Contrary to Movant's assertions, there is no provision of the CPL that limits the power of a District Attorney to subpoena only individuals who can authenticate the evidence they are compelled to bring or produce to the Grand Jury. Such narrow reading of CPL ยง 190 .50(2) is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent, the function of the District Attorney, and a plain reading of other relevant sections of the CPL which provide for and contemplate subpoenaed evidence to be obtained by a District Attorney for and on behalf of a Grand Jury. See In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, Dated December 28, 1992, 157 Misc.2d 432, 441 (Sup Ct ., New York Co.1993)(subpoenaed evidence can be authenticated by someone else). Article 610, et seq., of the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the methods of securing attendance of witnesses by subpoena and the definitions related thereto.
Second, the Supreme Court sealing order does not apply to the business records of SLS, even if those records ultimately also ended up as exhibits in the OMH hearings. See generally United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976) (attorney-client privilege does not extend to otherwise unprivileged business records merely because they were then turned over to counsel); In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 157 Misc.2d 432, 435, 597 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1993); Matter of Bekins Storage Co., 118 Misc.2d 173, 180, 460 N.Y.S.2d 684, 691 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1983) (citing Jones v. Reilly, 12 Bedell 97, 105, 174 N.Y. 97, 66 N.E. 649 (1903)), mod. on other grounds, 94 A.D.2d 643, 463 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 324, 465 N.E.2d 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1984). See also Matter of Vanderbilt, 57 N.Y.2d 66, 76, 439 N.E.2d 378, 453 N.Y.S.2d 662, 668 (1982) (test of privilege is whether document was protected when in the client's possession, not attorney's).