Opinion
Civil No. 3:03-CV-1726-H.
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Dismissal, filed March 11, 2005, and Defendant's Response, filed March 29, 2005. The Court directed Plaintiff to brief why his complaint should not be dismissed. The Court now reconsiders its Memorandum Opinion and Order, entered November 29, 2004, in light of its Memorandum Opinion and Order, entered February 23, 2005. Specifically the Court now considers the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant to determine if Defendant is Plaintiff's employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 ("Title VII") as a matter of law.
As a matter of procedure, both parties have argued and briefed whether Plaintiff's case should be dismissed. ( See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, filed Aug. 20, 2004; Pl.'s Resp., filed Sep. 13, 2004; Def.'s Reply filed, Sep. 28, 2004; and Mem. Op. and Order, entered Nov. 29, 2004; see also Pl.'s 3d Mot. to Am. Compl., filed Nov. 1, 2004; Def.'s Resp., filed Nov. 17, 2004; and Mem. Op. and Order, entered Feb. 23, 2005.)
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges that he was employed, as a felony probation officer, by Defendant Dallas County Community Supervision and Corrections Department ("DCCSCD") (Pl.'s Compl. at 3, 4.) Plaintiff alleges racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. ( Id. at 1, 4.)
On November 1, 2004, Plaintiff filed his Third Motion to Amend Complaint. While Plaintiff's Third Motion was pending, the Court ruled on DCCSCD's Motion to Dismiss, filed August 20, 2004. (Mem. Op. and Order, entered Nov. 29, 2004, ("November 29th Opinion".) In considering Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Court reviewed the record in its entirety and the applicable law. ( See Mem. Op. and Order, entered February 23, 2005.) The Court denied Plaintiff's motion on jurisdictional grounds for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies as against the proposed defendants District Judges of the Judicial District comprising Dallas County ("District Judges"). ( See id. at 6, 10.) In analyzing the employment relationship between Plaintiff and the District Judges the Court noted "that there may be substantial merit [to DCCSCD]'s argument that the District Judges may in fact be Plaintiff's Title VII employer." ( Id. at 6 n. 5 (citing Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4).) The Court now reconsiders whether, contrary to its November 29th Opinion, the District Judges or the DCCSCD are Plaintiff's Title VII employer.
In analyzing whether Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint was sufficient to survive DCCSCD's Motion, the Court determined that
[u]nder Oden[ v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2001)], "[f]ederal law controls whether a person is an employer under Title VII[.]" Id., 246 F.3d at 465 (citing Calderon v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir. Unit B Mar. 1981) ("[A] plaintiff's status as an employee under Title VII is a question of federal, rather than of state, law; it is to be ascertained through consideration of the statutory language of the Act, its legislative history, existing federal case law, and the particular circumstances of the case at hand.")), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 948 (2001); see Clark v. Tarrant County, Texas, 798 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1986); Teneyuca v. Bexar County, 767 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1985).
( Id. at 3-4.) The Court acknowledged that "[p]art of the process in determining whether a defendant is an employer under Title VII is to analyze the employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant." ( Id. at 9 (citing Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas, 5 F.3d 117, 118 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted).) The Court noted that "for the purposes of the [then pending] motion only, . . . DCCSCD is Plaintiff's employer." ( Id. at 9 n. 9 (emphasis added).) Existing federal case law controls the issue of whether DCCSCD is Plaintiff's Title VII employer.
Denying Defendant's Motion, the Court held, "looking merely to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint, which are presumed to be true, . . . that the jurisdictional allegations [were] sufficient . . . to survive DCCSCD's [Rule 12(b)(1)] jurisdictional attack." (Mem. Op. and Order, entered Nov. 29, 2004, at 4, 5 (citing Patterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[I]f the defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true. If those jurisdictional allegations are sufficient the complaint stands.").)
II. Analysis
Plaintiff's cause of action is not novel to the Fifth Circuit or to this Court. On two other occasions the federal courts have analyzed a plaintiff-probation officer's employment discrimination claims against his employer. See Shore v. Howard, 414 F.Supp. 379 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Clark v. Tarrant County, Tex., 608 F.Supp. 209 (N.D. Tex. 1985) rev'd in part on other grounds by 798 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1986).
At issue in Shore was whether Defendant Karl Howard, sued in his official capacity as the Director of the Tarrant County Adult Probation Office, was the proper party defendant. Shore, 414 F.Supp. at 384-85. The court ruled that "the Criminal and District Judges of Tarrant County, Texas, are necessary parties defendant to this action. . . . Any actions by Defendant Howard in his official capacity would be as an agent for the Judges." Id.
