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Muhammad's Temple of Islam v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jul 26, 2011
No. 1418 C.D. 2010 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Jul. 26, 2011)

Opinion

No. 1418 C.D. 2010

07-26-2011

Muhammad's Temple of Islam, Appellant v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Jeffrey A. Beard, Donald T. Vaughn, Donald L. Kelchner, Ulli Klemm, John Kerestes, Tab Bitner, John Doe, Jane Doe, and Members of the Religious Accommodation Committee


BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JOHNNY J. BUTLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER

Muhammad's Temple of Islam (MTI) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) that denied the Motion for the Appointment of Counsel of Kerry X. Marshall (Marshall), an inmate purporting to represent MTI, and dismissed Marshall's Complaint pursuant to Rule 240(j) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that Marshall failed to follow the established grievance procedure at SCI-Mahanoy. In its Complaint, MTI alleges that the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the other Appellees (collectively, DOC Defendants) violated the rights of members of MTI under the state and federal constitutions by failing to provide group worship for MTI members.

Although Muhammad's Temple of Islam is listed as the appellant, the Complaint in this matter was filed by Kerry X. Marshall, pro se. In addition, the body of the Complaint does not list Muhammad's Temple of Islam as a plaintiff.

On April 27, 2010, Marshall filed his Complaint with the trial court, attempting to institute a class action suit against the DOC Defendants. In addition to Marshall, the Complaint also listed four other representative plaintiffs. The facts alleged in the Complaint are as follows. DOC formerly provided for separate group worship services for inmates adhering to MTI (also known as Nation of Islam) and for Sunni Muslim inmates. (Complaint ¶¶ 24-26.) Sunni Muslims and MTI adherents each regard followers of the other religion as "unbelievers" due to differences in the tenets of the faiths and that they, therefore, are forbidden by each faith to worship together. (Complaint ¶¶ 27-28.) DOC provided for separate Sunni and MTI group services between approximately 1974 and 1993. (Complaint ¶¶ 31, 33.) In 1993, DOC initiated a regulation purporting to be consistent with DC-ADM 819 that ended recognition of MTI as a faith group and abolished group MTI services. (Complaint ¶ 33.) MTI adherents were left with the option of attending Sunni Muslim services or not attending any religious services. (Complaint ¶¶ 34, 53.) MTI adherents were told by prison officials that there would only be one recognized Islamic faith group and that group would be the Sunni Muslim faith group. (Complaint ¶ 34.) In contrast, DOC recognizes four separate Christian faith groups—including Catholics and Protestants—and allows separate services for each faith group; DOC's new policy did not require that these different Christian faiths worship as one faith group. (Complaint ¶¶ 35, 67.) DOC ended recognition of MTI as a faith group and abolished group services for MTI adherents maliciously because DOC "does not like the [MTI] religious beliefs." (Complaint ¶ 37.) MTI adherents, including Marshall, sought religious accommodations per DOC procedures for group services, but these were denied pursuant to DC-ADM 819. (Complaint ¶¶ 39-43.) On the basis of these facts, the Complaint alleges that the DOC Defendants violated the rights of Marshall and other MTI adherents under Sections 1, 3, 13, and 26 of article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as well as Section 93.6 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code. As relief, the Complaint seeks declaratory judgment that the DOC Defendants intentionally and maliciously violated these rights, injunctive relief allowing certain MTI services in State Correctional Institutes, and monetary damages. Marshall also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis and an application for appointment of counsel.

DC-ADM 819 generally describes permissible religious articles and accoutrements and, relevant to this case, sets out procedures for inmates to seek religious accommodations not provided for in the policy. A copy of this policy can be found at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/document/919467/819_religious_activites_policy_pdf (last visited June 30, 2011).

Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides "[a]ll men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." Pa. Const. art. I, § 1.

Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

[a]ll men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
Pa. Const. art I, § 3.

Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted." Pa. Const. art. I, § 13.

Article I, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides "[n]either the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right." Pa. Const. art. I, § 26.

The Board's regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.6 is entitled "Religious activities" and provides:

(a) Department responsibilities. The Department will permit inmates to possess approved religious items and make reasonable accommodations for dietary restrictions. The Department will provide chapel facilities at each facility and will permit inmates to request religious accommodations not already being permitted.

(b) Religious advisors.

