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On March 4, 2000, Deputy Noelck stopped Muller's vehicle because her license plate lamp was extinguished. Her grandchild was riding in a car seat in the backseat. Deputy Noelck detected the odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Muller. Muller informed Deputy Noleck that she had consumed three beers that evening.
Muller consented to take field sobriety tests. Deputy Noelck first administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which Noelck claims she failed. Muller also turned her head to follow Deputy Noelck's finger, in violation of his instructions. During the walk and turn test, Muller stopped twice and stepped off the line to keep her balance. Muller attributes her difficulties to her choice of footwear. Finally, during the one-leg stand, Muller lost her balance after approximately five seconds.
After conducting the field sobriety tests, Deputy Noelck administered a preliminary breath test (PBT) to Muller. Muller attempted the PBT, but only blew into the machine for short periods of time. Muller claimed she had an operation to remove a tumor from her pituitary gland, which impeded her ability to give the required breath sample. Deputy Noelck administered a second PBT, but Muller did not blow into the machine for the required ten to fifteen seconds as instructed by Noelck. The machine registered an alcohol concentration of .087.
Deputy Noelck escorted Muller to the Hampton Police Department where he read her the implied consent advisory. Muller consented to give a breath sample. Muller was informed she had to blow into the Intoxilyzer machine hard enough to maintain a green light. She was told she had to do so for twenty seconds. On her first attempt, Muller failed to keep the Intoxilyzer machine properly lit for more than a few seconds. Muller was then informed that failure to do so on a second test would be considered a refusal. On her second attempt, Muller again failed to provide an adequate breath sample as she was instructed. Both tests yielded a result of .08 blood alcohol concentration.
Deputy Noelck informed Muller her failure to properly complete the Intoxilyzer test was being considered a refusal. He stated that from his observations, he believed she was capable of giving an adequate breath sample. He informed her that he was revoking her driver's license, but that she had an opportunity to appeal. He told her she could present evidence of a medical condition that impeded her ability to give an adequate breath sample to the judge.
After an administrative hearing, Muller's license revocation was rescinded. In his May 2000 ruling, the administrative law judge found no evidence was presented to show the printed Intoxilyzer test results were anything other than a satisfactorily completed test. In June 2000, the charges against Muller of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and child endangerment were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.
In August 2000, Muller filed a petition against Deputy Noelck and Franklin County, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution. In May 2001, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district courted granted the motion in October 2001.
II. Scope of Review. We review rulings on motions for summary judgment for errors at law. Sain v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 626 N.W.2d 115, 121 (Iowa 2001). The record before the district court is reviewed to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id.
III. Summary Judgment. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 2001). The court must consider every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the record in favor of the resisting party. Id. at 718.
An inference is legitimate if it is rational, reasonable, and otherwise permissible under the governing substantive law. On the other hand, an inference is not legitimate if it is based upon speculation or conjecture. If reasonable minds may differ on the resolution of an issue, a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Muller, we find summary judgment was proper. Deputy Noelck's stop of Muller's vehicle due to the malfunctioning light was legitimate. It is undisputed that an empty case of beer lay in the backseat of the vehicle. Muller admitted to Deputy Noelck that she had consumed beer. She then voluntarily submitted to a series of field sobriety tests. Although Muller denied she failed the horizontal nystagmus test, she has no basis for evaluating her performance. However, from the audio portion of Muller's videotaped stop, it is clear Muller turned her head to follow Deputy Noelck's finger in disregard for his instructions. From the videotape, it is also clear that Muller was unable to complete the walk and turn test, and that she was unable to maintain her balance during the one-leg test. Although Muller attempted to explain away her deficiencies, probable cause to arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge would warrant a reasonable person to believe an offense is being committed. State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1990). We conclude that the facts listed above, when taken together, would warrant a reasonable person to conclude Muller was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
Deputy Noelck then asked Muller to submit to a PBT, to which Muller agreed. Muller, blowing into the machine for only a short period of time, registered a blood alcohol concentration of .08. This test result was sufficient to require an Intoxilyzer test. See State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 1988) (holding a PBT result of .08 blood alcohol concentration warranted a request for a blood test).
That the test result was less than the legal limit does not automatically eliminate any reasonable grounds for believing [the suspect] was driving while intoxicated. If, as in this case, the preliminary results showed the presence of alcohol, a prudent person would be warranted in requesting a more accurate test. This is especially true when, as here, the preliminary results were only slightly below the legal limit.
Id.
Deputy Noelck administered two separate Intoxilyzer tests to Muller. During each test, Muller was unable to supply a sample as instructed by Deputy Noelck. Deputy Noelck determined that a sufficient amount of air was not processed by the machine to give an accurate readout of Muller's blood alcohol content. The undisputed evidence presented to the district court indicates Deputy Noelck was told during training that if a suspect failed to give a proper sample, he was to consider it a refusal to submit to testing.
Deputy Noelck had probable cause to arrest Muller for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and child endangerment. The existence of probable cause vitiates Muller's claims of violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218-19, 18 L.Ed.2d 288, 295-96 (1967) (recognizing "the defense of good faith and probable cause" in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case involving unconstitutional warrantless arrest), false arrest, Kraft v. City of Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984) (identifying unlawfulness of detention as an element of false arrest), and malicious prosecution, Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d 681, 688-89 (Iowa 2000) (holding want of probable cause an element of malicious prosecution). Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on these claims.
We likewise conclude summary judgment was appropriate on Muller's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. To establish a prima facie claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress Muller must show (1) outrageous conduct by defendants; (2) the defendants intentionally caused, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, the emotional distress; (3) she suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the defendants' outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress. See Fuller v. Local Union No. 106, 567 N.W.2d 419, 423 (Iowa 1997). Before defendants' conduct can be considered outrageous, it must be "so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. It is not possible that Muller's warrantless arrest, based on probable cause, could be considered "extreme," "atrocious," or "utterly intolerable."
We conclude the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.