Opinion
No. 05-08-00888-CV
Opinion Filed September 3, 2009.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 08-05074-B.
Before Chief Justice THOMAS and Justices LANG and LANG-MIERS.
Opinion By Justice LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Cindy Montgomery, appeals the default judgment against her and in favor of Chase Home Finance, LLC, appellee. In a single issue, Montgomery contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because she was not personally served, nor did she appear in the county court at law. Chase responds that Montgomery should be deemed to have answered in the county court at law because she filed an appeal bond with the Dallas County Clerk. We conclude the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Montgomery. Because all dispositive issues are well settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 16, 2008, Chase Home Finance filed an original petition in the justice of the peace court for forcible detainer against Fernando Arzola and all other occupants, of which one was Montgomery. On May 19, 2008, one copy of the citation was served on Arzola and all occupants by leaving the citation with Montgomery. Defendants did not answer and the Justice of the Peace signed a default judgment against them on May 28, 2008.
On June 6, 2008, Arzola and Montgomery filed an appeal bond with the Dallas County Clerk, thereby perfecting an appeal from the justice court. The appeal was assigned to Dallas County Court at Law No. 2 and the case was tried on June 24, 2008. It is unclear from the record whether any defendant appeared in court on June 24, but Montgomery claims that she did not. The trial court's judgment dated June 24, 2008 awarded possession of the contested premises to Chase Home Finance. Montgomery filed timely notice of appeal.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION A. Standard of Review
Personal jurisdiction is a question of law. Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 (Tex. 2009). We review questions of law de novo on appeal. Id.
B. Applicable Law
After the justice court has signed a judgment in a forcible entry and detainer action, a party may obtain a trial de novo in the county court at law by filing an appeal bond. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 749, 751. An appeal bond operates as an answer and appearance in a county court at law and gives that court jurisdiction "completely and absolutely as though [the defendant] had appeared and answered in the justice court." Hairston Peters v. S. Pac. Ry. Co., 94 S.W. 1078, 1078 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1906, no writ); see also Advance Imports, Inc. v. Gibson Prods. Co. of Sherman, 533 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (same). When a defendant is deemed to have answered and appeared in court, she waives all complaints as to defects in the service of process. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120, 121; Phillips v. Dallas County Protective Servs. Unit, 197 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. denied), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 405 (2007).
C. Application of Law to the Facts
Because Montgomery filed an appeal bond with the Dallas County Clerk on June 6, 2008, she is deemed to have answered and appeared and has consented to the jurisdiction of that court "completely and absolutely." Hairston Peters, 94 S.W. at 1078; see also Advance Imports, Inc., 533 S.W.2d at 171. Her appearance constitutes a waiver of all complaints as to defects in the service of process. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120, 121; Phillips, 197 S.W.3d at 865. We decide Montgomery's sole issue against her.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial had personal jurisdiction over Montgomery. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.