Opinion
1:22-cv-184
01-12-2024
FAYSAL SALIM MUHAMMAD, Petitioner v. BARRY SMITH, et al, Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Petitioner Faysal Salim Muhammad's pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied. It is further recommended that a Certificate of
Appealability be denied and that this action be closed.
II. Report
A. Factual Background
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania set forth the factual background of this case as follows:
Appellant was arrested on March 8, 2017, for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PWID), possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, after he was found with approximately 20 grams of heroin on his person and a loaded gun was found in his hotel room. Appellant was initially represented by a public defender, but terminated that representation in September 2017, and was represented by privately retained counsel until January 22, 2018. Following the withdrawal of privately retained counsel, Appellant was again represented by the same public defender. Appellant, however, was dissatisfied with counsel and
requested to represent himself, and, at a Grazier hearing at which he was fully advised of his rights and the risks of proceeding pro se, Appellant waived his right to counsel and undertook to represent himself. N.T., 4/11/18, at 2-3, 11-15.
While Appellant was representing himself, he filed a motion to dismiss asserting, inter alia, that the evidence on which the charges against him were based was illegally seized because the police did not obtain a warrant before entering his hotel room. Motion to Dismiss at 1, 5; N.T., 9/7/18, at 9-10, 18, 20-21, 23-25. The trial court held a hearing on that motion at which the officer who conducted the hotel room search and arrested Appellant testified, and, following that testimony, denied Appellant's motion. N.T., 9/7/18, at 10-22, 25; Trial Court Order, 9/10/18. Appellant, on October 1, 2018, filed an appeal from the order denying his motion to dismiss. On October 9, 2018, Appellant requested counsel and the same public defender was appointed to represent him. N.T., 10/9/18, at 22-30. This Court on November 19, 2018 quashed Appellant's appeal from the order denying the motion to dismiss as interlocutory. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, No. 1419 WDA 2018 Order (Pa. Super, filed November 19, 2018).
On December 5, 2018, Appellant, represented by counsel, entered a negotiated guilty plea to PWID and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited under a plea agreement that dismissed the possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia charges, reduced the amount of heroin on the PWID charge from 20 grams to 17.46 grams, and agreed for purposes of sentencing that the firearm would be treated as unloaded. N.T., 12/5/18, at 10-15; Plea Statement; Disposition Sheet. On February 25, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 2 to 4 years' incarceration for the PWID conviction and a consecutive term of 3 to 6 years' incarceration for the firearms offense, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 5 to 10 years' incarceration. N.T., 2/25/19, at 12-13; Sentencing Order. Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of sentence seeking modification of the sentences to concurrent sentences, which the trial court denied on March 8, 2019.Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 2021 WL 5983824, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2021).
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal, but the trial court construed a belated filing styled a “Notice of Appeal” as a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Id. at *2. Through appointed counsel, Petitioner raised a single claim: “Whether the appellant was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel in that defense counsel failed to pursue a suppression motion on his behalf thereby rendering his subsequent guilty pleas as invalid in that the appellant could not enter an intelligent and voluntary plea under the circumstances of counsel negli[g]ently relinquishing a meritorious defense?” Id. On December 17, 2021, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Petitioner's PCRA petition after concluding that Petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing. Id. Petitioner filed the instant 2254 Petition promptly thereafter.
In the instant Petition, Proper raises the same ground for relief: that trial counsel “was ineffective in failing to file a suppression motion thereby rendering the guilty plea as subject to challenge as unknowing and involuntary.” ECF No. 4 at 5. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Applicable Legal Standards
Habeas corpus is an ‘“extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were ‘grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings.” Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)). In enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress “significantly limited the federal court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus.” Tolbert v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4677357 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2019). Under § 2254, a district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Moreover, federal courts must give considerable deference to determinations made by state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Thus, if a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless:
the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). It is the habeas petitioner's burden to show that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent and/or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Moreno v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 4192459, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2019).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized the heavy burden habeas petitioners bear, noting that “even ‘clear error'” by the state courts “will not suffice.” Orie v. Sec. Pa. Dept, of Corrections, 940 F.3d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 2019). Rather, the state court must be wrong “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. (citations and some internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the factual determinations of the state courts are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.”).
