Opinion
No. 99A-11-005 RRC.
Submitted: January 25, 2000.
Decided: March 28, 2000.
Upon Appeal From a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board.
AFFIRMED.
This 28th day of March, 2000, upon consideration of Employer's Motion to Affirm an October 13, 1999 decision of the Industrial Accident Board denying Employee's Petition to Determine Compensation Due, it appears to this Court that:
1. Marvin Mullens (Employee) filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due seeking worker's compensation benefits arising out of a January 5, 1999 heart attack he sustained while working for Worthy Construction Co., (Employer).
2. At the hearing, there was no dispute that Employee had suffered a heart attack while working for Employer. The Board considered the deposition testimony of Dr. Erik Marshall (Employee's doctor) and Dr. Edward M. Goldenberg (Employer's doctor). The issue before the Board was whether the heart attack would have occurred but for Employee's work activities. Dr. Marshall had testified that he had believed that the work activities had "contributed to the heart attack and that [Employee] would not have [had] the heart attack and that time." Dr. Marshall had stated that Employee had four major risk factors for heart disease and that he would have ultimately had a heart attack. Dr. Goldenberg however had concluded that "[Employee] would have had heart attack probably sometime in that week regardless of his activity because he was predisposed to having a heart attack."
Industrial Accident Board decision of October 13, 1999 at 5.
Id.
3. In its decision, the Board noted that "Dr. Marshall could not say that the heart attack would not have happened but for [Employee's] work activities." The Board then denied Employee's petition to determine compensation due and found that "[Employee] has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the heart attack would not have occurred but for his work activities on January 5, 1999."
Id.
Id.
4. Employee contends that the findings of the Board require a reversal of the decision an the award of compensation to Employee. Employee states that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Employee contends that the Board heard medical evidence that Employee would not have had the heart attack when he did but for his work activities.
Employer contends that the Board applied the correct standard in determining whether Employee's work related activities had caused the heart attack. Employer contends that the Board's decision is based on substantial evidence in the record and asks this Court to affirm the decision.
5. The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court, on appeal, does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. This Court's duty is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's findings of fact and whether errors of law exist. As the Court performs this duty, it views the facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Only where there is no satisfactory proof in support of the factual findings of the Board may Superior Court overturn it. Furthermore, this Court will give deference to the expertise of administrative agencies and must affirm the decision of an agency even if the Court might have, in the first instance, reached an opposite conclusion.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965); General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), appeal dismissed, Del. Supr. 515 A.2d 397 (1986).
Johnson at 66.
See Chudnofsky v. Edwards, Del. Supr., 208 A.2d 516, 518 (1965).
Johnson at 66.
See 29 Del. C. § 10142 (d); Petty v. University of Delaware, Del. Supr., 450 A.2d 392, 396 (1982); Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671 (1972).
6. If a worker has a pre-existing disposition to a certain physical injury, if that injury would not have occurred but for the accident, causation is satisfied for the purposes of compensability. Under Reese, Employee must prove that the heart attack would not have happened but for his work activities.
Reese v. Home Budget Center, Del. Supr., 610 A.2d 907, 910 (1992).
7. Dr. Marshall had testified by deposition on behalf of the Employee. Dr. Marshall had testified that Employee had been restricted in his work activities because he had angina and he also had noted that Employee had coronary artery disease, diabetes, smoking, and hypertension, the four major risk factors for a heart attack. Although Dr. Marshall had testified that he had believed that the work activities had contributed to the heart attack, he did state that "[Employee] would have at some point in his life had a heart attack . . . [w]ould he have ultimately had a heart attack? Yeah. I couldn't tell you when it was going to happen. But ultimately . . . he was more than likely going to have a heart attack at some point in his life."
Marshall deposition at 17.
Dr. Goldenberg in contrast testified by deposition that "[he] though it most unlikely that the actual work that he was performing at the time, no maffer how strenuous, actually caused the heart attack, that it would have happened whether he was working or not sometime around that date."
Goldenberg deposition at 12.
8. The Board is free to accept or reject in whole or in part testimony offered before it and to fix its verdict upon testimony accepted. Weighing of evidence, determining credibility of witnesses, and resolving any conflicts in testimony, are functions reserved exclusively for the Board.
Debernardv. Reed, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 684 (1971).
Downes v. State, Del. Supr., No. 25, 1993, Holland, J. (Mar. 30, 1993) (ORDER).
The Board considered the testimony of the two doctors and reconciled the differences by stating "Dr. Marshall's opinion is consistent with Dr. Goldenberg's opinion except that Dr. Goldenberg believes [Employee] would have had heart attack probably sometime that week regardless of his activity because he was predisposed to having a heart attack." This Court finds that the Board's decision to accept the testimony of Dr. Goldenberg in whole and reject part of Dr. Marshall's testimony was based on substantial evidence in the record. The Board did not otherwise commit any error of law.
Industrial Accident Board decision of October 13, 1999 at 5.
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________
cc: Prothonotary Industrial Accident Board Harvey Bernard Rubenstein, Esquire. Attorney for Employee Cassandra Faline Kaminski, Esquire, Attorney for Employer
Different counsel represented Employee at the Board hearing below.