Shore analyzed Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12 and the statute creating the Tarrant County Adult Probation Department. See Shore, 414 F.Supp. 379. The current statutes governing County Community Supervision and Corrections Departments and creating Plaintiff's position are Texas Government Code §§ 76.001-76.018 and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12. TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 76.001-.018 (West 2005); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (West 2005).
In Clark, "former . . . employees of the Tarrant County Adult Probation Department ("Adult Probation"), brought . . . suit under Title VII . . . and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Adult Probation and Tarrant County, Texas." Clark, 798 F.2d at 738. Among the district court's findings affirmed by the Circuit are the following facts:
the adult probation offices which exist in Texas are under the direct supervision of the state judiciary. State district judges are responsible for running the [Tarrant County Adult Probation Department] and the salaries of the probation officers are paid from the funds of the state judicial district. Chief probation officers are appointed by district judges. The chief probation officers then, pending the approval of their district judge, appoint the other probation officers.Clark, 608 F.Supp. at 211; see Clark, 798 F.2d at 746 ("Adult Probation was created and governed by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, and that under article 42.12 the state judges had direct supervision and control over the probation officers.").
Strikingly similar to Plaintiff's Brief, the Clark probation officers argued that "the evidence produced . . . was sufficient to show such an entanglement between the County and Adult Probation that the County should be held responsible for Adult Probation's discriminatory action." Clark, 798 F.2d at 746. ( See Pl.'s Br. at 3-5.) In responding to the argument, the Fifth Circuit held that:
While the status of an employee is a question of federal law in determining a Title VII claim, state law is relevant in describing the duties and supervision of the employees. Teneyuca, supra, at 150. Texas case law holds that . . . the authority to appoint and set salaries for probation officers is the prerogative of the state judges, Commissioners Court of Lubbock County v. Martin, 471 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Civ.App. — Lubbock 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) . . . The district court correctly determined as a matter of law that since [defendant] did not set salaries nor influence promotion decisions, appellant [probation officers] did not state a claim.Id. at 747-48.
Although not in the context of a probation officer versus probation department case, Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 2001), is also instructive. In Oden, the Fifth Circuit examined the parties' employment relationship and determined the defendant's status by reference to state law. Id. Oden did so despite the fact that Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex., 5 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993) urges application of the Circuit's "hybrid economic realities/common law control test." Deal and Oden therefore instruct that courts should look first to federal law, but if a court is unable to determine a defendant's status as an employer, the courts may turn to state law to resolve the matter. See id.; Oden, 246 F.3d 458. In the instant case, under existing federal case law the Court is able to determine DCCSCD's status as Plaintiff's employer.
"The right to control an employee's conduct is the most important component of [the hybrid economic realities/common law control] test." Deal, 5 F.3d at 119. The focus of the common law control component is "whether the alleged employer had the right to hire and fire, the right to supervise, the right to set the work schedule . . . The economic realities component . . . focuse[s] on whether the alleged employer paid the employee's salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment." Id.
Federal courts have ruled that in a Title VII suit by a probation officer such as Plaintiff, his employer is the District Judges. Shore, 414 F.Supp. 379; see Clark, 798 F.2d 736. Therefore under Oden, Shore, and Clark, the Court need not invoke the "hybrid economic realities/common law control test" or resort to state law to analyze Plaintiff and DCCSCD's employment relationship. See Oden, 246 F.3d 458; Shore, 414 F.Supp. 379; Clark, 798 F.2d 736. Pursuant to Shore and Clark, DCCSCD is not Plaintiff's employer for Title VII purposes. See Shore, 414 F.Supp. 379; Clark, 798 F.2d 736.
The Court notes that the Texas Court of Appeals explicitly held "that it is the district judges of the judicial district, and not HCCSCD, that is the employer of [adult probation officers] Sullivan and Broughton." Hardin County Community Supervision and Corrections Department v. Sullivan, 106 S.W.3d 186 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 76.002(a)(1), (2)).
Plaintiff argues and presents facts supporting his subjective belief that DCCSD is his employer. (Pl.'s Br. at 5-8; Pl.'s App. A-M.) In light of existing federal law, however, Plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Cornish v. Correctional Services Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 540047 at *2 (5th Cir. 2005). The Court holds that because he has filed a Title VII suit against an entity that is not his employer, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
III. Conclusion
The Court exercises its power to re-examine its previous ruling and reverse itself. Therefore the Court overturns that portion of its November 29th Opinion, which indicates that "[t]he Court cannot conclude that DCCSCD is not Plainitff's employer, as a matter of law." (Mem. Op. and Order at 4-5.) The Court, upon further review, now finds that Defendant Dallas County Community Supervision and Corrections Department is not Plaintiff Ibn Zakariya Muhammad's Title VII employer as a matter of law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. There being no remaining claims, Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. The Court will enter judgment accordingly.
SO ORDERED.