(4) In Connecticut "All statutes, whether remedial or penal, should be construed according to the apparent intention of the Legislature, to be gathered from the entire language used, in connection with the subject and purpose of the law." (Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242, 243 (1911)); (5) The purpose in enacting § 52-592 was to provide an enlarged statute of limitations in certain specific cases; this is a remedial statute (Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 386, 58 A.2d 5 (1948); Korb v. Bridgeport Gas Light Co., 91 Conn. 395, 99 A. 1048 (1917));

The statute is remedial and construed liberally, generally admitting statements of decedents in actions by or against their representatives. Starzec v. Kida, 183 Conn. 41, 45 n. 4, 438 A.2d 1157 (1981); see also Facey v. Merkle, 146 Conn. 129, 134, 148 A.2d 261 (1959) (noting that dead man's statute is "broad enough to include ordinary modes of communication" and allowing witness to testify to decedent's nodding or shaking his head in response to questions regarding accident); Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242 (1911) ("The statute . . . is a highly remedial one. Its aim was to take away the great advantage which under pre-existing law living persons had over the representatives of the deceased."). There is no requirement that the testimony offered be that to which the decedent could have testified if living.

The court's duty has been looked upon as how best to effectuate the legislative intent. Plisko v. Morgan, 148 Conn. 510, 512, 172 A.2d 621; Graybill v. Plant, 138 Conn. 397, 405, 85 A.2d 238; Joanis v. Engstrom, 135 Conn. 248, 251, 63 A.2d 151; Walter v. Sperry, 86 Conn. 474, 477, 85 A. 739; Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242; Pixley v. Eddy, 56 Conn. 336, 340, 15 A. 758; Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn. 509, 516; Douglas v. Chapin, 26 Conn. 76, 91, 92. The modern business entry statute, presently General Statutes 52-180, was originally enacted as Cum.

Such evidence was inadmissible at common law but the change made by statute has been approved by eminent authority. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) 1576; 12 B. U. L. Rev. 396, 412; Morgan, Law of Evidence, p. 37 et seq., p. 89 et seq. The statute is discussed in Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 661, 81 A. 242; Walter v. Sperry, 86 Conn. 474, 476, 85 A. 739; Furcolo v. Auto Rental Co., 110 Conn. 540, 542, 148 A. 377; and note, 96 A.L.R. 686. The declaration is evidence of the facts stated; Setchel v. Keigwin, 57 Conn. 473, 479, 18 A. 594; Norbutas v. Bendler, 116 Conn. 728, 729, 166 A. 388; but the weight is ordinarily for the jury; Setchel v. Keigwin, supra; Nagle v. Boston N. Ry. Co., 188 Mass. 38, 41, 73 N.E. 1019. The defendants do not seriously dispute these legal propositions but claim that the statement itself will not prevail against the overwhelming weight of evidence to the contrary, a view in which the trial court, in a studied memorandum, concurred. The danger of relying too heavily on such statements is pointed out in discussing the weaknesses inherent in the somewhat similar declarations by a person in articulo mortis.

However, the word "action" has no precise meaning and the scope of proceedings which will be included within the term as used in the statutes depends upon the nature and purpose of the particular statute in question. Thus in Barber's Appeal, 63 Conn. 393, 413, 27 A. 973, we held that an appeal from a decree of a Court of Probate admitting a will to probate was not an "action" within the meaning of that word as used in 5608 of the General Statutes making the declarations of deceased persons admissible in "actions" by or against their representatives, although we noted that such a proceeding was within the meaning of the word as used in some statutory proceedings, citing the statute authorizing appeals to this court; while in Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 661, 81 A. 242, we held that an appeal from a decree of a Court of Probate denying a petition to compel a correction of the inventory of an estate was an "action" within the same statute, construing the statute in the light of the subject and purpose of the law and the mischief to be remedied. In Porter v. Ritch, 70 Conn. 235, 259, 39 A. 169, we held that an order by a Court of Probate for the temporary detention of an insane person was not an "action" within the principle that an action was not commenced until service of process had been made on the defendant, and we said, referring to a definition of an action given by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 407, that, within the principle he was stating, it obviously would not include "proceedings or actions in rem, nor proceedings in the nature of an inquest of office, and other like proceedings."

