Mullen v. Nezhat

8 Citing cases

  1. Byrne v. Nezhat

    261 F.3d 1075 (11th Cir. 2001)   Cited 952 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding a district judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to recuse himself from a case when he screened his law clerk who had previously worked for one of the law firms representing a party in a case

    The "acts of racketeering" were, among others, that the Drs. Nezhat (1) made false statements in medical journal articles; (2) failed to obtain valid consent for surgical procedures from Mullen and other patients at the Center, thereby committing aggravated battery on the patients; (3) improperly billed insurance companies for experimental surgeries; and (4) improperly used experimental drugs. Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga.App. 278, 477 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1996). Count IX alleged aggravated battery, and federal mail and wire fraud as acts of racketeering.

  2. Sierra Express Inc. v. The Ins. Co. of the State

    No. A24A0172 (Ga. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2024)

    Thus, the orders identified by the defendant in the amended notices of appeal are not properly before us. See Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga.App. 278, 283 (4) (477 S.E.2d 417) (1996) (subsequent orders cannot be appealed by amending original notice of appeal).

  3. Dikeman v. Stearns

    253 Ga. App. 646 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that trial court properly denied overly broad discovery request for extensive client billing information, and noting that "where the information pertains to nonparties, confidentiality concerns may justify protecting other clients’ bills, not specifically related to the asserted cause of action, from discovery"

    Dikeman's post-summary-judgment attempt to re-characterize the counterclaim as a common-law claim for fraud is ineffectual.Sedima, S.P.R.I. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n. 14 ( 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346) (1985); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 282(3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996). Cf. City of Atlanta v. Jackson, 263 Ga. 426, 428(6) ( 435 S.E.2d 212) (1993).

  4. Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc.

    243 Ga. App. 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 40 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding two closings relating to acquisition of property were part of one transaction and did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity

    See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-5. See Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 281-282(3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996). Nevertheless, four of the brokers' own affidavits did not set forth specific facts that showed other predicate acts.

  5. Jarallah v. Schoen

    243 Ga. App. 402 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling upon summary judgment motion instead of granting continuance when appellant “did not demonstrate that a continuance would lead to the discovery of relevant evidence”

    This assertion fails to create a triable issue concerning violation of any of JarAllah's constitutional rights. Hyde v. Gill, 236 Ga. App. 729, 731 (1) ( 513 S.E.2d 278); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 282 (3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417). "The summary judgment law does not require the defendant to show that no issue of fact remains, but rather [that] no genuine issue of material fact remains . . .; and while there may be some `shadowy semblance of an issue' . . ., the case may nevertheless be decided as a matter of law where the evidence shows clearly and palpably that the jury could reasonably draw but one conclusion. [Cits.

  6. Matthews v. Tele-Systems, Inc.

    240 Ga. App. 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that a breach-of-fiduciary duty claim, which essentially alleged that excessive salaries depleted or wasted corporate assets, could only be brought in a derivative action

    See Barber v. Collins, 194 Ga. App. 385, 386 (3) ( 390 S.E.2d 633) (1990).Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 283 (4) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996).Desai, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 163 (1).

  7. Roth v. Connor

    235 Ga. App. 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 19 times

    The two predicate acts relied upon must be indictable under state or federal law and come within one of the categories allowing a RICO action. See OCGA § 16-14-3 (9) (A) (i) through (xxxii), (B); Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278 ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996); Sevcech v. Ingles Mkts., 222 Ga. App. 221 ( 474 S.E.2d 4) (1996); Raines v. State, 219 Ga. App. 893 ( 467 S.E.2d 217) (1996); Avery v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 214 Ga. App. 602 (1) ( 448 S.E.2d 737) (1994); Waldschmidt v. Crosa, 177 Ga. App. 707, 710 (5) ( 340 S.E.2d 664) (1986). Plaintiffs neither identified two criminal acts nor submitted evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that would raise a material issue of fact regarding whether such acts occurred.

  8. Security Life v. Clark

    229 Ga. App. 593 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 15 times

    Therefore, Security was entitled to a directed verdict on this ground also. See also Mullen v. Nezhat, 223 Ga. App. 278, 281 (3) ( 477 S.E.2d 417) (1996) (physical precedent). (d) Another ground urged below by Security was that the harm suffered by the Clarks was attributable solely to the acts of Fipps and not participated in by Security.