Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-6722.
September 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Stephen and Donna Mullen are seeking recovery against various parties for injuries suffered by Stephen Mullen in the course of his employment as a longshoreman. Pursuant to this Court's Order of August 2, 2004, Plaintiffs' claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), against Alicante Carrier Shipping Corp. and Del Monte Fresh Produce International were dismissed, and judgment was entered in favor of those defendants against Plaintiffs. The only remaining motion before the Court is Defendant Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.'s ("Del Monte N.A.") Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be denied.
I. Background
The relevant facts are set forth in this Court's August 2, 2004 Memorandum and Order. In brief, Plaintiff Stephen Mullen was employed as a longshoreman on April 10, 2001, when he was injured while attempting to unload pallets of bananas from a ship recently docked at the Camden pier. Plaintiffs claim that, as Stephen Mullen was attempting to remove two slings from a palletized unit of bananas (by pulling on the slings), one of the slings caught on the pallet, causing a pop in his right shoulder. Stephen underwent shoulder surgery in the summer of 2001 and reports that he still suffers pain and a limited range of motion. He alleges that the sling caught on the pallet as a result of a knot, and that the sling was knotted as a result of Defendants' combined negligence. Plaintiffs' sole remaining cause of action is against Del Monte N.A., the company that operated the No. 5 Terminal in Camden where Stephen was injured and that allegedly supervised much of the unloading process.
II. Choice of Law Question
For a personal injury claim to fall under the purview of federal maritime law rather than state tort law, a plaintiff must be engaged in maritime employment at the time of the injury and the injury must occur on a covered situs. More specifically, federal maritime tort jurisdiction requires that the incident: (1) occur on navigable waters; (2) bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity; and, (3) have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 531-34 (1995);see generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (3d ed. West 2001) at § 3-5. Plaintiffs' claim involves an alleged tort occurring on the pier while Stephen and fellow longshoremen were unloading cargo from a vessel. Initially, there is a question of whether state tort law applies — rather than federal maritime law — because the injury actually occurred on land.
Plaintiffs' argument in support of the application of federal maritime law rests on the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, which modifies the locality prong of the jurisdictional test. The Act provides that "[t]he admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." 46 App. U.S.C.A. § 740. In interpreting the jurisdictional reach of the Admiralty Extension Act, the Supreme Court has relied upon "the gangplank line as the presumptive boundary of admiralty jurisdiction except for cases in which a ship's appurtenance causes damage ashore." Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 214 n. 14 (1971) (emphasis added). Consequently, the application of federal maritime law to this case hinges on whether this injury was "caused" by a vessel or its appurtenance within the limited meaning of the Act. Two Supreme Court cases delineate the boundaries of such jurisdiction: Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963), and Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
Because both parties' briefs assumed that maritime law governed the dispute despite the fact that the injury occurred on land, this Court requested supplemental briefing on the choice of law issue before ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Gutierrez, the Supreme Court affirmed maritime jurisdiction over a tort claim brought by a longshoreman who had been engaged in unloading a vessel's cargo of soybeans, when he slipped and fell on beans that had leaked onto the pier as a result of broken and defective packaging. See 373 U.S. at 207. The Court reasoned that Congress had intended to expand maritime jurisdiction to include any case where the vessel or shipowner causes a tort while the ship is being unloaded, even when the impact is felt ashore. Id. at 210. In Victory Carriers, Inc., the Supreme Court limited the application of maritime jurisdiction to certain injuries occurring on land, but affirmed the rule that such jurisdiction applies whenever a longshoreman is injured on the pier by defective cargo containers or other "appurtenances" of the ship. See 404 U.S. at 214 (declining to extend maritime jurisdiction to suit stemming from personal injury on pier caused by a forklift); see also Mascuilli v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 770, 773 (D.C. Pa. 1974). Each decision rested on a factual analysis of the location of the injury, the circumstances that precipitated it, and the relationship between the allegedly defective cargo or equipment and the vessel.
Consideration of the specific facts of this case reveals that they are more akin to those of Gutierrez than to those ofVictory Carriers, Inc. and, therefore, that the application of federal maritime law is appropriate. Although the shipowner's actual liability is sharply circumscribed by the LHWCA, for jurisdictional purposes, the injury appears to have been "caused" by a vessel on navigable waters, in that the injury was caused by the cargo slings in a vessel's cargo hold soon after the vessel docked and during the process of unloading.
First, unlike in Victory Carriers, Inc., the arguably defective equipment in this case — the cargo sling — was part of the vessel's usual gear and was regularly stored on board, see Pl. Opp. to Motion I at 11. Compare Victory Carriers, Inc., 404 U.S. at 214. This bolsters the claim that the sling is an appurtenance of the ship, as required for jurisdictional purposes, rather than merely a shore-side tool for unloading (such as a forklift). Compare id.
