Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 134, Comment b, at 371 (1971). In the case of Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 435, 454 N.E.2d 754, the court stated that in Illinois a "forum will apply its own local law in determining which party has the burden of persuading the trier of fact on a particular issue unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule of the state of the otherwise applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the conduct of the trial." At the time the Mudd case was decided, the Indiana rule placed the burden of proving contributory negligence upon the defendant.

We note, however, that our courts have held that nonpercentage-specific interrogatories about plaintiff's contributory negligence are a proper check on a general verdict. See generally Santos v. Chicago Transit Authority, 198 Ill. App.3d 866, 556 N.E.2d 607 (1990): Bernardi v. Chicago Steel Container Corp., 187 Ill. App.3d 1010, 543 N.E.2d 1004 (1989); Mudd v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 454 N.E.2d 754 (1983). In Mudd, for example, this court approved a similar interrogatory, which read: "`Do you find that plaintiff was, before and at the time of the occurrence, exercising ordinary care for his own safety so as to avoid proximately causing himself injury?'" Mudd, 118 Ill. App.3d at 437, 454 N.E.2d at 758.

However, the mere mention of insurance or the lack thereof does not mandate reversal. (See Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 442, 454 N.E.2d 754, 762.) In Mudd, plaintiff claimed a defense attorney prejudiced him by implying one defendant had no insurance to pay a claim.

Special interrogatory No. 2 was properly given on the question of Bernardi's contributory negligence. A special interrogatory must be given when it is in proper form and relates to an ultimate issue of fact. ( Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 454 N.E.2d 754.) In particular, the trial court must give a special interrogatory submitted by the defendant in proper form on the question of contributory negligence. ( Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc., 118 Ill. App.3d at 437, 454 N.E.2d 754.

Plaintiff is correct that in Illinois, “an agent is competent to testify as to his agency or authority, [but] the fact of agency or authority, when disputed or denied, must ordinarily be established by evidence of the acts or conduct of the principal or [her] statements to the agent or third persons.” Mudd by Mudd v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 754, 761 (Ill.App.Ct. 1983) (internal citation omitted). [See dkt. 98 at 11.]

Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Special Interrogatory No. 5 was impermissibly compound for the jury where the concepts of negligence and proximate cause were adequately explained in the jury instructions and not used to reinstruct the jury. See Mudd v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d 431, 438 (1983) (court determined that the special interrogatory, read together with two jury instructions defining negligence and ordinary care, gave a proper statement to the jury on the law of contributory negligence).¶ 36 Next, we address whether Special Interrogatory No. 5 would have tested the general verdict.

” Zois v. Piniarski, 107 Ill.App.3d at 652, 63 Ill.Dec. 329, 437 N.E.2d 1251. Special interrogatories should “be considered together and in light of other instructions of the court.” Mudd v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 118 Ill.App.3d 431, 438, 73 Ill.Dec. 657, 454 N.E.2d 754 (1983). ¶ 41 Hayes proposed three special interrogatories, though, in his posttrial motion, Hayes only objected to the refusal of the second one. Accordingly, we find he forfeited his claims regarding the first and third interrogatories.

It is not the conduct or words of the apparent agent that create an apparent agency, but rather, the words or conduct of the apparent principal. (See Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 440, 454 N.E.2d 754 ("The law is well settled in Illinois that an agent cannot confer power on himself and his agency or authority cannot be established by showing what he said or did").) We note with regard to this issue, however, that counsel did not make a prompt objection to counsel's comments.

We have no quarrel with defendant's proposition that the meaning of an instruction should be gleaned in light of how and in what sense ordinary men acting as jurors, considering the evidence and circumstances presented to them at trial, will understand the instruction. (See Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 439.) We do not, however, agree with defendant's conclusion regarding the ordinary juror's understanding of the instruction involved here.

Recent decisions which have found proper a special interrogatory concerning the plaintiff's contributory or comparative negligence involved interrogatories that did not assume that the plaintiff had been negligent. (See Santos, 198 Ill. App.3d at 868-70 (interrogatory asked "Was there contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff before and at the time of the occurrence which was the sole proximate cause of his injuries?"); see also Bernardi v. Chicago Steel Container Corp. (1989), 187 Ill. App.3d 1010, 1019-21, 534 N.E.2d 1004 (interrogatory asked whether plaintiff "was exercising ordinary care for his own safety as to avoid proximately causing himself injury"); Mudd v. Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 431, 437-38, 454 N.E.2d 754 (interrogatory asked whether plaintiff "was, before and at the time of the occurrence, exercising ordinary care for his own safety so as to avoid proximately causing himself injury").) Because the defendant's interrogatory No. 3 did not ask the jury whether it had found that plaintiff was comparatively negligent, but rather assumed that the jury had found the plaintiff comparatively negligent, we determine that the special interrogatory was properly refused by the trial court.