The "acts of racketeering" were, among others, that the Drs. Nezhat (1) made false statements in medical journal articles; (2) failed to obtain valid consent for surgical procedures from Mullen and other patients at the Center, thereby committing aggravated battery on the patients; (3) improperly billed insurance companies for experimental surgeries; and (4) improperly used experimental drugs. Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga.App. 278, 477 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1996). Count IX alleged aggravated battery, and federal mail and wire fraud as acts of racketeering.
Thus, the orders identified by the defendant in the amended notices of appeal are not properly before us. See Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga.App. 278, 283 (4) (477 S.E.2d 417) (1996) (subsequent orders cannot be appealed by amending original notice of appeal).
Dikeman's post-summary-judgment attempt to re-characterize the counterclaim as a common-law claim for fraud is ineffectual.Sedima, S.P.R.I. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n. 14 ( 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346) (1985); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 282(3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996). Cf. City of Atlanta v. Jackson, 263 Ga. 426, 428(6) ( 435 S.E.2d 212) (1993).
See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-5. See Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 281-282(3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996). Nevertheless, four of the brokers' own affidavits did not set forth specific facts that showed other predicate acts.
This assertion fails to create a triable issue concerning violation of any of JarAllah's constitutional rights. Hyde v. Gill, 236 Ga. App. 729, 731 (1) ( 513 S.E.2d 278); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 282 (3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417). "The summary judgment law does not require the defendant to show that no issue of fact remains, but rather [that] no genuine issue of material fact remains . . .; and while there may be some `shadowy semblance of an issue' . . ., the case may nevertheless be decided as a matter of law where the evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw but one conclusion. [Cits.
See Barber v. Collins, 194 Ga. App. 385, 386 (3) ( 390 S.E.2d 633) (1990).Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 283 (4) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996).Desai, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 163 (1).
The two predicate acts relied upon must be indictable under state or federal law and come within one of the categories allowing a RICO action. See OCGA § 16-14-3 (9) (A) (i) through (xxxii), (B); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278 ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996); Sevcech v. Ingles Mkts., 222 Ga. App. 221 ( 474 S.E.2d 4) (1996); Raines v. State, 219 Ga. App. 893 ( 467 S.E.2d 217) (1996); Avery v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 214 Ga. App. 602 (1) ( 448 S.E.2d 737) (1994); Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga. App. 707, 710 (5) ( 340 S.E.2d 664) (1986). Plaintiffs neither identified two criminal acts nor submitted evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that would raise a material issue of fact regarding whether such acts occurred.
Therefore, Security was entitled to a directed verdict on this ground also. See also Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 281 (3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996) (physical precedent). (d) Another ground urged below by Security was that the harm suffered by the Clarks was attributable solely to the acts of Fipps and not participated in by Security.