C. Analysis and Discussion
1. Timeliness
Before the Court can address the merits of the petition, it must first decide whether it was timely filed. Romansky v. Superintendent Green SCI, 933 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2019). Pursuant to AEDPA, a state prisoner must file his federal habeas claims within one year of the date his judgment of sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Because he did not seek direct review from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Proper's sentence became final for purposes of the one-year PCRA statute of limitations and the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations on April 8, 2019, 30 days after the trial court denied his motion for reconsideration of sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the one-year federal limitations period generally begins on the date the petitioner's judgment of sentence became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”); Pa. R. App. P. 903(a).
When Petitioner filed his PCRA petition on April 29, 2019, the one-year habeas statute was “immediately tolled.” Nelson v. Superintendent of SCI-Retreat, 2019 WL 897296 *2 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2019). At that point, only twenty-one days of the limitations period had expired. Petitioner's PCRA petition remained pending in the state court system until January 17, 2022, when the time for Petitioner to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired. See Pa. R. App. P. 1113(a). Consequently, the instant 2254 petition, filed approximately five months later, was timely by almost six months.
2. Merits
As noted above, Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the firearm and drug paraphernalia found in his hotel room on the date of his arrest. Petitioner maintains that this deficiency undermined his ability to make an informed plea decision, rendering his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Respondent counters that, by electing to plead guilty, Petitioner waived his underlying claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel (IATC).
Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed this claim on the merits, the Court's analysis begins with the Superior Court's decision, viewed through AEDPA's highly deferential lens. In affirming the dismissal of his PCRA petition, the Superior Court addressed Petitioner's claim as follows:
Where the defendant pleads guilty, ineffective assistance of counsel prior to or at the time of the plea can be a basis for PCRA relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2014); Velazquez, 216 A.3d at 1149; Wah, 42 A.3d at 338; Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008). To establish that a guilty plea is voluntary and knowing, the plea colloquy must ascertain the factual basis for the plea and that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty, his right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, the sentencing ranges for the charges against him, and the plea court's power to deviate from any recommended sentence. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 500 & n.8, 504 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa. Super. 2015); Bedell, 954 A.2d at 1212; Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc); Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(A)(2). These matters may also be shown by a written plea colloquy read and signed by the defendant and made part of the record when supplemented by an oral, on-the-record examination. Reid, 117 A.3d at 782; Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108; Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(A)(2).
Here, the record shows that Appellant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing. At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth set forth the factual basis for the plea, the nature of the two charges to which Appellant was pleading guilty, the maximum possible sentences for those charges, and the nature of the plea agreement, and Appellant stated that he understood the charges, the plea agreement, and the maximum sentence that he could receive. N.T., 12/5/18, at 10-14. Appellant was also advised of his right to a jury trial and the presumption of innocence, that he was giving up those rights by pleading guilty, and that the plea court had the power to deviate from any recommended sentence, and he confirmed his understanding of those rights and that information. Id. at 5-7, 10. Appellant does not claim in his brief in this Court that trial counsel gave him any inaccurate information or inadequate advice concerning his plea or its consequences that caused him to plead guilty.
Rather, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that Appellant argues is that trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence had deprived him of the ability to have the evidence against him excluded. Counsel's failure to seek suppression of evidence, however, does not automatically render a guilty plea involuntary or unknowing. Commonwealth v. Jones, 566 A.2d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. 1989). Moreover, the claim that Appellant was forced to plead guilty by waiver
of the suppression issue or lack of awareness of this issue is contradicted by the record. The record shows that a motion to suppress was in fact filed by Appellant when he was acting pro se and that the right to seek suppression had not been waived at the time that Appellant chose to accept a favorable plea deal. Motion to Dismiss at 1, 5; N.T., 9/7/18, at 9-25. The record also shows that Appellant believed in September 2018, less than three months before he chose to plead guilty, that he had a viable challenge to the evidence against him on the grounds that police lacked probable cause and failed to obtain a warrant for the search of his hotel room. N.T., 9/7/18, at 20-21, 23-26.
Appellant did not allege in his PCRA petition that trial counsel gave him any subsequent advice that he should plead guilty because he was unlikely to succeed on appeal in suppressing the evidence. To the contrary, the only advice of counsel that Appellant claimed misled him concerning his guilty plea consisted of alleged representations concerning the sentence he would receive. Supplemental PCRA Petition at 1-3; Pro Se PCRA Petition at 4-5. Appellant does not contend in this appeal that counsel's alleged advice concerning his sentence constitutes grounds for reversing the trial court's dismissal of his PCRA.