In addition, to the extent that the sling was defective due to a knot, it is significant that any such defect arose while the sling was employed on the ship and well before the pallets and slings were unloaded onto the pier. See Mascuilli, 381 F. Supp. at 774 (ruling that dunnage from cargo hold was an appurtenance to ship and that maritime law would apply to case, but that dunnage was not defective until after it left ship). The Fourth Circuit and other courts have recognized that this distinction, and more generally, the time at which the alleged defect arises, is critical in determining the "cause" of an injury under the Act and the potential application of maritime law. See Snydor v. Villain Fassio et Compania Internazionale Di Genova Societa Reunite Di Naviagaione, S.P.A., 459 F.2d 365, 368 (4th Cir. 1972) (emphasizing the importance of establishing whether pallets were defective when they left the ship, in order to determine the applicability of maritime law to longshoreman's personal injury claim).
Finally, the sling in this case was determined to be part of the cargo hold of the ship and numerous cases have found maritime law to apply to shore-based injuries caused by such cargo in the loading or unloading process. See, e.g., Hagans v. Ellerman Bucknall S.S. Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3rd Cir. 1963) (ruling maritime law applies to tort claim arising when longshoreman slipped on sand from bags he was unloading); Garrett v. Gutzeit O/Y, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying maritime law to tort claim stemming from injury caused by defective coils used as cargo containers on vessel). Moreover, while the mere fact that a longshoreman is engaged in unloading cargo will not automatically entitle him to the benefit of maritime law, courts have recognized maritime law's traditional concern with the loading and unloading of vessels and regularly extended jurisdiction to injuries resulting from that process. See Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping Inc. Cie. Chambon Maclovia S.A., 562 F.2d 215, 221 (3rd Cir. 1977). In sum, the application of federal maritime law is appropriate.
III. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the test for whether to grant summary judgment is "whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Med. Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
IV. Del Monte N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment
Unlike Defendants Alicante Carrier Shipping Corporation (the vessel's owner) and Del Monte Fresh Produce International, Inc. (the time charterer), Del Monte N.A. (the terminal operator) is not limited to the duties and liabilities described in Scindia Steam Nav. Co., Ltd. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981), andHowlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92 (1994), because it is not considered a "vessel" for purposes of § 905(b) of the LHWCA. As a result, Plaintiffs' claims against Del Monte N.A. are governed by general negligence standards under maritime law, which impose "the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case." Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959).
In support of a general negligence claim, Plaintiffs allege that Del Monte N.A.'s personnel were utterly indifferent "to the consequences of allowing knots to be put in the slings and permitting them to be recirculated for continued use," a failure of Del Monte N.A.'s duty of reasonable care. See Pl. Opp. to Motion II at 5-6. Plaintiffs also allege that a number of persons asked Del Monte N.A.'s port manager, Ernie Casper, to see to it that knots were not put in the slings at the load port.
Defendant concedes that Casper received complaints about knots and asserts two arguments in response: (1) Defendant claims that Plaintiff Stephen Mullen and his fellow longshoremen knew that they were expected to dispose of unsafe slings, but failed to dispose of knotted slings and instead recirculated them to vessels for future use. See Deposition of Stephen Mullen ("Mullen Dep.") at 183-184. While this suggests that there may be some liability on Stephen's part, under federal maritime negligence law, such liability does not preclude a finding that Defendant was also negligent. See Pope Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (recognizing that Plaintiff's comparative negligence mitigates damages, but does not totally bar recovery). Based on the evidence before it, this Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant was not negligent, though a jury may determine that such negligence was mitigated by the actions of Stephen. (2) Defendant next argues that the complaints directed to Casper about knots had nothing to do with slings getting stuck on pallets; rather, the longshoremen were concerned that the pallets would tip and the slings would break, posing a danger to both the workers and the cargo. See Mullen Dep. at 132-133. However, Defendant is incorrect that it is shielded from liability simply because the exact manner in which the injury occurred was not foreseen. As the Third Circuit recognized in an analogous maritime suit, evidence of a general hazard that might cause injury in a number of different ways — in that case, a piece of equipment stuck to the ship — was sufficient for making out a plaintiff's specific negligence claim. See Serbin v. Bora Corp., Ltd., 96 F.3d 66, 72 (3rd Cir. 1996) ("[b]ecause [Plaintiff] must show that the block posed a general hazard, he is entitled to the inferences flowing from the many . . . ways a stuck block could injure someone"); see also Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1369 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("[t]he type of foreseeability that determines a duty of care . . . is not dependent on the foreseeability of a specific event"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(1) ("that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the . . . manner in which [the harm] occurred does not prevent him from being liable").
Here, if a knot was foreseeable, then Del Monte N.A. potentially bears liability for a range of resulting harms, including but not limited to, tipping pallets. A reasonable jury could conclude that a cargo sling becoming stuck due to a knot was a foreseeable risk, and accordingly, the Court cannot find as a matter of law that Defendant was not negligent. Summary judgment, therefore, must be denied as to Del Monte N.A.
V. Conclusion
Based on the application of federal maritime law's general negligence principles, the Court will deny the motion for summary judgment of Defendant Del Monte N.A.