(1) If the facility contains a sufficient number of inmates of the same faith, a qualified representative of that faith from the outside community will be appointed and approved by the facility manager. Qualified representative means a person from the outside community who has received endorsement from his faith group authority. Qualified representatives, staff and volunteers will be permitted to hold services that are consistent with the security needs and orderly administration of the facility.

(2) Each inmate will be permitted to select a religious advisor from the outside community subject to security needs and orderly administration of the facility. This person will be permitted to visit the inmate on an individual basis in accordance with general rules governing visitation.

(c) Accommodation of faiths. Requests for accommodation of faiths will be made according to DC-ADM 819 -- Religious Activities -- which provides a process for inmates to request accommodations not already being provided and for staff review of the requests.
37 Pa. Code § 93.6.

In its Order dated May 7, 2010, the trial court denied Marshall's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and dismissed the Complaint pursuant to Rule 240(j) on the ground that Marshall and the other plaintiffs had failed to fully exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to Section 93.9. Marshall now appeals to this Court.

"The scope of review of this Court's review of denial of an in forma pauperis application by the trial court is limited to a determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law." Thomas v. Holtz, 707 A.2d 569, 570 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

Before this Court, Marshall argues that the trial court erred in denying Marshall's Motion for Appointment of Counsel and his application for in forma pauperis status because they were not procedurally defective and these filings relate to important rights of the plaintiffs involving freedom of religion and other due process rights. Marshall argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the Complaint because the plaintiffs did, in fact, exhaust their administrative remedies. DOC, for its part, acknowledges that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Because the parties agree that the trial court reached this conclusion in error, we will not revisit it. However, DOC urges this Court to affirm the order of the trial court on the alternative basis that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

We first address DOC's argument that this Court may affirm the trial Court's order on the alternative grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. "[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm the decision of the court below for any valid reason." Brown v. Beard, 11 A.3d 578, 580 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Section 6602(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. § 6602(e), provides that prison conditions litigation may be dismissed at any time if the court determines that the litigation fails to state a claim. On the basis of the facts outlined above, the Complaint asserts that the actions of the DOC Defendants have violated the plaintiffs' rights in that they: (1) denied them of their freedom to worship, and by compelling them to worship with Sunni Muslims, (Complaint ¶¶ 79-82); (2) treated adherents of the MTI religion differently from adherents of other religions by refusing to recognize MTI as a faith group and by not allowing group worship services for MTI adherents (Complaint ¶¶ 83-89); and (3) inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on adherents of the MTI religion by not allowing them to freely practice their religion. To determine whether the Complaint states a claim, this Court must analyze each of the arguments raised in the Complaint in turn.

Under the PLRA, "prison conditions litigation" is defined as:

[a] civil proceeding arising in whole or in part under Federal or State law with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by a government party on the life of an individual confined in prison. The term includes an appeal. The term does not include criminal proceedings or habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.
42 Pa. C.S. § 6601.

We first address Marshall's allegation that the actions of the DOC Defendants denied the plaintiffs the right to worship freely and to be free of the governmental establishment of religion. Article I, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees the right to worship freely and to be free of government compulsion to support any faith. Pa. Const. art I, § 3. This provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution is understood to be coextensive with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Meggett v. Department of Corrections, 892 A.2d 872, 878-879 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). "Because of the crimes that prisoners committed resulting in their incarceration, prison officials are given a wide range of discretion in the promulgation and enforcement of rules to govern the prison community in order to maintain security, order and discipline." Maute v. Frank, 670 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). While imprisonment does not abrogate inmates' constitutional rights:

individual rights guaranteed under the federal or state Constitution . . . may be curtailed whenever prison officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that those rights possess the likelihood of disrupting prison order or stability or otherwise interfering with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment.
Id. at 740. In determining whether DOC has violated an inmate's right to freedom of religion by denying a religious accommodation, this Court must examine: (1) "if the inmate's belief is sincere and religious in nature"; (2) "whether there is a rational connection between the prison's refusal to provide the [accommodation] the inmate seeks and a legitimate penological interest"; and (3) "if the refusal is reasonable in light of the nature of the penological interest, the inmate's interest in practicing his religion, the overall effect on the prison community in granting the request, and the availability of ways to accommodate the request at a de minimis cost." Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). DOC does not dispute the sincerity or religious nature of Marshall's beliefs. In this case DOC asserts that, due to space and staffing limitations, it is not able to safely offer faith group recognition and group services for all faiths that desire it. (DOC Defendants' Br. at 15.) As DOC points out, courts have recognized such limitations as legitimate penological reasons for declining to provide separate group worship services for different faiths. (DOC Defendants' Br. at 15 (citing Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182, 185 (10th Cir. 1991)); Matiyn v. Commissioner Department of Corrections, 726 F.Supp. 42, 44 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that failure to provide separate services for Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims was not designed to deprive inmates of their religious freedom, but a necessity of the limitation of the prison setting). With regard to the reasonableness of DOC's refusal to provide group worship services and the impact of this refusal on Marshall's ability to practice his faith, Marshall does not allege in the Complaint that he and the other plaintiffs are prevented from privately practicing the MTI religion. For these reasons, we hold Marshall's Complaint fails to state a claim that the actions of the DOC Defendants have unjustifiably infringed on the plaintiffs' freedom of religion.

We next address Marshall's claim that the DOC Defendants treated adherents of the MTI religion differently from adherents of other religions by refusing to recognize MTI as a faith group and not allowing group worship services for MTI adherents. Marshall argues, for instance, that Catholics, Protestants, and Jehovah's Witnesses are all provided separate worship services even though these are all denominations of Christianity. The Complaint states that 150 inmates at S.C.I.-Mahanoy adhere to the MTI faith while 3,200 inmates in the DOC system adhere to the MTI faith. (Complaint ¶ 18.) The Complaint does not explain how these numbers compare to the number of adherents of faiths that are permitted to hold group worship services. Therefore, from the allegations of the Complaint, we cannot say that the MTI faith is similarly situated to the faiths permitted to hold group worship services. As the Supreme Court stated in Cruz v. Belo, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972):

We do not suggest, of course, that every religious sect or group within a prison—however few in number—must have identical facilities or personnel. A special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.
Id. Therefore, we hold that the Complaint fails to state an equal protection claim.

Finally, we turn to Marshall's claim that denial of group worship services for MTI adherents amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. The United States Supreme Court has held that:

"'The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'" We have said that "among 'unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are 'totally without penological justification.'" In making this determination in the context of prison conditions, we must ascertain whether the officials involved acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' health or safety. We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). Marshall bases his claim of cruel and unusual punishment solely on the acts constituting his claims for violation of the plaintiffs' rights of freedom of religion and equal protection. The Complaint alleges that the DOC Defendants' actions:
have directly caused the Plaintiffs to suffer 'mental and emotional anguish' injuries from believing that they will suffer a physical Hell, never acquire mental resurrection in life, and never attain a
physical/mental Heavenly state as punishment from Allah (GOD) for not obeying their [MTI] religious commandments, which has caused the Plaintiffs to suffer physical injuries of migraine headaches, chest pains and stomach illness.
(Complaint ¶ 78.) While we sympathize with the plaintiffs regarding any discomfort they may be suffering due to their inability to practice their faith as they wish, as discussed above, the Complaint fails to state a claim for the violations of the plaintiffs' rights to freedom of religion and equal protection, the violation of which they allege gives rise to their physical discomfort. Similarly, the Complaint does not allege that the DOC Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' physical complaints, beyond failing to provide them group worship services. We, therefore, hold that the Complaint fails to state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment.

For these reasons, we hold that Marshall's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, should be dismissed pursuant to Section 6602(e). However, in doing so, we explicitly hold that, although the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it is not frivolous and, if better pled, some of the claims raised by Marshall might survive demurrer. We, therefore, modify the trial court's order to make it clear that the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

Due to our holding on this issue, we do not reach Marshall's arguments regarding the trial court's denial of Marshall's Motion for the Appointment of Counsel, as the disposition of this Motion is moot, given that the Complaint is dismissed.

/s/ _________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER

NOW, July 26, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County is hereby AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED to dismiss the Complaint of Muhammad's Temple of Islam without prejudice.

/s/ _________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge


Summaries of

Muhammad's Temple of Islam v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Jul 26, 2011
No. 1418 C.D. 2010 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Jul. 26, 2011)
Case details for

Muhammad's Temple of Islam v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.

Case Details

Full title:Muhammad's Temple of Islam, Appellant v. Pennsylvania Department of…

Court:COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Jul 26, 2011

Citations

No. 1418 C.D. 2010 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. Jul. 26, 2011)