Because the record is clear that Appellant's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing and that Appellant's right to seek suppression of the evidence against him had not been waived and was known to him when he chose to plead guilty, trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute grounds for PCRA relief. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Appellant's PCRA petition.Muhammad, 2021 WL 5983824, at *3-4.
This language comports with the clearly established federal standard for determining the voluntary nature of a guilty plea. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that the “long standing test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”) (internal quotations and sources omitted); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n. 7 (1969) (noting that a plea colloquy must “satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences”). Hence, the Superior Court did not apply a rule of law that is “contrary to . .. clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Nor was the Superior Court's adjudication an unreasonable application of the Federal standard or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 107 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2005). Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d), the appropriate inquiry is whether the Pennsylvania courts' application of the law “was objectively unreasonable, i.e., the state court decision, evaluated objectively and on the merits, resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified.” Werts, 228 F.3d at 204. In making this determination, questions of fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are “entitled to the presumption of correctness accorded state court factual findings.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35, (1992). A habeas petitioner can only rebut this presumption of correctness by presenting “clear and convincing” evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This is a “heavy burden” in the context of a guilty plea because “the representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Zilich v. Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that “[s]olemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity”).
Petitioner has failed to meet this heavy burden. As noted by the Superior Court, the government, at Petitioner's plea hearing, “set forth the factual basis for the plea, the nature of the two charges to which Appellant was pleading guilty, the maximum possible sentences for those charges, and the nature of the plea agreement, and Appellant stated that he understood the charges, the plea agreement, and the maximum sentence that he could receive.” Muhammad, 2021 WL 5983824, at *3. Petitioner was “also advised of his right to a jury trial and the presumption of innocence, that he was giving up those rights by pleading guilty, and that the plea court had the power to deviate from any recommended sentence.” Id. Petitioner then “confirmed his understanding of those rights and that information” before pleading guilty. Id. The Superior Court's conclusion that this decision was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary was not an “unreasonable” determination within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2).
In addition to addressing the overall voluntariness of Petitioner's guilty plea, the Superior Court considered and rejected Petitioner's specific claim that counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress deprived him of the ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. As the Superior Court noted, Petitioner's claim that he “was forced to plead guilty by waiver of the suppression issue or lack of awareness of this issue” was “contradicted by the record.” Muhammad, 2021 WL 5983824, at *3. Rather, a review of the underlying proceedings revealed “that a motion to suppress was in fact filed by [Petitioner] when he was acting pro se" and, consequently, the right to seek suppression “had not been waived and was known to him when he chose to plead guilty.” Id. at *3-4. Accepting these factual findings as true, the Superior Court's conclusion that “trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness for failure to file a motion to suppress [did] not constitute grounds for PCRA relief' was not an unreasonable application of the facts or law.
Critically, this conclusion precludes further analysis of Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim. As our Court of Appeals has explained:
Courts have long understood a guilty plea to be “a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil intent imputed to the defendant.” Class v. United States, __U.S.__, 138 S.Ct. 798, 804, 200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869)). Inherent in this confession is the defendant's relinquishment of “not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 805
(quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). As relevant here, an unconditional “valid guilty plea ‘results in the defendant's loss of any meaningful opportunity he might otherwise have had to challenge the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.'” Id. (quoting Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983)). This rule is founded on the “simpl[e] recognition] that when a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the validity of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth Amendment violation because the conviction does not rest in any way on evidence that may have been improperly seized.” Haring, 462 U.S. at 321. Instead, the defendant who pleads guilty “is convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the crime charged against him.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 (1970). The basis for Porter's conviction is thus his solemn and unconditional confession of guilt-not the constitutionality of the search that discovered the cocaine base in his duffel bag.United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal citations truncated). Because Petitioner's claim that certain evidence was inadmissible is one that could have been “raised and ‘cured' before trial,” Petitioner's guilty plea precludes him from challenging that evidence on habeas review. Id. at 230.
For the foregoing reasons, the Superior Court's decision did not contradict or unreasonably apply United States Supreme Court precedent or rely on an unreasonable determination of the facts or law. Accordingly, no habeas relief is warranted.
D. Certificate of Appealability
A certificate of appealability should be issued only when a petitioner has made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c)(2). Where the district court has rejected a constitutional claim on its merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, “a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Here, the Court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claim should be denied for the reasons given herein. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
III. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).