" They were placed upon it by a bookkeeper in the employment of the deceased at his direction, given to her in the Lithuanian language. He told her that the check paid the note in full and instructed her to write upon it that the note was paid off, using two words which were variously translated at the trial as meaning "paid bank note" or "paid off note" and which were not susceptible of interpretation as signifying "paid on account of note." The finding contains a statement that the payment of $100 evidenced by the check was the only evidence offered that the note was paid in full, but this overlooks the fact that the decedent's declaration to his bookkeeper that the check paid the note in full was evidence of that fact. General Statutes, § 5608; Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242. The trial court concluded that the payment discharged the note, the facts it has found support that conclusion and no correction in or addition to them can be made which would be of advantage to the plaintiff. The plaintiff on the trial objected to the testimony of the bookkeeper as to the words she wrote upon the face of the check, upon the ground that the pleadings did not raise the issue of payment, but the trial court admitted the evidence upon the promise of the defendant's attorney to file an amendment to the answer and that amendment was filed; it contained an allegation that the defendant's intestate had paid the balance due upon the note by the check; this accorded with the defendant's proof and was adequate to support the conclusion of the trial court.

"It would be operative and conclusive to this extent, but no further" (p. 221). Omission from a final account of a claimed indebtedness to the decedent as an asset of the estate is a proper matter for consideration in connection with the acceptance of the account. Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 81 A. 242. When the Court of Probate allowed the executors full credit for the mortgage item, without diminution on account of the extension agreement, it exhausted the proper functions of action on the account with reference to that asset item.

The purpose of the statute was to remove the disparity in advantage previously possessed by living litigants as against the representatives of persons whose voices were stilled by death, by permitting the declarations and memoranda of the latter to be received and weighed in the evidential balance as against the assertions of the living. Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242; Rowland v. Philadelphia, W. B.R. Co., 63 Conn. 415, 417, 28 A. 102; Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn. 509, 516. While the statute is entitled to, and has been accorded, a liberal construction having in view its purpose and the mischief it was designed to remedy, it does not follow that the privilege conferred by it is entirely without exceptions or limitations in operation. We have recognized one such in the Rowland case, just cited (p. 418), holding that a deposition given by the decedent while living could not be supplemented by evidence, offered by his representatives, after his death, of his unsworn statements in his own favor as to the same matter. It is equally logical and reasonable that the law, primarily designed for the benefit of the decedent, through his representatives, should not be so construed or applied as to entirely deprive such representatives of that protection which would have been available to the decedent, while living, as to confidential communications between

. . . The true meaning of any passage is to be found not merely in the words of that passage, but in comparing it with every other part of the law, ascertaining also what were the circumstances with reference to which the words were used, and what was the object appearing from those circumstances, which the legislature had in view, and what were the cause and occasion for the passage of the Act, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it, in the light of the circumstances at the time, and the necessity of its enactment. . . . If possible, a statute must be so construed as to make it effect the purposes for which it was intended." Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, pp. 35-37; Stapleberg v. Stapleberg, 77 Conn. 31, 35, 58 A. 233; Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242; Wooley v. Williams, 105 Conn. 671, 673, 136 A. 583. Satisfied therefore that the legislative intent in enacting Chapter 285 was to except cases like the present from the operation of the suspended sentence and the probation law, how are we to construe § 2 of the Act? This section is the final word of the legislature which conferred upon our criminal courts the right of suspending sentence and giving probation.

It will . . . therefore be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character," and "the intention of the legislature may be gathered from a view of every part taken and compared together, and, when the true intention is ascertained, it will prevail over the literal sense of the terms." United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486, 487; Budd v. Budd, 59 F. 735, 738; Donnelly v. New Haven, 95 Conn. 647, 667, 111 A. 897; Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242. Our conclusion is that the informalities of procedure complained of in the present case were not such as to justify holding the proceedings void.